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ABSTRACT 
Key Words: Risk, Hazard, Explosion, Explosives, Accidents, 
Transport, Injury, Damage. 
A study was made of the hazard presented by, and the 
risks associated with, the road and rail transport of 
conventional explosives. 
Its purpose was firstly to review the 
transport environments associated with the 
hazardous goods and in particular conventional 
accident and 
carriage of 
explosives. 
Secondly, to identify and assess those stimuli present in 
transport and accident environments which are liable to 
cause accidental initiation of explosives. Thirdly, to 
identify explosion consequence models suitable for the 
assessment of injury and damage suffered by roadside and 
railside populations as a result of explosion. Finally, to 
apply and develop a risk assessment methodology capable of 
identifying, quantifying, evaluating and monitoring 
individual and societal risks. 
The study formulates a basic methodology for the 
assessment of transient hazards and more specifically, a 
methodology suitable for quantitative risk assessment of 
the road and rail transport of conventional commercial and 
military explosives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study assesses the hazard of, and the risks from, 
the transport of conventional commercial and military 
explosives by road and rail. The aim of the study is to 
1 . review the 
associated 
explosives, 
accident 
with the 
and transport 
carriage of 
environments 
conventional 
2. assess the sensitivity of explosives to accidental 
initiation and identify those initiation stimuli and 
accident/transport environments liable to introduce 
and cause accidental initiation, 
3. describe and determine a methodology from which 
a. potential incidents can be assessed and 
quantified, 
b. explosion consequences can be quantified and 
evaluated, 
c. risks can be assessed, monitored and evaluated 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Data and discussion on both the road and rail accident 
and transport environments are given in Part A. Accidents, 
fires and explosives movements are reviewed together with 
historical events/incidents providing a complete appraisal 
of the environment under which explosives are conveyed. In 
addition, Appendix A reviews the regulations and laws 
governing the transport of explosives, and Appendix B 
details a number of historical accidents on both the roads 
and railways. 
1 
The sensitivity of explosives to a number of stimuli is 
addressed in Part B. Sensitivity and stimuli are discussed 
in relation to accidental initiation. Conditions conducive 
to accidental initiation, stimuli most likely to cause 
initiation and those explosives most vulnerable to 
initiation are identified. 
Part C details the methodology developed for the 
assessment of the risks arising from the transport of 
explosives by road and rail (the general principles of the 
methodology are also applicable to the assessment of other 
hazardous goods). The methodology catalogues the essential 
items and data needed for such a risk assessment, together 
with a means by which data can be classified for ease of 
analysis and assessment. Incident sequence identification 
and quantification are detailed for fire and non-fire 
incidents and a number of illustrative examples given. 
Various means of evaluating explosion consequences are 
discussed and illustrated for blast, missile and thermal 
damage. The problems of estimating the numbers of 
individuals exposed to transport hazards are examined, and 
those most at risk identified. The difficulties in 
producing consequence evaluation models are discussed and a 
model suitable for transport environments and condensed 
phase explosions identified. 
An overview of risk assessment is given in Part D. 
Historical background together with studies of particular 
interest is discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of 
risk assessment studies are detailed. A discussion is given 
on the acceptability of risks, means of expression and 
assessment sensitivity. In addition, a means of monitoring 
risk is identified in the form of hazard warning structure, 
and the merits and use of this system detailed with 
illustrative examples. 
2 
Application of the risk assessment methodology is 
demonstrated in Part E. Two illustrative examples are 
given, primarily in a simple delineative manner, thereby 
providing a guide to the identification and quantification 
of accidents liable to cause explosion, the quantification 
of explosion effects, monitoring of risks and sensitivity 
assessment. 
Finally, 
suitability 
a number of broad conclusions on 
of the methodology developed, and 
the 
the 
assessment of transport hazards (road and rail) is drawn, 
together with a number of recommendations for further work. 
3 
PART A 
2.0 THE RISKS OF EXPLOSIVES TRANSPORT 
The risks from the processing and storage of hazardous 
materials at fixed installations are well documented and 
have been studied, assessed and quantified over the past 
decade in varying degrees of depth and approach. In 
comparison, less attention has been given to the risks from 
the transport of hazardous materials. However, the risks 
from transport operations have been acknowledged as 
requiring detailed assessment. The Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) voiced there concern during the late 
1970's culminating in the approval of recommendations by 
the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances (ACDS) to 
"[explore] the possibility of major hazard 
implications in the transportation of certain 
hazardous substances"! 
Subsequently the HSC through the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) have instigated programs into the 
assessment of risks from the transport of hazardous 
materials. Quantified risk assessments are currently being 
undertaken by the ACDS sub-committee on major hazard 
aspects of the transport of dangerous substances2 (1986 
to-date). Similar work, specifically for the hazard of 
transporting military explosives, is also being conducted 
for the Ministry of Defence by the Plant Engineering Group 
at The University of Technology, Loughborough. 
4 
It is thought here that the reason for delay in the 
assessment of transient risks is a combination of 
a. attention being focused on fixed installations as a 
result of incidents, such as Flixborough in 1974, 
b. the absence of major incidents on roads and railways 
in the UK. 
There are of course other contributing factors. 
Historically the public have expressed little concern over 
the transport of hazardous materials. Only recently, as a 
result of pressure group activities, has public perception 
of transient risks been stirred enough to question the 
safety of transporting hazardous goods. Furthermore, 
individual risks to members of the public from hazardous 
transport operations tend to be much lower than those from 
fixed installations. This is due in part to the inherent 
mitigating feature associated with transient hazards, 
namely, that an accident has a certain likelihood of 
occurring at any point along a transport route. In 
addition, individual risks are low compared with societal 
risks. This can be illustrated by a simple example. 
Consider a shopping complex exposed to a transient hazard. 
During the daytime the complex is full of individuals 
exposed to the hazard. However, the majority of individuals 
only spend a fraction of the exposed day at the complex. 
Thus, although a· sizeable population is continually 
exposed, individual exposure is low. As a consequence of 
the continual change in the individuals forming the exposed 
population, it is apparent that individual risks to members 
of the public are low compared with societal risks. 
5 
The 
hazardous 
occurring 
by data 
number of deaths resulting 
goods is said to be 
at fixed installations3. 
from the transport of 
comparable with those 
This fact is supported 
collected by Kletz and Turner4 over a ten year 
period between 1970 and 1979. During this time 2486 
fatalities were recorded world-wide as being associated 
with the oil and chemical industries. Over 40% of the total 
were associated with the transport of oil and chemical 
products. It is estimated here that between 2% and 3% of 
all world-wide transport accidents occur in the UK. The 
majority of the fatalities, it is assumed, are due to 
loading/unloading operations3 with the remainder resulting 
from traffic accidents. 
2.1 Road Transport 
At any one time there are between 400,000 and 450,000 
heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) legally registered in Great 
Britain. The population of HGVs by the end of 1986 totalled 
435,000. It is estimated here that just over 1% of HGVs are 
designed to carry hazardous goods3. For the year 1986 this 
provides a total of 4785 such vehicles. Assuming these 
vehicles to be as accident prone as other HGVs, then during 
a typical year, such as 1986, we could expect approximately 
150 injury accidents. From available literature it is 
apparent that HGVs designed specifically for the carriage 
of hazardous goods are less likely to be involved in 
accidents than other HGVs. This point is supported by 
factual data; between the years 1968 and 1976 only 19 
fatalities were recorded in the UK as being associated with 
vehicles conveying hazardous chemicals3. Statistics 
published by the Department of Transport5 illustrate that 
HGVs have a much lower rate of accident involvement than 
private motor cars. It follows that HGVs conveying 
6 
hazardous goods are likely to have an even lower accident 
rate. Some of the reasons for this are thought to result 
from the high standards of maintenance of such vehicles 
compared with other HGVs, regular vehicle inspections and 
the fact that drivers are specially trained not only to be 
proficient in driving but also to be aware of the risks 
involved in hazardous transport. A discussion on this topic 
is given by Withers3. He suggests that an accident rate of 
0.25 x 10-6 accidents per mile which corresponds to 0.16 x 
10-6 accidents per km is a good estimate for the transport 
of hazardous goods by road. This accident rate is 
approximately four times lower than the national HGV 
accident rate derived by the author (see Chapter 3.0, 
Section 3.1.1). It· is suggested here that the general 
accident rate for HGVs conveying hazardous materials lies 
somewhere between 0.10 x 10-6 and 0.30 x 10-6 accidents per 
km. Assuming HGVs transporting hazardous materials travel 
250 million km per year (i.e. approximately 1% of annual 
distance travelled by all HGVs) then the estimated range 
given here provides no more than about 75 injury accidents 
per year. This compares with 80 injury accidents per .year 
estimated by Kletz6. The ratio of fatalities to all injury 
accidents 7 varies from between 0.018:1 and 0.025:1. As a 
consequence of this we could expect between 0.5 and 2 
fatalities per year from the transport of hazardous goods. 
This estimate compares well with the rate of 2 fatalities 
per year suggested by Withers3. From data collected on 
fatal accidents involving the road transport of hazardous 
chemicals over a 13 year period from 1970 to 1982 Kletz6 
derives a figure of 1.2 fatalities per year. Unlike the 
figures derived by Withers and the author this figure 
excludes "ordinary road deaths". Only those fatalities 
where the load contributes in some way·towards death are 
recorded by Kletz. 
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From the data given above it is suggested here that the 
majority of fatalities from the transport of hazardous 
materials are not attributable to the loads conveyed. 
However, as the remainder of this section illustrates large 
numbers of deaths, as a consequence of hazardous loads, 
have a likelihood of occurring in Great Britain as they 
have done in other industrialised countries. 
The most horrific accident to-date involving the 
transport of hazardous goods occurred in Spain on 11 July 
1978 near San Carlos de la Rapita. A tanker conveying 22000 
litres (23.5 te) of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) developed a 
severe leak which resulted in the loss of large quantities 
of propylene. The ambient temperature on the day of the 
accident was reputed to be 28°C and this led to the rapid 
vaporisation of the liquid resulting in the formation of a 
dense cloud. Since propylene is heavier than air the cloud 
hugged the ground and was elongated over a distance of 300 
m in the windward direction. Shortly after formation the 
gas cloud ignited and a violent explosion occurred. The cab 
was thrown over 100 m in one direction with the tanker 
shell breaking up into several pieces scattered some 75 m 
in the opposite direction. The blast appeared to go in an 
upward and windward direction. This is supported by the 
fact that a single storey building 75 m from the centre of 
the blast was completely demolished, whereas, a motorcycle 
some 20 m in the opposite direction was still standing, 
although burnt-out. Unfortunately the incident occurred on 
a coastal road alongside a busy campsite filled with 
holiday makers. Over 100 people were killed instantly from 
the direct effects of blast and/or radiation and a further 
180 were burned, 
bringing the final 
some so badly that 
death toll to 2158. 
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they later died 
It has been remarked upon by Marshall8 that no vapour 
cloud explosion occurred at San Carlos. All blast damage 
resulted from hydraulic tank rupture and a number of small 
explosions as a result of gas penetration within buildings. 
Consequently, Marshal! claims that a number of individuals 
probably died from cryogenic shock following LPG contact. 
Regardless of whether the incident was a vapour cloud 
explosion or simply a hydraulic rupture the root cause of 
the accident is still unclear. However, it is thought that 
the 10 mm tank shell failed due to a combination of metal 
fatigue 
incident 
account 
and excessive internal pressure. Whether 
could occur in the UK is debatable. 
of the disaster clearly indicates 
such an 
Stintons9 
that he 
personally is convinced that such an incident could occur. 
He cites that tankers in the UK are of similar construction 
and that similar transport codes are enforced. However, the 
inquiry found that the tanker had been over-filled by some 
3% and that the pressure relief valves had been 
deactivated. In addition, the tanker had previously been 
used for the carriage of ammonia (hence the blocking off of 
the relief valves) which can cause embrittlement in certain 
metals and therefore increase the likelihood of fracture. 
These additional circumstances almost certainly aided the 
incidents occurrence and clearly indicate a poor compliance 
with the relevant transport regulations. It is suggested 
here that in the UK transport regulations are much 
strictly enforced and adhered to, and therefore, 
attributing factors outlined above are less likely 
occur. This point is supported by the safety record in 
UK compared with other European countries6. 
more 
the 
to 
the 
Only three serious incidents involving the road 
transport of LPG have occurred in the UK to-date, resulting 
in 2 fatalities. Both fatalities were associated with the 
incident at Hull in 1970. A flat bed truck conveying a 
pressurised vessel of LPG collided with brick work at the 
9 
entrance to a road tunnel resulting in the loss of propane 
and ultimately its ignition. The other two incidents both 
involved road tankers which is the usual way of 
transporting liquefied gases. During 1957 a road tanker 
filled with vinyl chloride was punctured. Fortunately the 
escaping liquid did not ignite and no one was injured. The 
third incident occurred in Aberdeen in the winter of 1974. 
A BOC road tanker loaded with 16000 litres of LPG collided 
with a motor car causing a large spillage of butane. Due to 
the freezing weather conditions only a small amount of the 
butane vaporised. However, ignition did occur but 
fortunately no injuries were sustained. It is apparent from 
the Spanish disaster described previously, that if the 
temperature on the day .of the accident had been higher 
(i.e. occurred during the summer) the consequences could 
have been much worse. 
As far as the transport of commercial/military 
explosives is concerned four serious incidents in the UK 
have been identified (after 1946). The first occurred on 12 
October 1957 when a lorry conveying 3.5 tons of 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) caught fire causing its load to 
ignite and ultimately explode. The explosion occurred on 
the main Brecon to Abergaveny road and left a crater 15 ft 
deep and 42 ft wide. Fortunately no one was. injured 
although two nearby cottages were damaged. The other three 
incidents all occurred during the 1980's. Both.incidents on 
15 September 1981 and 13 December 1982 involved military 
explosives. No explosion occurred in either incident and no 
casualties were sustained. However, both were serious 
enough to warrant exclusion zones during 
operations 
personnel 
and the attendance of emergency 
and/or explosives experts. The first 
"clear-up" 
service 
military 
incident closed 15 miles of the M4 motorway in Berkshire 
for 8 hours when a defective HGV brake drum overheated 
causing the engulfment of USAF "cluster bombs". In 
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comparison, the second military incident involved the 
collision of an RAF HGV, laden with air-to-surface 
missiles, with a commercial HGV on the A17 in Lincolnshire. 
The road was closed for 6 hours. However, by far the worst 
incident, in terms of casualties and damage, involved 
commercial explosives. On the 22 March 1989 at Fengate 
Industrial Estate, Peterborough, a 7.5 ton HGV laden with 
approximately 750 kg of commercial explosives caught fire 
causing its load to ignite and consequently explode. 
Surrounding buildings and vehicles were severely damaged 
and over 80 people injured. Unfortunately 1 fireman was 
killed. 
The incidents described above, especially San Carlos 
1978 and the explosion at Peterborough in 1989, highlight 
the hazard of transporting hazardous materials and the 
potential such operations have to inflict damage, injury 
and death. This study is primarily concerned with the 
transport of explosives and therefore incidents involving 
commercial and military explosives are detailed further in 
Appendix B. 
Although the safety record in the UK, for the transport 
of hazardous goods compares favourably with other 
industrialised countries there are no grounds for 
complacency. It is apparent that multiple fatality 
incidents could occur in the UK as they have in the United 
States and many European countries. This view is supported 
by numerous authors3,6,9. However, in addition to the 
incidents described here, the most damning evidence that 
such incidents could arise has been provided by the police 
force10. During the spring of 1985 various police forces 
throughout the UK conducted indiscriminate spot-checks on 
vehicles conveying hazardous goods. It was found that a 
third of the vehicles inspected were in breach of the 
11 
Dangerous Substances (Conveyance by Road in Road Tankers 
and Tank Containers) Regulations 1981. The HSE who acted as 
observers during the checks found that most of the breaches 
were of a minor nature. However, some were so serious that 
further travel was prohibited. Such action was mainly taken 
as a result of corroded or leaking tanks. It is clear from 
the survey that many road hauliers and their drivers were 
ignorant of the regulations or chose to disregard them, as 
was concluded by the HSE. 
2.2 Rail Transport 
During 1986, which was a typical year on British 
railways, freight trains were involved in 324 accidents at 
a rate of 6.0 x 10-6 accidents per km. The author has 
estimated that the rate of "severe" accidents for freight 
trains is between 0.5 x 10-6 accidents per km and 0.7 x 
10-6 accidents per km. A "severe" accident is classed here 
as an accident involving death, serious injury and/or 
extensive damage. The severe accident rate is based on a 
study, conducted by the author, of over 180 railway 
accident reports detailed by the Railway Inspectorate. 
Results from the study are discussed in chapter 4.0. It is 
estimated from the study that freight trains transporting 
hazardous goods account for between 15% and 30% of all 
severe freight train accidents, resulting in approximately 
4 to 11 severe accidents per year. This estimate assumes 
that freight trains conveying hazardous goods are as likely ~ 
to be involved in severe accidents as other freight trains. 
From the small number of accidents involving hazardous 
loads it can be argued that freight trains loaded with 
hazardous goods are less likely to be involved in severe 
rail accidents than freight trains 
goods. However, there is little 
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conveying 
data to 
non-hazardous 
support this 
argument and help quantify a scale of reduction. The 
majority of supporting factors tend to be qualitative, such 
as, improved maintenance compared with other freight 
wagons, regular wagon inspections and the strict 
enforcement of regulations and safe working practices. 
One of the worst accidents to occur in the UK, in terms 
of injuries and fatalities, took place near Eccles, Greater 
Manchester, on 7 December 1984. A 15 wagon freight train 
loaded with 500 te of gas oil travelling between 10 mph and 
15 mph was hit in the rear by a passenger train at a speed 
of approximately 50 mph. The rear wagon was thrown across 
adjacent track by the force of the impact and both trains 
derailed 
wagons 
ignited. 
causing many coaches to overturn. Some of the 
ruptured spilling their contents which ultimately 
Unfortunately 3 people were killed in the 
collision and over 60 injured. 
In comparison, the derailment at 40 mph of a train 
laden with 835 te of petroleum spirit resulted in no 
fatalities or injuries although the local population had to 
be evacuated. The accident occurred on 20th December 1984 
at Summit Tunnel, West Yorkshire. Due to excessive freedom 
of movement, caused by axle-box failure, the wheel-set on 
the fourth wagon lifted and climbed the rails as the train 
entered the tunnel. As a consequence of this, derailment of 
the following wagons occurred causing some to overturn and 
puncture. Fortunately the train crew were able to scramble 
to safety before the petroleum vapour, which had escaped 
from punctured wagons, ignited. The subsequent fire was not 
considered under control until four days later and the line 
remained closed for 8 months. 
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Incidents in the United States, Canada and other 
European countries have been much worse than those 
described above. On 10 November 1979 a train consisting of 
a mixed consignment of 106 wagons and tankers derailed in 
an industrial area of Mississauga, Canada11 ,12. Fire ensued 
almost immediately from leaking propane tankers, 
accompanied some ten minutes later by multiple explosions. 
The explosions were so fierce that one of the rail cars was 
thrown over 500 m demolishing all in its path. Fortunately 
no one was killed and only minor injuries were sustained by 
the emergency services. However, the explosions were so 
violent, the fires so intense and more importantly the 
risks from chlorine so great, that in excess of 230,000 
people were evacuated from hospitals, hotels and private 
residences. The fire took 3 days to extinguish and the area 
was not considered safe until almost a week later. 
Obviously the emergency services were hampered in their 
operations due to the mixed consignment of the train, which 
included propane, butane, chlorine, caustic soda, styrene, 
toluene, furnace oil, terpolene and hydrochloric acid. As a 
result of this the fire services concentrated on containing 
the fire rather than extinguishing it, consequently vast 
amounts of specialised equipment brought to the scene were 
left unused. 
Many similar incidents have occurred throughout the 
United States and Europe resulting in multiple deaths and 
injuries. By far the worst in terms of casualties occurred 
at Ludwigshaven, Germany in 1948. A rail tank car ruptured 
alongside a dimethyl ether processing plant causing a large 
explosion which resulted in over 2000 injuries and 200 
deaths. On 25th January 1969 2 people were killed and 
almost 1000 injured when a train conveying LPG derailed at 
Laurel Mississippi, causing propane vapour to be released 
resulting in fire and explosion. 
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The United States National Transportation Safety Board 
reported in 19791 3 that between the years 1969 and 1978 56 
fatalities were associated with the rail transport of 
hazardous materials, a rate of 4.6 per year. It is 
estimated that for every 43 train accidents on British 
railways (including train fires) 1 fatality is incurred14 . 
Assuming that this fatality rate is the same regardless of 
train type, then it is estimated here that freight train 
accidents account for between 7 and 8 fatalities per year. 
Of these it is estimated that no more than about 2 are 
associated with freight trains conveying hazardous goods. 
As stated above, this estimate assumes that the number of 
fatalities per accident is the same regardless of train 
type. In reality, a large proportion of freight train 
accidents will be less severe and involve fewer individuals 
than say passenger train accidents. As a consequence of 
this it is suggested here that the number of fatalities 
from the transport of hazardous goods (on average) is less 
than 2 per year. 
It should be noted that British and American fatality 
rates are not strictly comparable. The United States permit 
r 
much Jarger quantities of hazardous goods to be conveyed 
per train load than British Rail, and the mixing of 
dangerous - goods is common with less segregation, causing 
incidents to be more severe. In addition, United States 
railroad track is considered to be in a poor state of 
repair6 and free shunting of tank cars persists (or did), 
although its use has caused many incidents. One such 
incident involved the puncture and subsequent explosion of 
a tanker laden with nitromethane killing 2 people in 1958. 
Furthermore, 
incorporate 
heavier and 
rail tankers used in the United States do not 
~uffers with coupling equipment, they are 
their centres of gravity higher. All these 
factors, it is assumed, account for the increased number 
and severity of rail accidents in the United States 
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compared with the UK. 
Unlike the conveyance of explosives by road, only two 
serious incidents have been identified for the conveyance 
of explosives by rail. Both incidents occurred at rail 
stations in built-up areas exposing large numbers of 
individuals. The first incident occurred at Chelmsford 
Station on 22 October 1969. A 27 wagon FT laden with more 
than 117 tons 
extensive track, 
of military explosives 
signalling and platform 
derailed causing 
damage. A hot axle 
box subsequently caught fire but was quickly extinguished. 
Both lines into the station were blocked and "clear-up" 
operations by the Armed Forces took over 7 hours to 
complete. The second incident occurred during the autumn of 
1987 at Parkway Station, Bristol. An FT collided with 
another FT laden with ammunition causing it to derail close 
to a densely populated housing estate. Fortunately, neither 
incident incurred fatalities or was accompanied by 
explosion. However, public concern was aroused in each case 
by media attention, highlighting the propagation potential 
of such incidents to cause death, injury and damage to 
surrounding populations. 
Although the safety record in the UK for transporting 
hazardous materials is exemplary compared with other 
industrialised countries, such as the United States, it is 
clear that there is a possibility, however small, that 
multiple fatality accidents could occur on British 
railways. In addition to the incidents described here, 
evidence to support this claim is given by the 14 accidents 
which occurred between 1970 and 1985 involving the puncture 
of one or more tank wagons 15. It is interesting to note 
that fortunately none of the puncture incidents involved 
pressurised 
estimated15 
tankers containing hazardous chemicals. It is 
that the probability of pressurised chlorine 
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tankers being punctured in incidents of similar severity is 
no more than about 20%. There have also been numerous 
occasions where leaking valves and loose man-hole covers 
have resulted in fire and/or spillage of tank contents. 
Fortunately, the incidents have all been relatively small, 
even compared with other UK incidents, and only a few 
casualties have occurred. 
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3.0. THE ROAD ACCIDENT AND TRANSPORT ENVIRONMENT 
Risk assessments of the road transport of explosives and 
other hazardous materials require detailed information on 
the transport and accident characteristics of the vehicles 
used. The data and information presented within this 
chapter are applicable to the transport of goods by heavy 
goods vehicles (HGVs} on public highways in Great Britain. 
Particular emphasis is given to the transport of explosives 
and hazardous materials. The number of accidents, frequency 
of accidents, collisions, single vehicle accidents (SVAs}, 
HGV types, road class, collision speeds, urban and rural 
areas/roads and impact position have all been analysed. 
At present no common methods are used in the collection 
and analysis of transport statistics. Studies and published 
data tend to use varying definitions and nomenclature for 
urban and rural areas, HGVs, road class and accident 
severity etc.. Due to the multitude of data 
interpretation, such a mixture of classes and categorises 
presents problems in analysing and comparing data. Often 
only generalised conclusions can be drawn with any degree 
of confidence. Consequently much of the data provided in 
this chapter are taken or derived from Department of 
Transport statistics. The main reasons for this are 
diversity of information, general consistency (although not 
always} and availability. 
There are two other large sources of available data, 
namely the Home Office and the Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory (TRRL}. However, much of the data from such 
sources are not directly comparable with the data given 
here, or with other similar studies. For example, during 
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1976 TRRL 
Information 
extensive, 
definitions 
conducted a study of 740 fatal HGV 
contained within the study is 
however, the sample is small 
are used. In addition HGVs are 
accidents. 
reasonably 
and broad 
classed as 
vehicles having unladen weights in excess of 3 tons; 
whereas, within this report and most Department of 
Transport published statistics HGVs are taken as vehicles 
having unladen weights of not less than 1.5 tonnes. 
Similarly, a Home Office study into the transport of 
chemicals by road provides no distinction between road 
class or HGV type, the sample is small and only 36 of the 
607 incidents are attributed to road accidents. 
Although there are drawbacks with much of the published 
data and available statistics, most are useful in at least 
identifying and loosely quantifying areas of interest. 
Therefore, both of the studies mentioned above are detailed 
in this chapter. 
No attempt has been made to differentiate between 
weather conditions, time of year or time of day. It is 
possible to produce accident rates accounting for these 
factors. However, it is considered here that the 
improvement in assessment accuracy is minimal unless· the 
vast majority of movements all have the same 
characteristics (i.e. travel between certain set times, 
etc.). Finally it should be noted that all accident data 
within this chapter, unless otherwise stated, refer only 
to injury accidents. The criterion for reporting an 
accident is that personal injury has occurred. Hence, 
little or no data exist with respect to non-injury 
accidents and the true number of road accidents are not 
known. In addition, not all injury accidents are recorded. 
This is because the Department of Transport collate data 
from UK police forces and unfortunately not all injury 
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accidents are reported to the police. In a study of injury 
accidents conducted by TRRLl it is estimated that injury 
accidents involving car occupants, pedestrians and pedal 
cyclists are likely to be under-reported by 14%, 27% and 
60% respectively. Comparison between police and hospital 
records reveals that serious road accidents (in terms of 
casualties) are less likely to be under-reported. It is 
assumed that all accidents involving fatalities are fully 
recorded. 
Note: 
The HGVs discussed in this chapter are illustrated in 
Appendix c. 
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3.1 Vehicular Accidents 
1986 almost 15,000 HGVs were involved in road 
in Great Britain, providing a total of 13,429 
at a rate of 1 accident every 1.65 million km 
221 x 108 km travelled. Assuming 1986 to be a 
During 
accidents 
accidents, 
for the 
typical year for accidents on British roads (there is no 
evidence to suggest otherwise) it is estimated that 85% of 
all HGV accidents result from collision with two or more 
vehicles, and that the remaining 15% are the result of 
single vehicle accidents (SVAs) . The majority of accidents, 
58%, are the result of collisions with private motor cars, 
a further 11% are caused by collisions with motorcycles and 
over 14% with HGVs, light goods vehicles (LGVs) and public 
service vehicles (PSVs) • The second largest category of 
accidents is attributed to single vehicle accidents, which 
consist of accidents with pedal cyclists, pedestrians and 
collisions with stationary objects, such as, bridge 
parapets and lamp posts etc •• Over 59% of HGV vehicular 
accidents result in frontal impact, the remainder being 
split fairly evenly between side and rear impacts. 
Approximately 80% of all collisions in non-built-up areas 
occur at 30 mph or more, falling to 50% in built-up areas. 
In comparison, it is estimated that SVAs occurring at 30 
mph or more account for 42% and 33% of SVAs in built-up 
areas and non-built-up areas respectively. 
A little under 45% of all HGV accidents occur on built-
up roads (BURs). However, the rate of HGV accidents on BURs 
is approximately 2.5 times greater than that associated 
with non-BURs. Accident rates also differ between HGV 
types. For example, the accident rate for a rigid 2-axle 
HGV on a BUR is given in Table F as 0.86 x 10-6 accidents 
per km. This compares with an accident rate of 1.28 x 10-6 
accidents per km for an articulated 4-axle HGV over 
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identical road. Similarly, rates vary depending on the 
class of road, the "safest" roads, excluding motorways, 
being those designated as class A. 
During 1986 the number of HGVs involved in accidents on 
British motorways2 totalled 1531 providing an accident rate 
of 0.23 x 10-6 accidents per km travelled. This rate 
exemplifies the inherently safe characteristics of 
motorways compared with other roads. Non built-up roads 
have accident rates twice that of motorways and built-up 
roads a little over 4.5 times that of motorways. 
Approximately 29% of the annual distance covered by HGVs 
.occurs on motorways. If such roads were as hazardous as 
other roads then about 4000 accidents could be expected to 
occur on motorways each year. It is apparent from the data 
given here that motorway travel is much safer than travel 
along other road types regardless of whether they are 
built-up or non-built-up. 
With respect to motorway accidents, no data exist which 
distinguish HGVs by body type and/or axle configuration. 
In addition, much of the data within this chapter includes 
motorways in the non-BUR category. The Department of 
Transport suggest that errors .. which~ may -result- -fronr··· the-
inclusion of motorways in the non-BUR category are minimal. 
It is possible to produce accident rates which take 
account of vehicular position in relation to the road. For 
example, it is estimated that almost 6% of rigid HGV 
accidents on BURs occur at roundabouts, 14% at crossroads 
and over a third not at or within 20 m of a junction. In 
comparison, articulated HGV accidents on BURs 
similar accident proportions, except that almost 
accidents occur at roundabouts, highlighting the 
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produce 
9% of 
inferior 
stability of articulated vehicles compared with rigid HGVs. 
Furthermore, accident rates can take account of accident 
severity with respect to casualties. For example, almost 
60% of all fatalities resulting from HGV accidents occur on 
non BURs, whereas less than 10% occur on motorways. In 
addition, more casualties can be expected from articulated 
HGV accidents than from rigid HGV accidents. The severity 
and incidence of casualties can also be distinguished by 
accident type and colliding vehicle type. Casualties 
resulting from HGV accidents are detailed in Section 3.6, 
Tables N, o, P, Q and R. 
3.1.1 Vehicular Accidents 'Involving the Transport of 
Explosives and Other Hazardous Goods 
A total of 435,000 HGVs were registered up to the end of 
19863. Of these it is estimated by Withers4 that only 1.1% 
were designed to carry hazardous goods. Hazardous goods 
are those substances designated as hazardous by United 
Nations classification and governed by the 
Packaging and Labelling Regulations 1984 
Classification, 
(CPL UK) • In 
essence, substances are considered hazardous if they are 
one or more of·-the-following: explosive, flammable, toxic, 
radioactive, or likely to decompose to oxygen at elevated 
temperatures. 
From the data given above, it is estimated here, that up 
to the end of 1986, there were approximately 4785 vehicles 
designed to transport hazardous goods. Assuming that such 
vehicles travel similar annual distances as any other HGVs 
and are as accident prone, then the data given in Section 
3.6, Tables A, E and F can be used to estimate, the 
distance travelled, number of accidents and the accident 
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rate of such vehicles. These estimates are shown here in 
Table 1. 
From the available literature it is apparent that HGVs 
designed to transport hazardous goods are not as accident 
prone as 
Withers4 • 
accidents 
general HGVs. A discussion on this is given by 
He suggests an accident rate of 0.25 x 10-6 
per mile which corresponds to 0.16 x 10-6 
accidents per km. This general rate is almost 4 times less 
than the "all speed limits" rate of 0.62 x 10-6 accidents 
per km given in Table lC. From the study conducted by the 
author on the transport of military explosives by roads, 
the HGVs used by UK Armed Forces for the conveyance of 
explosives are considered to have accident rates between 
one tenth and one third of that attributed to national 
HGVs. The accident reduction proposed by Withers and that 
estimated by the author compare favourably and support the 
assumption that military HGVs and national HGVs 
transporting hazardous goods, with respect to the 
likelihood of accident involvement, are affected by similar 
mitigation. Table 2, given b~low, illustrates the effect of 
compensating for the known lower incidence of accidents for 
HGVs conveying hazardous goods. For comparative purposes 
both reducing factors, one tenth and one third, estimated 
by the author, are detailed. 
The most common vehicles used to transport 
are rigid 2-axle HGVs. These vehicles tend 
explosives 
to have 
substantially lower accident rates than other 
especially on built-up roads. It has been discussed 
and in Chapter 2.0 that HGVs transporting hazardous 
are less likely to be involved in accidents than 
HGVs, 
here 
goods 
HGVs 
transporting non-hazardous goods. It is therefore sensible 
to assume that rigid 2-axle HGVs loaded with explosives 
have accident rates below that nationally attributed to 
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rigid 2-axle HGVs. Accident rates are thought to be 
appreciably less as a result of thorough vehicle 
maintenance, compliance with relevant regulations and codes 
of practice and driver training. In addition, it is thought 
that the fact that drivers appreciate the load being 
conveyed ensures their vigilance and attention and 
therefore, reduces their chances of accident involvement. 
The mitigating features described above are clearly 
shown by the UK Armed Forces in their movement of military 
explosives. Vehicle maintenance is thorough and driver 
instructions strictly enforced6. Load and vehicle 
inspections are performed prior to and during transit . and 
limits imposed on vehicle speeds and the distance to be 
kept from other road traffic6. It is somewhat uncertain as 
to how much these mitigating features reduce accident 
rates. However, the author has found evidence to suggest 
that HGVs conveying explosives under the control of UK 
Armed Forces may have accident rates between one tenth and 
one third of that given nationally for HGVs. 
Between January 1970 and June 1987 Army HGVs used for 
the conveyance of military explosives, henceforth termed 
munitions vehicles (MVs), were involved in four injury 
accidents providing an average of 0.23 injury accidents per 
year. These accidents occurred in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Not one single injury accident is known to have 
occurred in the UK between January 1970 and June 1987. The 
author has no knowledge of RAF or Naval MV injury accidents 
during this period. 
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Where no event or failure has occurred over the period 
of observation, it is a common statistical device to assume 
that one occurs just at the end of the period. It is 
postulated that between January 1970 and June 1987 one 
person was injured as a result of a vehicular accident 
during the road transport of munitions in 2-axle HGVs (MVs) 
on BURs. Assuming MVs travel a total of 1.04 x 106 miles 
per year and that 17% of this is on BURs3 then the 
postulated accident rate is 0.06 injury accidents per year. 
Kletz et al7 assume MVs to have accident rates half that of 
national rigid 2-axle HGVs. However, Kletz et al suggest 
that their assumption probably over-estimates MV accident 
rates, and that actual MV rates are much lower. The 
rate postulated here is one half of that found 
injury 
if the 
assumption used 
compared with 
by Kletz et al is adopted (i.e. 0.06 
0.12). This suggests that the doubts 
expressed 
accident 
by Kletz et al, regarding the magnitude of 
reduction, are well founded. As previously 
it is thought here that MV accident rates are 
rate 
mentioned, 
between one tenth and one third of the national HGV 
accident rates. Assuming a value of 20% the annual MV 
injury accident rate on BURs approximates to 0.049. This 
estimate is supported here by reference to data collected 
on Armed Forces "B" vehicle accidents8,9. Vehicles classed 
as "B" are "soft-skinned" wheeled vehicles10, such as, cars 
and general--purpose vans and lorries. The category includes 
vehicles employed to transport munitions. 
Between 31 March 1985 and 31 March 1986 United Kingdom 
Land Forces (UKLF) "B" vehicles were involved in 4213 road 
accidents at a rate of 1.43 x 10-6 accidents per km 
travelled. The corresponding rate for 
vehicles over 4 ton was 1.86 x 10-6 
regular Army "B" 
accidents per km 
travelled. Munitions vehicles are classed here 
axle HGVs and the vast majority of these are 
the "over 4 ton" category. 
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as rigid 
included 
2-
in 
The above rates are for all accidents over all classes 
of road within the UK. From data received through the 
Logistics ExecutiveS approximately 8% of all tri-service 
worldwide transport accidents involve injury. Thus, it is 
estimated here that UKLF "B" vehicles over 4 ton have an 
injury accident rate of 1.5 x 10-7 accidents per km. 
National rigid 2-axle HGVs in Great Britain have a BUR 
injury accident rate of 0.86 x 10-6 accidents per km. This 
rate is approximately 40% greater than the accident rate 
for all HGVs over all classes of road (see Section 3.6, 
Table F). Assuming this increase is applicable to "B" 
vehicles then on BURs UKLF "B" vehicles over 4 ton have an 
injury accident rate of 2.1 x 10-7 accidents per km 
travelled on BURs. 
As mentioned earlier national HGVs transporting 
hazardous goods tend to have lower accident rates than HGVs 
transporting non-hazardous goods. It is commonly accepted 
that MVs have lower accident rates than general UKLF 
vehicles. The reduction is somewhat uncertain. It is 
suggested here that the divide between national HGVs 
transporting general goods and those transporting hazardous 
goods is much greater than that between general UKLF 
vehicles and MVs. This is supported by the lower incidence 
of accidents to UKLF "B" vehicles over 4 ton (1.5 x 10-7 
accidents/km) as opposed to national HGVs (0.62 x 10-6 
accidents/km, see Section 3.6, Table F). As a consequence 
of this it is assumed that MVs have accident rates 
approximately 30% less than general UKLF "B" vehicles over 
4 ton. From this assumption it is thought that MVs are 
involved in 0.04 injury accidents per year on BURs (0.14 x 
10-6 accidents/km) (compared with 0.049 injury accidents 
per year estimated solely from national HGV data) • 
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It is envisaged that a similar deviation of accident 
rates exists between national HGVs transporting explosives 
(and other hazardous goods) and those national HGVs not 
conveying such cargo's. The estimates given here for MV 
injury accidents on BURs are derived from different data 
sources (i.e. 0.049 and 0.04 injury accidents per year). 
However, they compare favourably lending support to the 
argument for accident rate reduction when assessing HGVs 
involved in the transport of explosives and other hazardous 
goods. 
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Table 1: Distance travelled, number of accidents and 
frequency of accidents of HGVs designed to 
transport hazardous goods: Great Britain 1986 
See note. 
lA: Distance travelled 
Kilometres x 108 
All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
2.39 
lB: Number of accidents 
Number 
All speed 
limits 
148 
1. 77 
of accidents 
Non-BUR 
81 
31 
0. 62 
BUR 
67 
Table 1: continued 
lC: Frequency of accidents 
Frequency of 
All speed 
limits 
accidents x 10-6 per km 
Non-BUR BUR 
0. 62 0.46 1.08 
Note: 
a. Data refer to HGVs conveying hazardous goods assuming 
accident rates are the same as for HGVs conveying non-
hazardous goods. 
b. Injury accidents only. 
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Table 2: Number and frequency of HGV accidents designed to 
transport hazardous goods: Modified to accommodate 
the known lower incidence of accidents compared 
with other HGVs: 1986 
2A: Number of accidents 
Number 
All speed 
limits 
15 - 48 
2B: Frequency of accidents 
of accidents 
Non-BUR 
8 - 27 
BUR 
7 - 22 
Frequency 
All speed 
limits 
of accidents x 10-6 per km 
Non-BUR BUR 
0.06 - 0.21 0.05 - 0.15 0.11 - 0.36 
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Table 2: continued 
2C: Comparison between HGVs transporting hazardous and 
non-hazardous goods 
Relative frequency of accidents 
Hazardous Non-Hazardous 
0.1 - 0.33 1 
2D: Comparison between MVs and UKLF vehicles 
Relative frequency of accidents 
MVs UKLFa 
0.6 - 0.8 1 
Note: 
a. UKLF "B" vehicles over 4 ton. 
b. Accident rates for Tables 2C and 2D refer to all speed 
limits . 
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3.2 Collision Speeds of Heavy Goods Vehicles: 
Impact Speed Study 
Estimating the speed of road vehicle collisions has 
until recently been entirely based on professional 
judgements formed by reference to travel speed surveys and 
accident investigations. For example, during the summer of 
1983 the Department of Transport conducted a survey of 
vehicle speeds on non built-up roads. Speed measurements 
were taken on flat straight roads free from junctions, 
roadworks and other causes of traffic congestion. As a 
consequence of this, vehicle speeds were only restricted by 
road speed limits and the speeds at which drivers chose to 
travel. On single carriageway roads mean HGV speeds were 41 
mph for rigid HGVs and 42 mph for articulated ,HGVs. These 
mean speeds compare with 48 mph and 49 mph, and 56 mph and 
60 mph for rigid and articulated HGVs on dual carriageway 
roads and motorways respectively. It is perhaps surprising 
to note that articulated HGVs have greater mean speeds than 
rigid HGVs, but not surprising to find that the percentage 
of HGVs exceeding permitted speed limits range from 30% for 
rigid HGVs on motorways to 60% for articulated HGVs on 
single carriageway roads. The survey is detailed in Table 
3. The Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL) 
suggest that vehicle speeds in built-up areas are governed 
by traffic conditions, which are controlled by parking 
restrictions, junctions, traffic lights, roundabouts and 
crossings, etc.·. From data supplied by Duncanll it is 
estimated that the mean speed of HGVs through large and 
small towns (population less than 30,000) is 23 mph and 14 
mph respectively. Vehicle speeds, however, vary depending 
on the time of day and hence traffic density. During "peak" 
periods mean vehicle speeds tend to fall by between 1 mph 
and 3 mph. The data supplied by Duncan relate to actual 
vehicle motion and no account is taken of vehicle 
stoppages, although almost 11% of accidents occur when 
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vehicles are stationary12 (i.e. 5.3% of accidents occur 
whilst vehicles are parked and 5.3% whilst vehicles are 
stationary in traffic) . 
Obviously only poor estimates of actual HGV collision 
speeds can be made from speed surveys, such as those 
described above. In addition, only marginal improvement in 
collision speed estimates is found by reference to accident 
investigations, which are based on vehicular damage and the 
measurement of skid marks, etc .. However, with the 
introduction of tachograph charts in 1974 and compulsory 
implementation for all HGVs in 198113,14 it is now possible 
to obtain accurate impact speeds for HGVs. 
Essentially tachograph charts record the time, speed and 
distance of a vehicles journey. Tachograph analysis15 has 
become an integral part of accident investigation and is 
performed by specially trained police and forensic science 
personnel. The detail provided by the recordings is often 
used as evidence in court cases supplementing eye witness 
accounts and data collected at the scene of accidents. 
Impact speed data for HGVs have been collected by the 
author with the help of the Metropolitan Police Forensic 
Science Laboratory16 (MPFSL) . Over 110 tachograph based 
reports have been studied covering the years 1978 through 
to 1982. These tacho-graph reports form the basis of the 
impact speed study (ISS) . MPFSL were the first to introduce 
tachograph analysis in the UK, as a consequence of this 
early reports cover various locations throughout Britain. 
However, with the increase nationally in facilities and 
staff trained specifically in tachograph analysis most of 
the latter reports relate to the Metropolitan Borough of 
London. 
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The data presented here are considered a biased sample 
of HGV impact speeds. This is because each report is part 
of an accident investigation which either involves 
serious casualties and/or police enquiries and/or court 
proceedings. No attempt has been made to compensate for the 
known conservatism. 
Table 4 illustrates HGV accidents with respect to impact 
speed, location and accident type. Tables 5 and 6 use the 
data in Table 4 and distinguish between vehicular 
collisions (collisions between vehicles excluding 
collisions with motorcycles) and single vehicle accidents. 
Actual impact speeds for vehicular collisions in built-up 
areas are recorded in Table 7. The sample of impact speeds 
given in Table 7 appear to be normally distributed (see 
Figure 1) . Using the usual formula the distribution of HGV 
impact speeds in built-up areas is shown in Figure 2. 
Key to Tables 4, 5 and 6 (ISS) 
A - accident (impact position undetermined) 
F · - frontal impact of HGV 
H - head-on collisions 
MC - collision with motorcycle 
PED - collision with pedestrian 
PC - collision with pedal cyclist 
R - rear impact of HGV 
S - side impact of HGV 
SVA - single vehicle accident 
37 
Table 3: Speed of heavy goods vehicles on non built-up 
roads: Department of Transport vehicle speed 
survey: 1983 
3A: Single carriageway 
HGV type mean speed speed limit % over 
(mph) (mph) limit 
Rigid 41 40 55 
Articulated 42 40 60 
All HGVs 41 40 56 
3B: Dual carriageway 
HGV type mean speed speed limit % ove5 
(mph) (mph) a limit 
' 
Rigid 48 40 87 
Articulated 49 40 92 
All HGVs 48 40 89 
Note: 
a. New speed limit 50 mph, 23 March 1984 
b. With respect to new speed limit - 37% rigid, 46% artic. 
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Table 3: continued 
3C: Motorways 
HGV type mean speed speed limit % over 
(mph) (mph) a limit 
Rigid 56 60 30 
Articulated 60 60 50 
All HGVs 58 60 39 
Note: 
a. Unladen weight less than 3.05 te speed limit is 70 mph. 
Table 4: HGV impact speeds: All accidents 
4A: Built-up areas 
Impact speed Accidents No 
(mph) 
0 - 9 3F MCS 4 
10 - 19 3H A 2SVA MCH PC 2PED 10 
20 - 29 2H 7F S 9SVA MCS 2PED 22 
30 - 39 H 6F S 4A 2SVA MCH PC 3PED 19 
40 - 49 H 3F A 4SVA 2PED 11 
50 - 60 2F 2 
60+ --
Total 68 
39 
Table 4: continued 
4B: Non built-up areas 
Impact speed Accidents No 
(mph) 
0 - 9 s SVA 2 
10 - 19 H S 3SVA 5 
20 - 29 A 2SVA 3 
30 - 39 2H F R A 2SVA PC 8 
40 - 49 3H SF A SVA PC 11 
50 - 60 2F 2 
60+ F 1 
Total 32 
4C: Motorways 
Impact speed Accidents No 
(mph) ~ 
0 - 9 - -
10 - 19 - -
20 - 29 H F MCR 3 
30 - 39 H SVA 2 
40 - 49 2F SVA 3 
50 - 60 F R 2SVA 4 
60+ SVA 1 
Total 13 
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Table 5: HGV impact speeds: Vehicular collisions 
Accidents 
Impact Speed 
(mph) BUA No Non-BUA No M-WAY No 
0 - 9 3F 3 s 1 
10 - 19 3H A 4 H S 2 
20 - 29 2H 7F S 10 A 1 H F 2 
30 - 39 H 6F S 4A 12 2H F RA 5 H 1 
40 - 49 H 3F A 5 3H SF A 9 2F 2 
50 - 59 2F 2 2F 2 F R 2 
60+ -- F 1 
TOTAL 36 21 7 
Note: 
a. Excludes accidents with motorcycles. 
Table 6: HGV impact speeds: Single vehicle accidents 
Accidents 
Impact Speed 
(mph) BUA No Non-BUA No M-WAY No 
0 - 9 SVA 1 
10 - 19 2SVA 2PED 4 3SVA 3 
20 - 29 9SVA 2PED 11 2SVA 2 
30 - 39 2SVA 3PED 5 2SVA 2 SVA 1 
40 - 49 4SVA 2PED 6 SVA 1 SVA l 
50 - 59 2SVA 2 
60+ SVA l 
TOTAL 26 9 5 
Note: 
a. Includes accidents with pedestrians. 
41 
Table 7: Sample of HGV impact speeds: Vehicular collisions 
in built-up areas 
Impact Speed (mph) 
4 4 9 16 19 19 
19 22 23 24 25 26 
27 27 28 28 29 30 
31 34 35 35 36 36 
36 36 37 37 39 40 
42 44 44 48 55 57 
42 
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3.3 Vehicle Fires 
During 1986 the fire brigade attended 7212 van and lorry 
fires1 7 • Van and lorry fires accounted for 4634 and 2578 
fires respectively. Not all.of these were on the public 
highway. However, no data are available to quantify the 
number of fires on the public highway, but it is thought 
that the vast majority would have been. Due to lack of 
detail, and so as to estimate the incidence of vehicle 
fires it is assumed here that all van and lorry fires occur 
on the public highway. 
From data released by the Home Office17 a total of 71 
van and lorry fires were caused by crash or collision 
during 1986. Of these 19 were attributed to lorry crash 
fires. Over the same period lorry non-crash fires totalled. 
2559. 
When recording fire incidents the fire services use the 
term "lorry" to describe all vehicles which have a 
commercial chassis and/or a separate personnel and load 
compartment/area. For example, an HGV consisting of a cab 
with a flat-bed load area or tank compartment is classed as 
a lorry. From discussions with the London Fire 
Defence Authority18 and the Cleveland County Fire 
it is assumed here that a lorry corresponds to 
goods vehicle (HGV) • 
and Civil 
Brigade1 9 
a heavy 
Assuming that HGVs travel20 a total of 221 x 108 km per 
year, then during 1986 it is estimated here that HGVs were 
involved in 2559 non-crash fires at a rate of 0.12 x 10- 6 
fires per km. It follows that 19 HGVs were involved in 
crash fires over the same period at a rate of 0.09 x 10-8 
45 
fires per km. 
The rates given above are general rates for all HGVs 
over all speed limits. The estimates assume that crash and 
non-crash fires are as likely to occur on BURs as on non-
BURs and that these likelihoods are the same regardless of 
HGV type. However, both crash and non-crash fire rates vary 
with respect to vehicle type, time and . location. 
Unfortunately no data are readily available to categorise 
non-crash fires by vehicle type. Location, however, can be 
examined by the estimation of the distance travelled on 
particular roads combined with the mean HGV speeds 
associated with these roads (see Section 3.6, Table A 
mean HGV speeds are detailed in Section 3.2). For example, 
the mean speeds of HGVs are governed by traffic conditions. 
The mean speed11 of HGVs on BURs is 23 mph and on non-BURs 
it is assumed here to be 45 mph. Assuming HGVs travel 221 x 
108 km per year, that 25% of this is on BURs and that a 
direct relationship exists between the incidence of non-
crash fires and the time spent on BURs, then it is 
estimated here that 40% of HGV non-crash fires occur on 
BURs. This compares with almost a half of all HGV crash 
fires occurring on BURs (46%). HGV crash fires categorised 
by axle configuration, body type and location are detailed 
in Section·3.6, Tables Sand T. 
The causes of HGV non-crash fires are as numerous as 
they are frequent. Approximately 70% are attributed, at 
least in part, to poor vehicle maintenance. Such fires tend 
to be the result of fuel leaks, electrical faults and 
overheating, etc •. Surprisingly almost 14% of non-crash 
fires are the result of arson and 6% smokers negligence. 
Compared with non-crash fires the vast majority of crash 
fires are caused by the spillage and subsequent ignition of 
fuel. Non-crash fire causes are summarised in Section 3.6, 
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Table u. 
It is considered here that the chances of fire resulting 
from one of the above causes, especially arson and smokers 
negligence are substantially lower for HGVs conveying 
explosives (and other hazardous goods) than HGVs conveying 
non-hazardous goods. This is because vehicles are rarely 
left unattended, smoking is strictly controlled (and 
actively discouraged) and vehicle maintenance is generally 
attributed greater importance6. 
The greatest threat to explosives and other thermally 
sensitive goods is the spread of fire causing vehicle, and 
in particular, load compartment engulfment. Vehicle 
engulfment is dependent upon a multitude of factors. First 
aid fire-fighting may be undertaken by those accompanying 
the vehicle or by other road users. Such action, however, 
relies to a large extent on the availability of fire-
fighting equipment. Fires occurring in load compartments, 
or other areas where sight is restricted, may not be 
discovered until they are well established. Tyre fires are 
notoriously difficult to extinguish. In addition some delay 
may occur in the notification of the fire services. 
Obviously delays of this kind reduce the chances of rapidly 
controlling and extinguishing vehicle fires. Additionally, 
it is not uncommon for those within the immediate vicinity 
of a vehicle fire to refrain from first aid fire-fighting. 
Such "in-action" may be due to lack of equipment, injury or 
the need for evacuation as a result of engulfment (or 
imminent engulfment) of a hazardous load. In such 
instances, the only source of emergency action is that of 
the fire services. However, upon their arrival at the scene 
the vehicle may already be engulfed. 
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Vehicle engulfment is also affected by cause and 
location of fire. For example, vehicle fires caused by fuel 
tank rupture burn much more fiercely than isolated 
electrical fires. The location of fire on vehicles not only 
affects the likelihood of engulfment (i.e. relative 
position with respect to fuel or readily combustible 
materials) but also affects fire fighting procedure. For 
example, a fuel fire near to a load liable to explode 
requires greater caution by fire fighting personnel than a 
fire confined to a HGV cab. In certain circumstances the 
location of the vehicle may also affect fire fighting 
procedure and effectiveness (i.e. narrow roads, multiple 
accidents, injured persons and the distance from and 
vehicle position with respect to fire hydrants, densely 
populated areas, and chemical plants etc.). 
There is a lack of detailed information on the causes of 
engulfing fires. In addition there are no data on the 
likelihood of engulfment given a fire of known cause. It is 
considered here that for HGVs conveying explosives the 
likelihood 
than that 
addition 
of engulfment given a non-crash fire is 
for HGVs conveying non-hazardous goods. 
to the points raised above vehicles used for 
less 
In 
the 
carriage 
cut-off 
of explosives are fitted with quick release fuel 
valves - and - most have additional fire · proofing 
protection between the load compartment and surrounding 
vehicle. A review of vehicle features and regulations which 
affect the likelihood of fire and engulfment are given in 
Section 6.5.2 and Appendix A. 
For HGVs not conveying hazardous goods, it is estimated 
here that about 20% of all non-crash fires subsequently 
become engulfing and that for HGVs conveying hazardous 
goods the proportion is substantially less than this (i.e. 
between 5% and 15%) . These estimates are based on 
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assumptions used in the assessment of munition vehicle (MV) 
fires, conducted by the author for the Ministry of 
Defences. It is estimated that the probability of 
engulfment given a fire caused by arson, smokers 
negligence, electrical faults, oil/petrol and unknown 
causes is 0.40, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.10 respectively. 
Based on these assumptions 16% of all HGV (national) non-
crash fires are considered to be engulfing. Ignoring arson 
and smokers negligence as causes of fire (for the reasons 
given previously) the probability of engulfment given a 
non-crash fire for MVs is estimated to be 5%. These 
estimates compare well with the estimate implied by North20 
that between 20% and 30% of all private motor vehicle fires 
are engulfing. This is because compared with private motor 
vehicles it is generally agreed that HGVs are less likely 
to become engulfed and that this likelihood diminishes 
further for HGVs conveying hazardous goods. 
Between January 1970 and June 1987 Army MVs were 
involved in 7 non-crash fires and 1 crash fire22. Only 
three fires involved injury, all of which were ,non-crash 
fires occurring in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
comparison, RAF MVs were involved in 3 non-crash fires 
between 15th September 1981 and 1st May 1986. All the RAF 
MV fires occurred on British roads and no casualties were 
reported23. No data have been made available on the 
incidence of naval MV fires. 
The data given above on MV fires, and that data detailed 
in Appendix B, are not strictly comparable with data given 
here on national HGV fires. This is a direct result of the 
means by which the Ministry of Defence and the Department 
of Transport collect and record data. Statistics on 
national HGV fires are collated by the Home Office through 
data supplied by the fire services. All vehicle fires 
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attended by the fire services are recorded and reports made 
available to the Home Office. The attendance of the fire 
services, in most cases, only occurs when vehicle fires 
cannot be extinguished by those at the scene or there is a 
possibility that the fire may spread and/or endanger life. 
It should be noted that the fire services attend all fires 
on request regardless of severity. However, it is suggested 
here that only a small proportion of all vehicle fires 
attended by the fire services are trivial. Therefore, the 
majority of recorded incidents are fires considered to be 
"serious" or "non-trivial" in terms of severity, life and 
property. In comparison, the majority of MV vehicle fires, 
whether trivial or not, are recorded. In addition, unlike 
MV fire data a large proportion of fires recorded by the 
Home Office include HGV fires caused by arson and smokers 
negligence adding to the already present disparity between 
the two sets of data. 
From the foregoing it is not possible to estimate the 
incidence of MV fires or make strict comparisons with 
national HGVs. However, the qualitative factors discussed 
above are useful in adjusting estimates based on national 
HGV data. 
3.4 Movements of Explosives 
The road movement of explosives can be chiefly divided 
into those explosives conveyed for commercial purposes and 
those conveyed by the Armed Forces (including Ministry of 
Defence establishments) . As a result of the need for 
commercial confidentiality and military secrecy data on 
explosives movements are scarce and limited. consequently 
only a broad description of explosives movements can be 
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given here. 
It is estimated that HGVs conveying commercial 
explosives travel between 3 x 106 km a~d 4 x 106 km per 
year. A large proportion of the distance is covered by 
specially equipped rigid 2-axle HGVs. These vehicles are 
mainly used for secondary movements from 
storage/distribution depots to customers, and account for 
between 50% and 70% of all movements. In comparison the 
majority of primary movements, which consist of 
explosives transfers between depots, and factories and 
depots, involve articulated 4-axle HGVs. However, it is 
estimated that approximately 20% to 40% of primary 
movements are made by rigid 2-axle HGVs. For the distances 
quoted here it is thought that loaded vehicle kilometres 
account for between 50% and 65% of all vehicle kilometres. 
In comparison, the vast majority of military movements 
involve rigid 2-axle HGVs similar in construction to those 
used commercially. Loaded military movements cover between 
1 x 106 km and 2 x 106 km per year. It is known that both 
commercial and military movements avoid, wherever 
practicable, built-up areas and use main trunk roads and 
motorways. The distance travelled through built-up areas is 
obviously route dependent, but it is thought that between 
5% and 20% of total annual MV distance is covered on roads 
passing through BUAs. 
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3.5 Review of Accident Studies 
Two reports have been found which are of particular 
interest to this study. The first report, issued by TRRL, 
details fatal accidents involving HGVs, and the second, 
issued by the Home Office, details incidents involving 
dangerous chemicals. Both reports have been compiled 
without the intention that their contents may be used for 
hazard assessments. However, the information they contain 
is useful for this purpose, if only as a general guide to 
the frequency of events. Although both surveys are useful 
in identifying areas of concern, detailed data with respect 
to road accidents, axle configuration, body type and road 
class are not recorded. A bibliography of accident studies 
and other useful data are given at the end of this section. 
Fatal Accidents in Great Britain in 1976 Involving Heavy 
Goods Vehicles 
Riley, B.S. and Bates, H.J. (1980). SR 586. Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory, Crowthorne, Berkshire. 
The report· is based on data collated from 740 fatal HGV 
accidents recorded by the police during 1976. All accidents 
occurred on British roads. The main aim of the study is to 
formulate a basis for the selection of safety developments 
and transport policies. 
Heavy goods vehicles are classed as vehicles having 
unladen weights in excess of 3 tons. Axle configurations of 
vehicles are ignored and the only mention of body type 
refers to the fact that 54% of the 812 vehicles are rigid 
and 43% articulated. However, the data collated suggest 
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that rigid HGVs are under-represented in the sample. 
Road class is highlighted, indicating that 65% of 
accidents occur on A class roads and approximately 8% on 
motorways. This compares well with the data given in 
Section 3.6 that about 68% of accidents occur on A class 
roads and 11% on motorways. 
The report was compiled prior to the introduction of 
built-up and non built-up road classification. However, the 
report states that 43% of accidents occur in built-up 
areas, and that three quarters of these occur on roads 
subject to a 30 mph speed limit. 
Accidents involving no more than two vehicles account 
for 85% of all accidents, whereas three or more vehicle 
accidents account for 5% of the total. This compares with 
approximately 78% and 22% respectively, using the data 
compiled within Section 3.6. 
Eight HGVs caught fire, all due to impact. This figure 
indicates that the crash-fire rate of fatal HGV accidents 
is approximately twice that expected from all HGV road 
accidents. 
Although rigid vehicles are under-reported the data 
support the general assumption that articulated HGVs are 
much more likely to roll-over when involved in accidents 
than rigid HGVs. Two thirds of roll-overs involve 
articulated HGVs (from a sample of 40) . It is interesting 
to note that half of all the roll-overs are associated with 
single vehicle accidents (SVAs), and that these account for 
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some 70% of all SVAs. 
Finally, recording of load movement and load shedding, 
which is often neglected or only briefly mentioned in 
reports is well documented. Of the 812 HGVs, 58 shed 
load and 30 experienced load movement. It should be 
that only 1 HGV shed its load and 5 experienced 
movement prior to impact. The data suggest that 50% of 
most 
their 
noted 
load 
all 
shedding and load movement occurs as a result of collisions 
between HGVs, illustrating the ferocity of these accidents. 
Incidents Involving Dangerous Chemicals 
Home Office Survey for the years 1977 and 1980. 
During 
conducted 
transport 
undertaken 
1980 the Fire Department of the Home Office 
a survey of road incidents involving the 
of "dangerous chemicals". The survey was 
in order to supplement a similar study by the 
Scientific Advisory Branch of the Home Office, which was 
curtailed in 1977 due to the Fireman's strike of that year. 
The 1977 survey covers a period of 9 months and records 
250 incidents arising from the transport of hazardous 
freight on British roads (out of a total of 304 incidents). 
Only 6 fatalities are recorded, all of which are associated 
with road accidents. Non-fatal casualties total 110, 41 
resulting from road accidents and 69 resulting 
involvement with chemicals in transit. 
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from 
Five fires are recorded although incidents involving 
fumes total 124. Spillage of vehicle loads occurs in 260 
cases; 109 being spills of up to 10 litres, another 109 
between 10 and 210 litres and 42 incidents in excess of 210 
litres. 
Over 80% of all incidents are caused by mechanical 
defects. Less than 20% of incidents are the result of 
traffic accidents. Unfortunately, traffic accidents are not 
detailed. 
In 
survey, 
percent 
comparison 609 incidents are recorded in the 1980 
of which 15 are the result of fire. Thirty nine 
of road transport incidents occur on the public 
of these only 36 are due to traffic accidents, a highway, 
mere 15%. 
Incidents are recorded by location; approximately 72% 
occur in urban areas, 25% in rural areas and 3% of 
locations are not known. The number of incidents in urban 
areas is 
accident 
considered excessive compared with 
data which indicate that between 45% and 
all HGV accidents occur in built-up areas. 
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national 
60% of 
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3.6 HGV Accident and Transport Data 
Notes to tables 
Table H 
Proportions have been derived using vehicle involvement 
rates given in Table G and the number of vehicles involved 
by road class given by the Department of Transport3. 
Table I 
Accident frequencies have been derived using the data 
given in Tables A, C, E and H. 
e.g. HGV, rigid, 2-axle, non-BUR, class A road. 
Accident frequency 
= 
= 
= 
(number of accidents) I (vehicle kilometres) 
(0. 76 X 3482) I (0.87 X 87 X 108) 
0.35 x 10-6 accidents/km 
Table J 
Accident frequencies have been derived using the data 
given in Tables D2, D3, and I. 
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e.g. Accident between a rigid 2-axle HGV and a pedal cycle 
on a class A road. 
Accident frequency 
= 
= 
proportion of PC accidents x frequency of HGV accidents 
(0.086 X 0.852) X (0.84 X 10-6) 
= 0.06 x 10-6 accidents/km 
Two vehicle, and three or more vehicle accidents have 
been combined to give 85.2% of all HGV accidents. The 
vehicle combinations of accidents involving three or more 
different vehicles have not been considered due to lack of 
data. Hence, it is assumed that the relative proportions of 
vehicle combinations given in Table 03 are representative 
of all accidents, regardless of the number of vehicles 
involved. Similarly the relative proportions hold good 
regardless of road class. 
Table K 
See notes to Table J. 
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Table A: Distance travelled by road type, body type and 
axle configuration: 1986 
Distance (108 km) 
HGV type All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
Rigid 
2-axle 131 87 44 
3-axle 11 8 3 
4-axle+ 10 8 2 
Articulated 
3-axle 6 5 1 
4-axle 41 36 5 
5-axle+ 18 17 1 
All HGVs* 221 165 56 
Note: 
a. * includes axle configuration not reported. 
b. Non-BUR includes motorways. 
Source: Department of Transport2 0 
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Table B: Number of HGVs involved in accidents by road 
type, body type and axle configuration: 1986 
HGV type All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
Rigid 
2-axle 7660 3672 3988 
3-axle 1345 714 631 
4-axle+ 1120 657 463 
Articulated 
3-axle 730 447 283 
4-axle 2118 1444 674 
5-axle+ 1188 872 316 
All HGVs* 14773 7958 6815 
Note: 
a. * includes axle configuration not reported. 
b. Non-BUR includes motorways. 
Source: Department of Transport20 
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Table C: Proportion of HGVs involved in accidents by road 
class: 1986 
Road class Non-BUR 
A 76 
B 10 
Other 14 
Total 100% 
Note: 
a. Data excludes motorways. 
Source: Department of Transport20 
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BUR 
60 
11 
29 
100% 
Table D: Number of HGV accidents by the combination of 
vehicles involved: 1986 
Dl: Two vehicle and single vehicle accidents 
Accident Number of 
involving accidents 
Car 5271 
MC 1012 
Coach or Bus 186 
LGV 594 
HGV 529 
Pedal cycle 723 
Pedestrian 1104 
SVA 890 
Other 137 
Total 10446 
Note: 
a. MC includes combinations. 
Source: Department of Transport20 
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Proportion 
of accidents 
50.4 
9.7 
1.8 
5.7 
5.1 
6.9 
10.6 
8.5 
1.3 
100.0% 
Table D: continued 
D2: Two vehicle accidents only 
Accident with •. Proportion 
of accidents 
Car 62.4 
MC 12.0 
Coach or Bus 2.2 
LGV 7.0 
HGV 6.3 
Pedal Cycle 8.6 
Other 1.5 
Total 100.0% 
Note: 
a. Data is for two vehicle accidents only. 
b. MC includes combinations. 
Source: Department of Transport20 
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Table D: continued 
03: All accidents 
Accident Number of Proportion 
involving accidents of accidents 
SVA 1994 14.8 
Two vehicles 8452 63.0 
Three or more 2983 22.2 
vehicles 
All accidents 13429 100% 
Source: Department of Transport20 
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Table E: Number of HGV accidents by road type, body 
type and axle configuration: 1986 
HGV type All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
Rigid 
2-axle 7264 3482 3782 
3-axle 1275 677 598 
4-axle+ 1062 623 439 
Articulated 
3-axle 692 424 268 
4-axle 2009 1370 639 
5-axle+ 1127 827 300 
All HGVs 13429 7403 6026 
Note: 
a. Non-BUR includes motorways. 
b. During 1986 14161 HGVs (excluding axle configuration 
not reported) were involved in 13429 accidents. The 
ratio of accidents to vehicles involved is 0.948:1. 
Using this ratio the number of accidents during 1986 
can be estimated for HGVs by road type, body type and 
axle configuration. It is assumed that the ratio is 
constant regardless of HGV type and road type. 
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Table F: Frequency of HGV accidents by road type, body 
type and axle configuration: 1986 
Frequency (accidents/106 km) 
HGV type All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
Rigid 
2-axle 0.55 0.40 0.86 
3-axle 1.16 0.85 2.00 
4-axle+ 1. 06 0.78 2.20 
Articulated 
3-axle 1.15 0.85 2.68 
4-axle 0.49 0.38 1.28 
5-axle+ 0.63 0. 4 9 3.00 
All HGVs 0.62 0. 46 1. 08 
Note: 
a. Non-BUR includes motorways. 
b. Accident frequencies are derived from data given in 
Tables A and E. 
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Table G: HGV involvement rates by road class: 1986 
Involvement rate x 10-6 
Road class Non-BUR BUR 
A 0.57 1.19 
B 1.15 1. 21 
Other 1. 30 1.28 
All roads 0.48 1. 22 
Note: 
a. Involvement rate is per km. 
b. Non-BUR includes motorways. 
Source: Department of Transport 20 
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Table H: Proportion of distance travelled by HGVs by road 
class: 1986 
Road class Non-BUR (%) BUR (%) 
A 87.0 61.0 
B 6.0 11.5 
Other 7.0 27.5 
All roads 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: 
a. Data excludes motorways. 
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Table I: Frequency of HGV accidents by body type, axle 
configuration and road class: 1986 
Frequency x 10-6 per km 
Non-BUR BUR 
HGV type A B Other A B 
Rigid 
2-axle 0.35 0.70 0.80 0.84 0.86 
3-axle 0.74 1.48 1. 69 1. 95 1. 98 
4-axle+ 0.67 1.35 1.55 2.14 2.19 
Articulated 
3-axle 0.74 1.48 1. 69 2.62 2.67 
4-axle 0.33 0.66 0.76 1.25 1.28 
5-axle+ 0.43 0.85 0.97 2.91 2.99 
All HGVs 0.66 1.32 1.51 1.05 1.08 
Note: 
a. Data excludes motorways. 
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Other 
0.90 
2.09 
2.30 
2.81 
1.34 
3.14 
1.13 
Table J: Frequency of HGV accidents on BURs by body type, 
axle configuration, road class and the combination 
of vehicles involved: 1986 
Jl: Car, MC and coach or bus 
Frequency X 10-6 per km 
Car MC Coach or 
HGV type A B Other A B Other A B 
Rigid 
2-axle 0.45 0. 46 0.48 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 
3-axle 1. 04 1. 05 1.11 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.04 0.04 
4-axle+ 1.14 1.16 1.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.04 0.04 
Artic. 
3-axle 1.39 1.42 1.49 0.27 0.27 0. 29 0.05 0.05 
4-axle 0.66 0.68 0. 71 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.02 
5-axle+ 1.55 1.59 1. 67 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.05 0.06 
All HGVs 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.02 
J2: LGV, HGV and pedal cycle 
Frequency x 10- 6 per km 
Bus 
Other 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
0.05 
0.03 
0.06 
0.02 
LGV HGV Pedal Cycle 
HGV type A B Other A B Other A B Other 
Rigid 
2-axle 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
3-axle 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15 
4-axle+ 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Artic. 
3-axle 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.21 
4-axle 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 
5-axle+ 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.23 
All HGVs 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 
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Table K: Frequency of HGV single vehicle accidents by body 
type, axle configuration and road class: 1986 
Kl: Built-up roads 
Frequency x 10-6 per km 
SVA (no ped.) SVA (ped.) Total SVA 
HGV type A B Other A B Other A B 
Rigid 
2-axle 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 
3-axle 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.27 
4-axle+ 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.30 0.31 
Ar.tic. 
3-axle 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.36 0.38 
4-axle 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18 
5-axle+ 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.41 0.42 
All HGVs 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.15 
K2: Non built-up roads 
Frequency x 10-6 per km 
Other 
0.13 
0.29 
0.32 
0.40 
0.18 
0.44 
0.16 
SVA (no ped.) SVA (ped.) Total SVA 
HGV type A B Other A B Other A B Other 
Rigid 
2-axle 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.11 
3-axle 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.24 
4-axle+ 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.22 
Artic. 
3-axle 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.24 
4-axle 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.11 
5-axle+ 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.14 
All HGVs 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.21 
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Table L: Impact position of HGVs by the combination of 
vehicles involved 
Impact Proportion of impacts 
Position Car MC LGV HGV All 
Frontal 66 41 63 53 
Side 16 31 9 15 
Rear 14 26 28 24 
Other 4 2 0 8 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Riley, B.S. and Bates, H.J. (1980). 
vehicles 
59.4 
18.6 
18.1 
3.9 
100.0% 
Fatal accidents in GB in 1976 involving HGVs. 
SR 586. Transport and Road Research Laboratory, 
Crowthorne, Berkshire. 
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Table M: Proportion of HGV accidents by body type and 
junction type: 1986 
Rigid Articulated 
Junction type Non-BUR BUR Non-BUR BUR 
roundabout 3.4 5.5 5.0 8.9 
T or staggered 13.7 36.0 10.0 32.9 
y junction 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.4 
crossroads 4.2 13.6 3.1 12.5 
multiple 0.5 1.7 0.5 2.7 
slip road 2.7 0.5 4.1 1.3 
private entrance 5.0 5.0 3.0 5.2 
other 1.0 1.6 1.0 2.1 
not at or within 68.2 34.4 72.2 33.0 
20m of junction 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Department of Transport20 
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Table N: Number of casualties involving HGVs by road 
type: 1986 
Road type Fatalities All casualties 
BURsa 
A roads 205 4926 
B roads 34 933 
Other roads 74 2316 
All roads 313 8175 
Non-BURsa 
A roads 451 6452 
B roads 34 838 
Other roads 37 1095 
All roads 522 8385 
All speed limits 
Motorways 73 1888 
A roads 656 11378 
B roads 68 1771 
Other roads 111 3411 
All roads 908 18448 
Note: 
a. Excludes motorways. 
Source: Department of Transport2 
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Table 0: Proportion of casualties resulting from HGV 
accidents by road type: 1986 
Road type Fatalities All casualties 
(%) (%) 
BURsa 34.5 44.3 
Non-BURsa 57.5 45.5 
Motorways 8.0 10.2 
Note: 
a. Excludes motorways. 
Source: Department of Transport2 
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Table P: Number of HGV occupant casualties by road 
type: 1986 
Pl: Drivers 
Road type No. fatalities No. casualties 
BURs 8 773 
Non-BURs 53 1987 
All speed limits a 61 2760 
P2: Passengers 
Road type No. fatalities No. casualties 
BURs 8 205 
Non-BURs 14 354 
All speed limits a 22 559 
P3: ~1 casualties 
Road type No. fatalities No. casualties 
BURs 16 978 
Non-BURs 67 2341 
All speed limit sa 83 3319 
Note: 
a. Includes speed limit not reported. 
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Table Q: Number of HGVs involved in injury accidents by 
road type, body type, and axle configuration: 1986 
Ql : Rigid HGVs 
Road type No. of vehicles Involved 
Fatal accidents All accidents 
2-axle 
BUR 164 3988 
Non-BUR 239 3672 
All speed limits a 403 7660 
3-axle 
BUR 32 631 
Non-BUR 41 714 
All speed limit sa 73 1345 
4-axle+ 
BUR 25 463 
Non-BUR 50 657 
All speed limits a 75 1120 
All rigid HGVs 
BUR 221 5082 
Non-BUR 330 5043 
All speed limits a 551 10125 
Note: 
a. Includes speed limit not recorded. 
b. Excludes axle configuration not reported. 
Source: Department of Transport2 
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Table Q: continued 
Q2: Articulated HGVs 
Road type No. of vehicles Involved 
Fatal accidents All accidents 
3-axle 
BUR 15 283 
Non-BUR 35 447 
All speed limits 50 730 
4-axle 
BUR 39 674 
Non-BUR 127 1444 
All speed limits 166 2118 
5-axle+ 
BUR 15 316 
Non-BUR 83 872 
All speed limits 98 1188 
All artic. HGVs 
BUR 69 1273 
Non-BUR 245 2763 
All speed limits 314 4036 
Note: 
a. Includes speed limit not recorded. 
b. Excludes axle configuration not reported. 
Source: Department of Transport2 
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Table R: casualties resulting from HGV accidents with 
respect to vehicle(s) involved: 1986 
Vehicle type No. Fatalitiesa No. Casualties a 
HGV 24 672 
LGV - 137 
Bus/coach - 47 
Car 4 622 
Motorcycleb 
-
17 
Pedal cycle 1 8 
SVA 32 1045 
SVAC 171 1184 
Otherd 28 747 
Note: 
a. Excludes pedestrian casualties. 
b. Includes scooters and mopeds. 
c. Pedestrians hit by HGVs. 
d. Includes any other vehicles, motorcycle combinations and 
accidents involving 3 or more vehicles. 
Source: Department of Transport2 
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Table S: Estimated number of HGV crash fires by road 
type, body type and axle configuration: 1986 
HGV type All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
Rigid 
2-axle 10 5 5 
3-axle 2 1 1 
4-axle+ 1 1 1 
Articulated 
3-axle 1 1 0 
4-axle 3 2 1 
5-axle+ 2 1 0 
All HGVs 19 11 8 
Source: Nyman, M.17 
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Table T: Estimated frequency of HGV crash fires by road 
type, body type and axle configuration: 1986 
Frequency (fires/10 8 km) 
HGV type All speed Non-BUR BUR 
limits 
Rigid 
2-ax1e 0.08 0.06 0.12 
3-ax1e 0.16 0.12 0.28 
4-axle+ 0.15 0.11 0.31 
Articulated 
3-axle 0.16 0.12 0.38 
4-axle 0.07 0.05 0.18 
5-axle+ 0.09 0.07 0.42 
All HGVs 0.09 0.06 0.15 
Note: 
a. Non-BUR includes motorways. 
b. Crash-fire frequencies are derived from data given in 
Tables E, F and N. 
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Table 0: Number of lorry non-crash fires by cause: 1986 
Cause Number Proportion 
(%) 
Deliberate 352 14 
Smokers materials 147 6 
Electrical 720 28 
Oil, petrol/other fuel 1044 41 
Sparks 31 1 
Overheating 24 1 
Other/unknown 241 9' 
Total 2559 100 
Source: Nyman, M.l7 
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Table V: Proportion of all goods vehicles by gross 
vehicle weight (GVW) on British roads: 1985 
Gross vehicle Proportion of all 
weight (te) goods vehicles (%) 
·,. 
under 20 70 
20 - 22 3 
22 - 24 3 
24 - 26 2 
26 - 28 2 
28 - 30 4 
30 - 32 6 
32 - 34 4 
34 - 36 2 
36 - 38 3 
38+ 1 
Source: JMP Consultants24 
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4.0 THE RAIL ACCIDENT AND TRANSPORT ENVIRONMENT 
Risk assessments of the rail transport of explosives and 
other hazardous materials require detailed information on 
the transport and accident characteristics of the vehicles 
and wagons used. The data and information presented within 
this chapter are applicable to the transport of goods by 
freight trains (including freightliners) operated by 
British Rail (BR) . Particular emphasis is given to the 
transport of explosives and other hazardous materials. The 
number of accidents, frequency of accidents, collisions, 
derailments, fires, accident speeds, locomotive/wagon types 
and commodities transported, are all analysed. In addition, 
those accidents considered to be the greatest threat to the 
integrity of conveyed goods are identified. 
Over 180 railway accident reports, published by the 
Railway Inspectorate, have been studied by the author. 
Those of interest here (i.e. freight train accidents) have 
been used to devise a means of assessing accident severity. 
An accident severity index has been developed and appears / 
to be useful in quantifying the severity of freight train 
accidents. 
No attempt has been made to differentiate between 
weather 
possible 
conditions, time of year or time of day. 
to produce accident rates accounting for 
It is 
these 
factors. However, it is considered here that improvement in 
. assessment accuracy is minimal (unless the vast majority of 
movements are conducted at the same time every day and only 
during the summer months, etc.). 
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It should be noted that unless otherwise stated all data 
refer to accidents reported by the Railway Inspectorate. 
The criterion for reporting an accident tends to change as 
new equipment 
However, the 
and working practices are introduced. 
chapter are 
accident frequencies presented within 
unlikely to be greatly affected by 
this 
minor 
changes in the classification and recording of freight 
train accidents. 
Much of the data presented in the following sections are 
taken from, or based on, data recorded by the Railway 
Inspectorate for the year 1986. Compared with other years 
1986 is typical of the transport and accident environment 
found on British railways during the 1980's and will 
probably remain so for the early part of the 1990's. 
4.1 Freight Train Accidents and Fires 
Freight train (FT) accidents essentially consist of 
collisions, derailments and fires. During 1986 FTs 
travelled a total of 54 x 106 km on British railways and 
were involved in 324 accidents1, providing a rate of 1 
accident every 167,000 km travelled. Unfortunately, 
available statistics do not detail the number of accidents 
which occur in built-up areas, and Railway Inspectorate 
accident reports lack clarity when describing accident 
locations. However, from the freight train accident (FTA) 
survey, conducted by the author and detailed in Section 
4.2, it is estimated that 10% of British rail track (38,053 
km open to traffic2 at the end of 1986) is within built-up 
areas (BUAs) • As a consequence of this it is estimated that 
between 10% and 30% of all FT accidents occur on rail track 
within BUAs. 
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No data have been found to support the general consensus 
that FTs conveying hazardous goods are less likely to be 
involved in accidents than FTs conveying general goods. 
Thus, it can be argued that, per km, the rate of FT 
accidents is the same regardless of load conveyed. 
4.1.1 Collisions 
During 1986 the number of FT collisions3 totalled 113, 
providing 1 collision every 478,000 km travelled. From a 
study of over 90 train collisions published by the Railway 
Inspectorate, and from the FTA survey detailed in Section 
4.2, collisions involving rolling stock are generally 
considered to be the most severe FT collisions, in terms of 
deaths, injuries and property damage. Of the 113 collisions 
during 1986 only 19 involved collisions with other rolling 
stock. Thus, from these figures it can be inferred that 
severe collisions account for approximately 17% of all FT 
collisions and a mere 6% of all FT accidents. Of these 
collisions approximately 42% involve other FTs, 53% empty 
coaching stock (ECS) and 5% passenger trains (PTs) • 
The collision at Dingwall on 5 November 1973 serves to 
illustrate the severity of collisions between rolling 
stock. A freight train consisting of a diesel locomotive, 
brake van and 14 freight vehicles, some loaded with whisky, 
having a total weight of 467 tons, collided head-on with a 
stationary passenger train at approximately 20 mph. 
Extensive damage was caused to both locomotives and three 
leading FT wagons derailed resulting in the loss of their 
contents. Subsequently a number of whiskey barrels ruptured 
causing a large spillage. All coaches of the PT suffered 
minor damage injuring 6 members of the public and 2 railway 
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staff. 
Accidents similar to the collision described above 
illustrate the severity of collisions between trains having 
relatively low impact energies (i.e. closing speed, 
momentum and tonneage) • If the train had been carrying a 
hazardous substance the consequences of the accident could 
have been much worse. Train speed, momentum and tonneage is 
discussed further in Section 4.4. 
From a review of FT collisions conducted by Taig4 
approximately 65% of all FT collisions with rolling stock 
are thought to be either "head-on" or "rear-on" collisions. 
This figure compares well with the figure derived from the 
FTA survey that 70% of all FT collisions are either frontal 
or rear impacts (see Section 4.2). Taig's estimate is based 
on a much larger sample of FT collisions than that given by 
the FTA survey. This is because only those collisions which 
have been formally investigated by the Railway Inspectorate 
and reports published are included in the FTA survey. 
However, Taig's figure tends to augur well for the validity 
of the FTA survey. From the survey it is estimated that of 
the frontal/rear collisions 40% are head-on, 40% are 
frontal impacts with the rear of other trains (i.e. front-
rear collisions) and 20% are. rear impacts with the front of 
other trains (i.e. rear-front collisions). The remaining FT 
collisions with rolling stock are split between side 
impacts and glancing impacts. The FTA survey, together with 
the data collected by Taig4 suggest that 10% and 25% of all 
FT collisions with rolling stock are side impacts and 
glancing impacts respectively. 
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Accidents involving buffer stops3 totalled 55 during 
1986. Most of the collisions occurred at impact speeds of 
10 mph or less. It is suggested here that the vast majority 
of buffer stop collisions are unlikely to pose a 
significant threat to the integrity of wagons or their 
loads. Since the beginning of 1987 the Railway Inspectorate 
have ceased recording buffer stop collisions, emphasising 
the minor nature of such impacts. However, buffer stop 
accidents are the largest single source of FT collisions 
and most occur in BUAs (i.e. at railway stations and 
terminals, etc.). A collision of this type occurring at 
high speed to a train conveying flammable, toxic or 
explosive substances could conceivably result in a major 
incident with multiple fatalities. No such accidents have 
been identified by the author on ordinary surface track. 
This is not to say none have occurred. It should be noted 
that buffer stop collisions resulting in casualties have 
occurred on the London Underground, one of particular note 
being the accident at Moorgate in 1975. 
A little over 5% of all FT collisions during 1986 were 
the result of collisions at level crossings1 . For all 
rolling stock, over the same period, 44 accidents occurred 
on protected level crossings, 23 of which involved 
collision with road vehiclesl. The corresponding figures 
for unprotected crossings are not known. However, from 
these data it can be argued that approximately half of all 
FT collisions on level crossings involve road vehicles, the 
remainder being collisions with barriers, pedestrians and 
rail debris, etc •• Information contained within the Railway 
Safety Report 19861 indicates that over 3/4 of all 
collisions with road vehicles on level crossings involve 
frontal collision of the train (i.e. 78% of incidents are 
the result of train impact with a vehicle obstructing the 
crossing). In comparison, less than a 1/4 of such 
collisions involve side collision of the train (i.e. 22% of 
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incidents are the result of road vehicle impact with a 
train travelling over the crossing) • 
It is possible for a large motor vehicle at a level 
crossing to cause structural damage and endanger life and 
loads under conveyance. However, such accidents, concluded 
from the FTA survey and other accident reports, are 
generally not severe enough to cause extensive train/track 
damage, effect the integrity of conveyed goods'and/or cause 
multiple fatalities. The rail accident at Whittlesea level 
crossing on 8 May 1972 between an FT and a heavy goods 
vehicle (HGV) serves to support this statement. A laden 
HGV, having a gross weight of 23.5 tons, was hit at 30 mph 
by an FT consisting of 30 loaded 21 ton hopper wagons. The 
gross weight of the train was over 790 tons. No derailment 
of the train occurred and no damage was caused to the 
track. Fortunately, the driver of the HGV sustained only 
minor injuries. 
Freight train collisions also involve impacts with 
animals and miscellaneous obstacles/projections. During 
1986 almost 30% of all FT collisions were the result of 
such impacts3. The vast majority of these accidents are, 
however, relatively minor compared with rolling stock 
collisions. Animals hit by trains rarely cause serious 
damage (to the train) and obstacles placed maliciously or 
otherwise on the track, are unlikely to be of sufficient 
mass to cause incidents which could endanger the train or 
its load. However, it is not unknown for trains to derail 
as a result of objects placed on the track (see Section 
4.1.2). 
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The primary causes of freight train collisions are not 
specifically recorded by the Railway Inspectorate. However, 
assuming (in the absence of other data) that the primary 
causes of train accidents are the same for all current 
train types (except accidents resulting from the irregular 
opening of doors by the public) then it is estimated here 
that 65% of all collisions are the result of staff error. 
Most of these accidents are caused by train crew, 
especially the ''engine-men" (almost 50% of all staff 
errors) . 
account 
In comparison, irresponsible acts by the 
for 31% of all collisions, a staggering 
public 
67% of 
these due to malicious acts. Only about 4% of accidents are 
thought to result from mechanical/electrical defects of 
trains, signalling equipment or track. 
4.1.2 Derailments 
Derailments of FTs on British railways3 totalled 158 
during 1986, providing 1FT derailment every 342,000 km 
travelled. Although FT derailments account for 
approximately 50% of all FT accidents, judging from the 
small number of official reports published by the Railway 
Inspectorate regarding FT derailments, it can be judged 
that generally FT derailments are not as severe as FT 
collisions. The number of FT derailments included in the 
FTA survey is small, and therefore, it is difficult to make 
quantitative judgements on the proportion of fires, 
subsequent over-turning and casualties associated with FT 
derailments. However, the data collected illustrate that 
most derailments occur at speeds in excess of 35 mph, 
wagons can run derailed for several miles without over-
turning and that spillage of wagon contents can occur and 
fire may result. 
95 
From a review of FT derailments conducted by Taig4 
approximately 64% of unprotected lines are blocked per 
derailment, and of these, 4% lead to subsequent collision 
with rolling stock. This provides 1 derailment followed by 
collision every 13.4 million km, hence 4 accidents of this 
type annually. Taig also concludes that 4% of FT 
derailments subsequently collide with objects off the 
track, providing about 6 such accidents per year. 
Railway Inspectorate (RI) accident reports indicate that 
derailments followed by subsequent collision with rolling 
stock are by far the worst FT derailments, in terms of 
expected casualties and property damage. From the FTA 
survey one RI accident report illustrates this point. On 8 
March 1969 an FT consisting of a locomotive, brake van and 
57 wagons loaded with coal derailed at approximately 35 
mph. The FT was hit by an on-coming passenger train 
resulting in over 40 injuries and 2 deaths. Forty one of 
the FT wagons derailed and many were damaged beyond repair. 
However, it is clear from RI accident reports that the 
majority of FT derailments are not as severe as the one 
described here. Derailments are often associated with 
wagons running derailed for several miles before being 
rectified and thus, little or no damage to the train, track 
or signalling occurs. One such derailment occurred on 16 
June 1973 at Berkhamstead. The 14th wagon of a 15 wagon 
freightliner derailed at approximately 60 mph and ran 
derailed for over 3 miles. No casualties or damage to the 
train, track or signalling occurred. 
Derailments involving fire are much more 
to freight trains conveying flammable 
likely to occur 
or explosive 
substances. However, regardless of the load being conveyed 
a simple "wheel-set" derailment is unlikely by itself to 
result in fire. It is suggested here and supported by RI 
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accident reports that fire is much more probable when 
derailment is accompanied by over-turning and/or collision. 
One such derailment which was accompanied by fire occurred 
on 3 March 1983 near Warrington. An FT consisting of 14 
tank wagons loaded with gas oil derailed. Subsequently one 
of the derailed wagons collided with a post supporting 
over-head electricity cables and fire ensued. Fortunately 
none of the staff present were injured and the fire was 
quickly extinguished. 
As with collision incidents the primary causes of FT 
derailments are not specifically recorded by the Railway 
Inspectorate. However, assuming that the primary causes of 
train derailments are the same regardless of rolling stock 
type, then the primary causes of FT derailments can be 
estimated. Thus, based on 1986 data it is suggested here 
that about 56% of all FT derailments result from staff 
error. It is thought that such errors occur as a result of 
excessive speed at junctions, crossings and curved track. 
Technical defects account for approximately 38%, and 
obstacles placed on the track about 6% of. all FT 
derailments. Derailments caused by technical defects are 
largely the result of worn equipment, such as, wheel-sets 
and track. The majority of derailments caused by objects 
lying on the track are the result of adverse weather 
conditions. However, a sizeable proportion of such 
derailments (approximately 38%) are caused as a result of 
malicious acts by the public. 
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4.1.3 Fires 
Fires which do not result from train collision or 
derailment are referred to here as non-crash fires and 
'those as a result of collision or derailment as crash 
fires. Train accidents are classed by the Railway 
Inspectorate as either collisions, derailments or fires. A 
collision or derailment involving subsequent fire is 
classed as a collision or derailment accident. Therefore, 
FT fires recorded by the Railway Inspectorate refer to non-
crash fires. 
Non-crash FT fires, as recorded by the Railway 
Inspectorate, are those extinguished by, or requiring the 
attendance of, the fire services5. As a consequence of this 
it can be argued that all such fires have the potential to 
cause serious train damage and/or endanger life and/or 
endanger the load under conveyance. During 1986 a total of 
53 non-crash FT fires occurred on British railways1, 
providing a rate of 1 fire every 1 million km travelled. It 
is not known how many non-crash FT fires occur in BUAs. 
Assuming average FT speeds of 25 mph in BUAs and 45 mph 
in non-BUAs it is estimated here that 17% of non-crash FT 
fires occur whilst FTs pass through BUAs. The author has 
found no data which can be used to identify mean FT speeds. 
However, from contacts within British Rail6,7 it is known 
that FT speeds are generally less in BUAs than in non-BUAs, 
and that mean FT speeds range somewhere between 20 mph and 
40 mph and 40 mph and 60 mph in BUAs and non-BUAS 
respectively. Assuming a range of mean FT speeds between 
20 mph and 40 mph in BUAs and between 40 mph and 60 mph in 
non-BUAs the proportion of non-crash FT fires in BUAs 
ranges from between 10% and 25%. 
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Following discussions with British RailS and from 
reference to various Railway Safety reports it is concluded 
here that the vast majority of non-crash FT fires do not by 
themselves present a major threat to the train, its load or 
occupants. This is because most fires are small, localised 
and quickly extinguished. 
Of the 68 FT non-crash fires detailed in the FTA survey 
for the years 1986 and 1987, approximately 82% started in 
hauling locomotives, the remaining 18% occurred else-where. 
The main causes of these fires were 
a. axle bearings overheating, 
b. irregular sparking of brake blocks, 
c. electrical faults, 
d. engine/exhaust malfunction. 
Excluding locomotive fires the FTA survey suggests that 
approximately 60% of all FT non-crash fires (excluding 
leaking tank wagons) are the result of brake block sparks 
and hot axle boxes/pipes. 
The FTA survey conducted by the author, for the years. 
1967 through to 1984, details only one severe FT non-crash 
fire (see Section 4.2). The fire occurred on 1 January 1969 
near Ambergate, Derbyshire. Brake block sparks ignited oil 
escaping 
casualties 
from insecure tank hatches. Fortunately no 
were sustained although the fire caused 
extensive train damage. In comparison, the FTA survey 
details six FT crash fires. Of these four involved FTs 
conveying flammable liquids. However, only one of these 
incurred fatalities. The accident occurred on 7 December 
1984. A PT travelling at approximately 50 mph collided into 
the rear of an FT laden with gas oil. The rear FT rail car 
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was thrown across adjacent track causing extensive damage 
and subsequent fire. Unfortunately over 60 members of the 
public were injured and 3 individuals killed. In 
comparison, both crash fire accidents, not involving 
flammable liquids, incurred fatalities. The first accident 
occurred on 8 April 1969 near Wolverhampton when a four 
coach PT collided head-on with a stationary 32 wagon steel 
laden FT at 45 mph. Both drivers were killed and over 30 
people injured, including 1 fireman attending the scene. 
The second accident occurred on 6 October 1971 when two 
FTs, both conveying steel, collided near Beattock in 
Scotland. The speed of one train was estimated to be in 
excess of 80 mph when it impacted the rear of the other FT 
which was travelling at approximately 35 mph. The guard of 
the struck FT was killed. These two accidents highlight the 
significance of speed in FT crash fires which do not 
involve the carriage of flammable liquids. 
Of the six crash fires detailed in the FTA survey all 
those involving casualties were the result of FT collisions 
with rolling stock. These incidents suggest that casualties 
are much more likely from crash fires resulting from 
rolling stock collisions than other crash fire types. 
4.1.4 "Severe" Freight Train Accidents and Fires 
Accidents designated here as "severe" are 
accidents which endanger life and/or the integrity of 
those 
the 
load under conveyance. Such accidents are often associated 
with extensive train, track and/or signalling equipment 
damage. Freight train collisions which are considered 
severe have been previously identified as those involving 
rolling stock. During 1986 the rate of severe FT collisions 
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was 1 every 2.8 million km travelled. 
The FTA survey suggests that between the years 1967 and 
1984, only 6 FT derailments were serious enough to be 
classified as severe. Two of these involved subsequent 
collision with PTs. Of the remaining 4, 2 involved 
subsequent fire of the flammable liquids under conveyance, 
one high speed derailment at a junction and one extensive 
track, signalling equipment and station platform damage, 
together with the risk of explosion due to the loss of its 
cargo of military ammunition. Assuming FTs travel an 
average of 59.2 x 106 km per year (9 year average, 1978 
.1986), then from the number of severe FT derailments given 
above (FTA survey) this suggests that the rate of severe 
derailments is 1 every 178 million km travelled. However, 
this figure 
is thought 
is based on the reports readily available. It 
that during this period a number of severe 
incidents may not have been reported, correctly classified, 
or made readily available. Therefore, it is considered (and 
shown below) that the rate calculated from the FTA survey 
under-estimates the actual rate of severe FT derailments. 
The number of severe FT derailments per year is not 
known. Its estimation would require the analysis of a much 
larger sample of FT derailments than those included in the 
FTA survey. However, between 1975 and 1986 the number of 
staff casualties resulting from FT derailments totalled 70 
(see Section 4.6, Table H3). During this period there were 
approximately 1900 FT derailments1 . As previously mentioned 
in Section 4.1.2 there are about 4 FT derailments per year 
which result in subsequent collision with other rolling 
stock. Therefore, between 1975 and 1986 it is estimated 
that 
other 
can 
FT derailments 
rolling stock) 
be calculated 
(excluding subsequent collision with 
totalled 1850. From these figures it 
that there are about 0.04 staff 
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can be calculated that there are about 0.04 staff 
casualties per 
collision with 
FT derailment 
other rolling 
(excluding subsequent 
stock) • Assuming FT 
derailments are distributed evenly over the 12 year period, 
1975 through to 1986 and that the average annual distance 
travelled by FTs is 59.2 x 106 km, then it can be 
calculated that there are approximately 6 severe FT 
derailments (excluding subsequent collision with other 
rolling stock) per year at a rate of 1 every 10 million km 
travelled. All FT derailments followed by subsequent 
collision with other rolling stock are judged to be severe 
FT derailments. The rate of such derailments is given in 
Section 4.1.2 as 1 every 13.4 million km travelled. From 
the postulated rates given here it is estimated that the 
rate of severe FT derailments is approximately 1 every 5.7 
million km travelled. 
A similar treatment to that given above can be used to 
calculate the number and rate of severe FT fires. Between 
1975 and 1986 only 3 minor and 1 serious injury were 
recorded out of a total of 644 FT non-crash fires. Thus, 
over the 12 year period there were approximately 0.006 
casualties per FT non-crash fire. Assuming all non-crash 
fires resulting in casualties are severe fires and that FTs 
travel an average of 59.2 x 106 km annually, then it can be 
inferred from the figures given here that there are 0.33 
severe non-crash fires per year at a rate of 1 severe non-
crash fire every 178 million km travelled. However, it is 
thought that there are a significant number of severe FT 
non-crash fires which do not incur casualties. This 
statement is supported by the severe FT non-crash fire 
detailed in the FTA survey and the contrasting severe non-
crash fire rate derived below. 
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A better estimate of the rate of severe FT non-crash 
fires can be gained by examining severe FT crash fires. 
From the FTA survey 4 collisions and 2 derailments were 
accompanied by fire. All 6 crash fires are classed as 
severe. Therefore, from the 34 crashes detailed in the FTA 
survey 6 involved fire. From this it can be calculated that 
there are about 0.18 severe FT fires per crash. The FTA 
survey is based on RI reports which concentrate on serious 
accidents and therefore the FTA survey is biased towards 
severe accidents. As a consequence of this the severe crash 
fire rate derived here can be considered as an upper bound. 
Freight train crashes total between 250 and 300 per year2 . 
Judging from published data and data obtained through 
personal contacts215 1986 was a typical year for FT 
accidents and fires on British railways. During this 
271 FT crashes were recorded. Using this figure and 
year 
the 
severe FT crash fire rate derived above (0.18) it can be 
estimated that there are about 50 severe FT crash fires per 
year. This provides a rate of 1 severe FT crash fire every 
1.1 million km based on the number of miles travelled by 
FTs during 1986 (54 x 106 km). It can be inferred from the 
FTA survey that severe crash fires outnumber severe non-
crash fires by a ratio of 6:1. Applying this ratio to the 
figures given here we could expect about 8 severe non-crash 
fires per year. This compares with 0.33 severe non-crash 
fires per· year derived from non-crash fire casualty rates. 
It is acknowledged that severe non-crash fires are also 
likely to occur in the absence of casualties. Therefore, 
the true rate of severe FT non-crash fires lies somewhere 
between the two rates calculated here (i.e. between 1 every 
178 million km (0.33 per year) and 1 every 1.1 million km 
(8 per year)). In the absence of further data it is not 
known to which end the actual rate lies. Assuming 1 severe 
FT non-crash fire every 15 million km travelled provides a 
mid-range value of about 4 severe non-crash fires per year. 
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The annual rate of severe FT accidents is the simple 
addition of severe collisions, derailments and non-crash 
fires (severe FT crash fires are included in severe FT 
collisions and derailments) . Hence, annually, it is 
estimated that there is 1 severe FT accident every 1.7 
million km, providing about 30 severe FT accidents per 
year. 
4.2 Freight Train Accident Survey 
Over 180 accident reports published by the Railway 
Inspectorate between the years 1967 and 1984 have been 
analysed by the author. Only 38 of the reports refer to 
freight train accidents. Accidents involving FTs are 
categorised as follows. 
a. collisions, 
b. derailments, 
c. level crossing accidents, 
d. fires. 
The vast majority of the reports reflect the main 
preoccupation of the Railway Inspectorate, that is, to 
investigate rail accidents so as to identify their cause. 
This is undertaken in the hope that the consequences of 
future accidents can be minimised by preventive 
action/measures (especially with regards to casualties) and 
lead to the reduction or eventual elimination of such 
accidents. 
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Unfortunately some reports are not as concise as others. 
However, a brief review of the accidents analysed is given 
in this section. 
4.2.1 Collisions 
The survey includes 26 FT collisions, 16 of which 
involve passenger trains (PT), 6 other FTs and one each 
with a parcels train, engineers repair train, empty wagon 
and a newspaper train. A total of 16 collisions involve 
derailment of one or more vehicles. Overturning of one or 
more derailed vehicles occurs in 10 of the 16 derailments. 
Of the 26 collisions 21 involve death or injury. The 21 
injury accidents account for 17 deaths and over 230 
injuries. Approximately 70% of the collisions involve 
frontal impact of the train (locomotive), 20% rear impact 
and 10% side or glancing impact. Head-on collisions account 
for 23% of all collisions. The survey reveals that almost 
a third (30%) of all FT collisions occur when the ,FT itself 
is stationary. 
It was found that in general the greater the closing 
speed the greater the likelihood of death or injury as 
Table 1 illustrates. However, the data given in Table 1 
should be interpreted with caution. The data include 
collisions between FTs and PTs and, therefore, it can be 
argued that a disproportionate view of the effect of impact 
speed is portrayed by Table 1. This is because although it 
is accepted that impact speed increases the severity of 
accidents and consequently increases the chances of death 
of exposed individuals, the number of exposed individuals 
is greatly increased in FT accidents involving PTs 
regardless of speed and therefore a greater number of 
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casualties can be expected. 
4.2.2 Derailments 
Only 8 FT derailments were found amongst the 38 FT 
accidents. Speed of derailment ranged between 35 mph and 
75 mph. Of the 8 derailments 2 resulted in subsequent 
collision with PTs. Excluding derailments involving 
subsequent collision only 1 derailment resulted in 
casualties. All three casualties were minor injuries to 
railway personnel. Three derailments involved overturning 
of vehicles, which by and. large resulted in extensive 
train, track and property damage. Only 2 derailments were 
accompanied by fire, both of these involving tank wagons 
loaded with flammable liquids. The survey highlighted the 
fact that wagons may run derailed for many miles before 
rectification or overturning. 
4.2.3 Level Crossing Accidents 
The survey reveals only 3 level crossing accidents. 
These accidents tend to indicate that for collisions where 
FTs hit road vehicles obstructing the track, very little FT 
damage is caused. Additionally, road vehicles are likely 
to be driven/pushed by the train well past the crossing 
point. One incident also highlights the fact that such 
accidents can be the result of reckless and irresponsible 
driving by those in ·charge of road vehicles. It was 
impossible to derive any further useful information from 
the few reports available. 
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4.2.4 Fires 
Only 1 report of an FT fire from the 187 reports studied 
was found. However, further data was made available through 
the Railway Inspectorates. From these data 68 FT fires 
between the years 1986 and 1987 were analysed as to the 
cause of fire. 
Not one of the 68 FT fires resulted in railway staff or 
members of the public being injured or killed. 
Approximately 82% of the fires occurred in hauling 
locomotives, the remaining 18% occurred elsewhere. Table 4 
illustrates the causes of FT fires. By far the largest 
cause of fire is "sparking" from brake blocks igniting 
oil/dirt deposits and/or flammable liquids escaping from 
pipes and insecure tank hatches. Excluding locomotive 
fires, the causes of fires are spread fairly evenly between 
a. brake block sparks igniting oil/dirt deposits. 
b. overheating of axle boxes causing ignition of 
oil/dirt deposits and/or surrounding materials, 
c. hot stove pipes in brake vans igniting surrounding 
materials. 
It should be noted that a large proportion of the FT 
fires analysed were the result of insecure tank hatches 
facilitating the ignition of flammable liquids. Obviously 
this cause of fire is eliminated if tank wagons are not 
used or flammable liquids are not conveyed. Therefore, for 
FTs not exposed to this potential cause of fire, the survey 
suggests that fires, excluding locomotive fires, are 
largely the result of brake block sparks, hot stove pipes 
(brake vans) and overheating axle boxes. 
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Table 1: Freight train casualties with respect to closing 
speed: Freight train collisions: Freight train 
survey 1967 - 1984 
Closing Deaths Injuries Deaths/accident 
speed (mph) (%) (%) (mean) 
1 - 20 18 17 0.4 
20 - 25 0 19 -
25+ 82 74 1.2 
Table 2: Freight train 
with respect 
survey 1967 -
collisions with other rolling stock 
to impact speed: Freight train 
1984 
Freight train Proportion of 
impact speed impacts (%) 
(mph) 
1 - 10 29 
11 - 20 33 
21 - 30 14 
31 - 40 5 
40+ 19 
lOB 
Table 3: Freight train collisions 
with respect to impact 
survey 1967 - 1984 
Passenger train 
impact speed 
(mph) 
1 - 10 
11 - 20 
21 - 30 
31 - 40 
40+ 
with passenger 
speed: Freight 
Proportion of 
impacts (%) 
10 
27 
18 
18 
27 
Table 4: Freight train fires with respect to cause: 
Freight train survey 1986 - 1987 
4A: Freight train fires 
Cause of fire Proportion of 
fires (%) 
Brakes/sparks 47 
Exhaust system 10 
Engine 16 
Mechanical fai1uresa 7 
E1ect6ica1 4 
Other 15 
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trains 
train 
Table 4: continued 
4B: Freight train fires 
(excluding fires started in hauling locomotives) 
Cause of fire Proportion of 
fires (%) 
Brakes/sparksc 66 
Hot stove pipes 17 
Hot axle boxes 17 
4C: Freight train fires (hauling locomotive fires only) 
Cause of fire Proportion of 
fires (%) 
Brakes/sparks 52 
Exhaust system 13 
Engine 
failuresd 
20 
Mechanical 5 
Electrical 5 
Othere 5 
Note 
a. Includes hot axle boxes. 
b. Includes hot stove pipes and leaking cargo/fuel. 
c. Insecure tank hatches on rail tankers account for 33% of 
fires, leaking fuel accounts for a further 8% of fires. 
d. Includes hot axle boxes. 
e. Includes hot stove pipes and leaking cargo/fuel. 
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4.2.5 Freight Train Accident Descriptions 
Freight Train Collisions 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
11 July 1967 
00.16 
Winwick Junction 
Injuries: 20 (all minor - 19 passengers + PT driver) 
Description: A stationary 37 wagon FT was hit in the rear 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
by a PT at 20 mph. The FT brake van and 3 of 
the last 5 wagons derailed. Only minor damage 
occurred to the PT and· no coaches 
derailed. FT 50 BWU. 
30 October 1968 
00.16 
Selside near Horton-in-Ribblesdale 
were 
Injuries: 2 (minor, driver + guard) 
Description: A 24 wagon FT hit the rear of a stationary 46 
wagon FT (56 BWU) at 30 mph causing 14 of the 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
46 wagons to derail; The stationary FT was 
driven 30 yards. Extensive damage to track and 
rolling stock. 
8 April 1969 
14.26 
Monmore Green, Wolverhampton 
2 (drivers of both trains) 
Injuries: 33 (30 passengers, 2 staff, 1 fireman) 
Description: A 4 coach electric PT collided head-on at 45 
mph with a stationary 32 wagon FT loaded with 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
steel. Fire ensued and extensive damage was 
caused to track (locos. were beyond repair). 
PT 158 tons, FT 791 tons (class 7 special FT) . 
27 May 1970 
17.22 
Near Albion Sidings, Oldbury 
2 (driver and guard of PT) 
Description: Glancing collision between FT and PT. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
Derailment of PT coaches and 2 empty oil tank 
wagons. Speed of impact, PT 20-25 mph, FT 4 
mph. PT 152 tons, FT 435 tons. 
12 November 1970 
21.38 
Bexley Station 
Description: FT hit rear of stationary 6 coach PT at 10-15 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
mph. PT was driven forward 40 feet. FT 696 
tons, (44 wagons + brake van + diesel-elec. 
loco.), PT 208 tons. 
6 October 1971 
03.20 
Near Beattock, Scotland 
1 (guard of struck FT) 
Description: A 24 wagon FT loaded with 10-12 tons of steel 
collided with the rear of a 34 wagon FT 
conveying containers and 17 wagons of steel. 
The 24 wagon FT hit the 34 wagon FT at 
approximately 80 mph. The initial speed of the 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
34 wagon FT was 35 mph. The collision 
completely demolished brake van and colliding 
loco (which also overturned and caught fire) . 
Extensive damage to both trains was caused. FT 
(24 wagon) 967 tons, FT (34 wagons) 814 tons> 
27 November 1971 
19.25 
Sharnbrook 
Description: A 61 wagon FT hit a stationary engineers train 
at 20 mph causing the engineers train to shunt 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
another FT. 
16 December 1971 
06.15 
Nottingham 
3 (all staff) 
Description: Head-on collision between a parcels train and 
a 32 wagon FT loaded with coal. Both locos. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
derailed causing extensive damage 
sp·eed on impact, FT 5-10 mph, PAR 40-50 mph. 
PAR moved backwards 20 feet. FT 1190 tons 
(24.5 ton hopper wagons+ brake van), PAR 278 
tons (13 vans). 
25 March 1972 
22.28 
Drem, Scotland 
Description: Head-on collision between a PT and a 19 wagon 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
FT. PT hit FT at 15 mph. PT derailed. PT 451 
tons. 
8 May 1972 
20.51 
Chester General Station 
Injuries: 5 (minor - all staff) 
Description: A 38 vehicle FT consisting of wagons laden 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
with petroleum products collided with a 
stationary PT (empty) causing extensive 
property and train damage. FT loco. caught 
fire. FT impact speed, 20 mph. FT 981 tons. 
29 August 1972 
18.30 
Near Nuneaton 
Description: PT consisting of 13 coaches hit open door 
wagon FT. The door was strewn across 
of 
the 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
20 
line and a second PT ran into it at 98 mph. 
6 September 1972 
20.58 
1 (loco. driver) 
1 (guard) 
Description: Eighteen wagon FT collided at 30 mph with 
forty empty wagons causing derailment and 
overturning of wagons. Extensive damage. 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
12 October 1972 
19.48 
Wimbledon Station 
Description: FT consisting of 22 wagons loaded with coal + 
brake van + diesel-elec. loco. collided with a 
Date: 
Time: 
stationary 6 coach PT at 25 mph. The PT was 
driven 35 yards. FT loco. derailed and 
extensive damage was caused. FT 544 tons, PT 
135 tons. 
27 April 1973 
Location: Kidsgrove Station 
Deaths: 1 (FT driver) 
Injuries: 7 (FT guard, 4 staff + 2 NT staff) 
Description: FT hit rear of stationary newspaper train (NT) 
at 12 mph. FT consisted of 9 empty mineral 
wagons, 3-empty hopper wagons and a brake 
van. Extensive damage to FT loco .. FT 529 
tons, NT 499 tons. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
5 November 1973 
18.20 
Dingwall, Scotland 
8 (6 passengers + 2 staff) 
Description: Head-on collision between a 14 wagon FT loaded 
with whisky and a 4 coach stationary PT. 
Extensive damage to both locos., 3 leading 
wagons of FT derailed, minor damage to PT 
coaches. FT 467 tons. 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
27 November 1973 
08.11 
Near Whitehaven 
Injuries: 2 (PT driver + FT guard) 
Description: PT hit rear of slow moving FT (1 mph) at 25 
mph. Derailment of PT leading bogie and FT 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
brake van. Extensive damage to PT loco •• 
23 October 1974 
05.04 
Bridgewater 
1 
1 
Description: Stationary 42 wagon FT (767 tons) hit in the 
rear by a 13 wagon FT (1082 tons) at 45 mph. 
Derailment and extensive damage. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
31 May 1975 
09.15 
Near Rutherglen Station, Scotland 
37 (34 passengers + 3 staff) 
Description: A stationary FT loaded with cement was hit by 
a 6 coach PT at 30-40 mph. Derailment of FT 
loco. and leading 4 coaches of PT. FT 1107 te, 
PT 256 te. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
6 August 1975 
22.12 
Weaver Junction 
Injuries: Minor (FT crew + driver of FL) 
Description: FT conveying 20 tank wagons hit side of 15 
116 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
wagon FL. Both trains derailed and were 
extensively damaged. FT tank wagons were 
each loaded with 30 tons of caustic soda. FL 
wagons suffered extensive damage and piercing, 
the last 10 wagons derailed. Speed on impact, 
FT 60 mph, FL 70-75 mph. FT 1033 tons, FL 670 
tons. 
11 November 1976 
10.10 
Melton Lane, near Ferriby 
Injuries: 7 (all minor) 
Description: A stationary FT consisting of 29 wagons, 13 of 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
which were loaded to 21 tons was hit by a PT 
at 35 mph. The PT consisted of a two car-
diesel and a trailer. PT loco. and last two 
wagons of FT derailed. 
14 February 1979 
20.15 
Chinley North Junction 
7 (5 passengers + 2 staff of PT) 
Description: A stationary FT was hit head-on by a PT at 10-
15 mph. The FT was loaded with limestone in 22 
46 te hopper wagons. FT 1146 te, PT 58 te. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
30 July 1982 
08.30 
Near Lindsey Oil Terminal 
Minor 
Description: Head-on collision between two FTs (coal train 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
v 26 tank wagon train loaded with petroleum) . 
Closing speed approximately 16 mph. Extensive 
damage to locomotives. 1556 te coal train, 
1736 te petroleum train. 
9 December 1983 
18.18 
Wrawby Junction 
1 (passenger) 
Injuries: 3 (passengers) 
Description: FT consisting of 9 empty oil tank wagons 
struck the side of a PT. First coach of PT 
derailed, PT loco. derailed and overturned. PT 
speed on impact 5-10 mph. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
3 February 1984 
02.14 
North Western Street, Wigan 
2 (driver + guard) 
Description: FT (658 te) consisting of 21 wagons 14 of 
which were loaded hit the rear of a stationary 
10 wagon FT (630 te) at 5-8 mph. The struck FT 
was driven over 16 m by the impact. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
11 October 1984 
16.04 
Wembley Central Station 
Deaths: 3 passengers 
Injuries: 18 (17 passengers + driver of PT) 
Description: Eight coach PT hit the 11 th wagon of a 20 
wagon FL causing all but the rear PT coach to 
derail. The 1st two PT coaches overturned. PT 
speed on impact was estimated as 57 mph and 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
the FL as 15 mph. Damage was caused to 
track(extensive), signalling and overhead line 
equipment. FL wagons were undamaged. FL 1302 
te, PT 316 te. 
7 December 1984 
10.37 
3 (2 passengers + driver) 
68 
Description: A PT collided with the rear of an FT. 
coach PT hit the FT at approximately 
The 6 
50 mph 
throwing the rear FT wagon (100 ton) laden 
with gas oil over adjacent track. Oil tank 
wagons ruptured and contents ignited. PT loco. 
caught fire. Extensive damage to both trains 
was caused. FT consisted of ten 45 te wagons 
and five 100 ton wagons laden with gas oil. FT 
speed on impact was between 10 and 15 mph. FT 
1062 te, PT 390 te. 
Freight Train Derailments 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
12 June 1968 
12.40 
Berkhamstead 
Description: Five wagons of a 15 wagon FL derailed at 75 
mph due to track misalignment. Only wagons 1 
and 13 were loaded. FL 410 tons. 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
8 March 1969 
11.46 
Near Ashchurch Station 
2 passengers 
45 (41 passengers + 4 staff) 
Description: Forty one wagons of a 57 wagon FT loaded with 
coal derailed at 35 mph. An 11 coach PT hit 
the derailed wagons at 30 mph causing 
extensive damage. 
Date: 
Time: 
·Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
22 October 1969 
22.18 
Chelmsford Station 
Description: The 8th wagon of a class 6 special FT 
conveying military explosives derailed at 45 
mph. The FT consisted of 27 covered wagons 
hauled by a diesel-electric loco. The first 5 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
Description: 
wagons 
other 
and the last wagon were empty, 
21 were loaded with just over 117 
of ammunition and pyrotechnics. No 
the 
tons 
wagon 
contained more than 7 tons. Extensive track, 
signalling and platform damage was caused. A 
hot axle box overheated and caught fire after 
derailment. Explosives were removed by the 
Army. 
31 December 1969 
11.35 
Near Roade Junction 
1 (PT driver) 
9 passengers 
Wagon of FT derailed at approximately 45 mph 
and ran derailed for over 2 miles before 
120 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
overturning and causing 
derail. A glancing blow by 
other wagons 
a PT with two 
to 
of 
the derailed wagons caused extensive damage. 
The PT driver was killed when the PT loco. hit 
a mast supporting overhead electricity lines. 
FT 716 tons, PT 158 tons. 
6 June 1973 
16.48 
Berkhamstead 
Description: The 14th wagon of a 15 wagon FL ran derailed 
for 3.5 miles at speeds of up to 60 mph before 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
being rectified. 
9 December 1975 
08.58 
Ferryhill 
3 (all staff) 
Description: Rear-most wagon of 5 ran derailed for over 3 
miles before overturning at a junction and 
derailing adjoining wagons. Derailment 
occurred at approximately 50 mph. The FT was 
conveying a small amount of acid and the 
public were evacuated. FT 713 te. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
3 March 1983 
07.10 
Near Warrington 
Description: A 14.5 ton van behind the leading loco. 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
derailed and uncoupled from the loco. at 35-40 
mph. The van subsequently derailed other 
wagons. The FT was conveying 14 tank wagons 
loaded with gas oil. One of the wagons hit a 
post carrying overhead wires and a fire 
ensued. Slight damage to loco •. Some wagons 
overturned and punctured. 
20 December 1984 
05.50 
Summit Tunnel 
Description: FT consisting of 13 wagons loaded with 835 te 
of petroleum spirit derailed at 40 mph behind 
the third wagon upon entering Summit Tunnel. 
Wagons 6 and 10 overturned, wagon 13 remained 
' 
on the track. Petroleum vapour was released 
due to the piercing of some wagons, fire 
ensued. Local residents evacuated. The fire 
was not considered under control until the 
evening of 24 December. Tunnel re-opened 19 
August 1985. 
Freight Train Level Crossing Accidents 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
8 March 1972 
10.18 
Near Whittlesea 
Injuries: Minor 
Description: FT conveying 30 loaded 21 ton 
collided with a 23.5 ton HGV at 
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hopper 
30 mph. 
wagons 
Minor 
damage to line, no derailment. FT 798 tons. 
Date: 15 November 1980 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 2 (car occupants) 
Injuries: 
Description: Driver of car attempted to cross rail track by 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
swerving around automatic half barrier. Car 
was hit by a 20 wagon FT at 70 mph and was 
driven 700 yards. FT 1100 tons 
21 January 1983 
Reddish Lane 
1 (car driver) 
Description: FT hit side of car at 35 mph. Car was driven 
80 m. Minor damage to loco .. 
Freight Train Fires (Non-Crash Fires) 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
1 January 1969 
08.15 
Near Ambergate 
Description: Brake block sparks ignited spillage of oil 
from unsecured tank hatch. FT consisted of ten 
100 ton tank wagons and two barrier wagons. 
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4.3 Freight Train Accident Speeds 
Information contained within this section refers to the 
closing speed of freight train collisions and the speed at 
which freight trains derail. Due to lack of data and/or 
insufficient detail where data are available, the author 
has been unable to relate speed to accident location. 
Therefore, a comparison between the speed of FT collisions 
and the speed of FT derailments in built-up and non-built-
up areas is not made. 
Data from various Railway Inspectorate (RI) accident 
reports have been used here to estimate the closing speed 
of FT collisions. It is considered that the closing speed 
estimates form a biased sample. This is because RI accident 
reports tend to detail those accidents associated with 
casualties and/or extensive damage. Although the sample is 
biased it is difficult to quantify a degree of error, and 
since no other information is available on which judgements 
can be made, the values in Table 5 are given without 
refinement. It is acknowledged that risk assessments using 
these data may produce conservative results. 
The author has also been unable to obtain data on 
closing speeds with respect to collision types. The data 
listed in Table 5 refer to head-on, front-rear and rear-
front FT collisions. Consequently the data do not refer to 
any one collision type but provide a generalised set of 
closing speed data. 
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can be seen that From Figure 1 (and chi-square test) it 
the closing speed data approximate 
distribution. Hence 
to a normal 
sample size n = 35 
best estimate of.the mean X = x1 + x2 + •••••••••• Xn 
x = 26.95 
= 27 mph 
best estimate of the variance 6n~1 = ~(Xj x)2 
n - 1 
62 = 
n-1 173.63 
best estimate of the standard deviation is 6n-l 
i.e. 6n-l = ~~~ 
6n_1 = 13.18 
From the above, and using the usual formula, the closing 
speed data can be represented as a normal distribution (see 
Figure 2) • 
Very little data exist on the speed of FT derailments. 
The author has been unable to collect sufficient data on FT 
derailments. Therefore, a similar treatment to that given 
above for collisions cannot be performed for FT 
derailments. However, Taig4 has analysed 300 FT 
derailments. The vast majority of FT derailments which 
result in casualties and/or extensive damage are those that 
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occur at high speed. This study is primarily concerned with 
high speed derailments and these are mainly the misfortune 
of plain track (Taig distinguishes between plain track and 
non-plain track but does not say what is meant by this. It 
is thought that plain track refers to track free from 
points and "cross-overs''). Plain track derailments are 
detailed in Table 6. 
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Table 5: Freight train closing speeds: Collisions 
SA: Sample of freight train closing speeds 
Closing Speed (mph) 
7 
12 
12 
12 
16 
17 
20 
20 
20 
24 
25 
30 
30 
35 
35 
37 
45 
45 
45 
52 
SB: Closing speed of freight train collisions 
Closing speed Proportion of 
(mph) collisions (%) 
1 - 10 5 
11 - 20 40 
21 - 30 20 
31 - 40 15 
41 - 50 15 
51 - 60 5 
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Table 6: Speed of freight train derailments 
Derailment Proportion of 
speed (mph) derailments ( %) 
1 - 10 15 
11 - 20 20 
21 - 30 6 
31 - 40 18 
41 - 50 26 
51 - 60 9 
61 - 70 3 
71 - 80 2 
81 - 90 1 
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4.4 Accident Severity Index: Collision Accidents 
It is shown here that an index can be 
quantify/categorise (or predict) the 
formulated to help 
severity of FT 
accidents. Much 
Inspectorate and 
However, as yet 
data are 
detailed in 
these data 
recorded 
various 
have 
by the 
accident 
not been 
Railway 
reports. 
used to 
quantify/categorise train accidents. 
Assuming that accident severity is measured in terms 
deaths, injuries and property damage, then the results 
the FTA survey indicate that closing speed is the 
important factor in accident severity. Generally, 
greater the closing speed, the greater the number 
of 
of 
most 
the 
of 
casualties and the greater the magnitude of damage. As a 
consequence of this, closing speed is considered the 
primary component of accident severity. However, the FTA 
survey indicates that speed is not the only factor 
governing accident severity. Two second order effects, 
termed secondary components, are shown to influence 
accident severity. These secondary components are known as 
closing train momentum and closing train tonnage. Unlike 
train speed, greater closing momentum (CMf does not 
necessarily mean an increase in casualties and damage. For 
example, in one accident (from the FTA survey) the closing 
momentum was 14.72 MNm and 4 injuries resulted. In another 
accident the closing momentum was 1.6 MNm with a total of 3 
deaths and 68 injuries. The closing speed for each accident 
was 20 mph and 35 mph respectively, illustrating the effect 
of closing train speed (CS) • Closing train tonnage (CT) can 
be illustrated in a similar fashion. However, it does not 
follow that an accident involving large closing momentum 
will necessarily have a large closing tonnage. This is 
because momentum is a product of mass and speed. As a 
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consequence of this, a train may have a relatively low 
tonnage but a high speed giving it a relatively high 
momentum, and vice-versa. 
The FTA survey indicates that deaths, injuries and 
damage are related to accidents which have a large primary 
component and at least one large secondary component (i.e. 
a large closing speed together with either a large closing 
momentum or a large closing tonnage} . Thus, it appears that 
only two of the three criterion are needed for a 
potentially severe accident. However, one of the criterion 
.must be high closing train speed. 
In order to illustrate the concept of a numerical index 
to quantify/categorise FT accidents, a simple index is 
detailed here for FT collisions. Due to lack of data the 
index is based on only 10 of the 26 collisions detailed in 
the FTA survey. 
The three criteria, speed, momentum and tonnage are each 
attributed a "score" until a means of satisfying the ten 
accidents is achieved. The three individual scores relate 
the three criterion and the sum of these provides an 
overall value of severity, known as the accident severity 
index (ASI} . 
Consider a freight train "X" colliding head-on with 
another freight train "Y". Freight train "X" is travelling 
at 25 mph (11.2 m/s} and freight train "Y" at 10 mph (4 .5 
m/s} before collision. The gross weight of each vehicle is 
1000 te and 600 te respectively. 
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CS = 25 + 10 = 35 mph 
CM = (1000 X 103 X 11.2) + (600 X 10 3 X 4.5) 
= 13.9 MNm 
CT = 1000 + 600 = 1600 te 
From the accident severity chart (page 134) 
ASI = 8 + 3 + 5 = 16 
i.e. Derailment and over-turning is almost 
accompanied by deaths and injuries. 
certain 
This simple accident severity index (ASI) has been 
cross-checked by applying it to a number of FT collisions. 
The remaining 16 FT collisions detailed in the FTA survey 
together with other similar accident reports have been 
used for this purpose. Although the data included in these 
reports are insufficient to assist ASI construction they 
are sufficient to provide a rough cross-check. The check 
tends to support the validity of the index in 
quantifying/categorising collision severity. 
It should be noted that expressing accident severity in 
terms of closing speed, momentum and tonnage provides a 
rough estimate of accident severity. From the FTA survey it 
is apparent that an accident resulting in multiple deaths 
may be less severe (in terms of damage and expected deaths) 
than one having only a few deaths or none at all. Deaths, 
injuries and damage are not only dependent on the three 
criteria speed, momentum and tonnage, but individual 
exposure, vehicle orientation and the properties of the 
load under conveyance. Unfortunately, due to lack of data, 
such considerations have not been included in this index. 
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ACCIDENT SEVERITY CHART 
Closing speed - CS 
CS (mph) Score 
45+ 10 
35 - 44 8 
25 - 34 5 
20 - 24 3 
Below 20 1 
Closing momentum - CM 
(CM)1/3 Score 
2.5+ 5 
1.19 - 2.49 3 
1. 00 - 1. 90 1 
Below 1.00 0 
Closing tonnage - CT 
(CT)1/4 Score 
5.0+ 5 
3.5 - 4.9 3 
3.0 - 3.4 1 
Below 3.0 0 
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SCORE 
AS! Possible consequences 
15+ deaths 
12 - 14 wagons over-turning and deaths 
9 - 11 derailment and injuries 
4 - 8 minor injuries 
Sample used in formulating freight train accident severity 
index: Freight train collisions 
1. FT (10 mph, 1556 te) V FT (10 mph, 1736 te) 
Head-on collision, 4 minor injuries. 
CS= 20 mph CM= 14.72 MNm CT = 3292 te 
ASI = 11 
2. FT (15 mph, 696 tons) v FT (stationary, 208 tons) 
Front-rear collision. 
CS= 15 mph CM= 4.74 MNm CT = 904 te 
ASI- = 7 
3. FT (stationary, 1107 te) v PT (40 mph, 256 te) 
Front-rear collision, 40 minor injuries, OT. 
CS = 40 mph CM = 4.6 MNm CT = 1363 te 
ASI = 14 
4. FT (10 mph, 1190 tons) v PAR (50 mph, 278 tons) 
Head-on collision, 3 deaths, OT. 
CS= 60 mph CM= 11.72 MNm CT = 1492 te 
ASI = 18 
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5. FT (35 mph, 814 tons) v FT (80 mph, 967 tons) 
Front-rear collision, 3 injuries, 1 death, OT. 
CS = 45 mph CM = 22.2 MNm CT = 153 te 
ASI = 18 
6. FT (stationary, 791 tons) v PT (45 mph, 158 tons) 
Front-rear collision, 33 injuries, 2 deaths, OT. 
CS = 45 mph CM = 3.23 MNm CT = 964 te 
ASI = 16 
7. FT (12 mph, 529 tons) v NT (stationary, 342 tons) 
Front-rear collision, 7 minor injuries, 1 death. 
CS = 12 mph CM = 2.88 MNm CT = 871 te 
ASI = 7 
8. FT (stationary, 767 tons) v FT (45 mph, 1082 tons) 
Front-rear collision, 2 injuries, 1 death, OT. 
CS = 45 mph CM= 15.68 MNm CT = 1879 te 
ASI = 20 
9. FT (15 mph, 1062 te) v PT (50 mph, 390 te) 
Front-rear collision, 68 injuries, 3 deaths, OT. 
CS= 35 mph CM= 1.6 MNm CT = 672 te 
ASI = 14 
10. FT (stationary, 1146 te) v PT (15 mph, 58 te) 
Front-rear collision, 7 injuries. 
CS = 15 mph CM = 0.4 MNm CT = 1204 te 
ASI = 6 
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4.5 Movements of Explosives 
It is thought that less than 10% of all commercial 
explosives are transported by rail, compared with about 60% 
of all military explosives. As a result of commercial 
confidentiality and the need for military secrecy very 
little data are available on explosives movements. No 
specific data are available on commercial movements, except 
general data, as given in Section 6.1. However, a 
substantial amount of data have been collected by the 
author on rail movements of military explosives during the 
currency of this study. Data have been made available 
through Movements l(Army)9, the Logistics ExecutivelO and 
the assistance of staff at both the central Ammunition 
Depot (CAD) Longtown11 and Kineton12 . Kind permission has 
been granted to illustrate the movements data. 
The majority of the data refer to rail movements from 
CAD Longtown and CAD Kineton. A summary of these data are 
given below. 
CAD Longtown: Rail Movements November 1987 - October 1988 
During the twelve months November 1987 through to 
October 1988 234 wagons, classed as being laden with hazard 
division (HD) 1.1 munitions, were issued from CAD 
Longtown. It is not known how many of the wagons contained 
mixed loads, but between November 1987 and April 1988 26 
out of a total of 84 HD 1.1 wagons contained mixed loads. 
It can be estimated from this that approximately 30% of HD 
1.1 wagons issued between November 1987 and October 1988 
contained military explosives of other hazard divisions. 
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Based on 17 mixed wagon loads, issued between November 1987 
and April 1988, the ratio of HD 1.1 munitions to munitions 
of other classes is estimated here as 1:0.61 (in terms of 
gross munition weight). 
Rail movements from CAD Longtown totalled 144 for the 
234 wagon issues providing an average of almost 2 wagons 
per movement (1.63). A little under 170 te of explosive 
were moved between November 1987 and October 1988 (168.8 
te), the mean net explosives quantity (NEQ -i.e. net weight 
of explosives excluding casings and packaging, etc.) per 
wagon approximating to 0.53 te. 
From the years survey it has been possible to detail an 
average ratio of HD 1.1 NEQ with respect to gross munition 
weight, this being 0.26:1. Similarly, from the six months 
survey NEQ to gross munition weight for HD 1.2, HO 1.3 and 
HD 1.4 munitions approximates to 0.13, 0.16, and 0.06 
respectively. The NEQ ratios given for HD 1.2 and HD 1.3 
munitions have been based on very small samples, and as 
such, could be considered poor estimates. However, based on 
CAD Kineton data similar ratios have been derived from much 
larger samples. 
CAD Kineton: Rail Movements November 1988 - February 1989 
A detailed survey for the month of November 1988 of 
munitions wagons issued from CAD Kineton reveals that a 
total of 38 wagons were used to move approximately 28 te 
(NEQ) of explosive (excluding two very large and untypical 
wagon loads of HD 1.2 munitions). The number of movements 
totalled 35 providing an average of 1 wagon per movement. 
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Over the next three months, December 1988 and January and 
February 1989 similar amounts of explosive were moved, 
these being 22 te, 34 te, and 34 te respectively. During 
this four month period approximately 40% of the total NEQ 
moved was classed as HD 1.1, 22% as HD 1.2, 27% as HD 1.3 
and 12% as HD 1.4. 
Eighteen of the 38 wagons issued during November were 
classed as being laden with HD 1.1 munitions. However, 50% 
of the wagons also contained munitions of other hazard 
divisions. The mean NEQ of the 18 wagons approximates to 
1.37 te. This compares with a maximum mean NEQ per wagon, 
from the CAD Longtown survey, of 1.30 te. Between November 
1988 and February 1989 a total of 67 wagons classed as 
being laden with HD 1.1 munitions were issued from Kineton. 
Mixed wagon loads accounted for 40% of these. This compares 
with approximately 30% for similar issues from CAD Longtown 
between November 1987 and February 1988. 
The data collected from CAD Kineton have been used to 
estimate the ratio of NEQ to gross munition weight for each 
hazard division. With the exception of HD 1.1 munitions the 
ratios compare favourably with those obtained using data 
from CAD Longtown. The HD 1.1 munition ratio based on CAD 
Kin et on data is 0 .14: 1, compared with 0. 2 6: 1 based on CAD 
Longtown data. The CAD Kineton derived ratio for HD 1.2, HD 
1.3 and HD 1.4 are 0.11, 0.16 and 0.07 respectively. 
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Table 7: Rail movements of munitions classed as HD 1.1: 
CAD Longtown November 1987 - October 1988 
Number of Number of NEQ/wagon Total 
Month movements Wagons (te) NEQ (te) 
Nov 15 21 0. 96 20.15 
Dec 10 11 0.34 3.71 
Jan 8 11 0.32 3.50 
Feb 8 10 0.41 4.10 
Mar 14 21 0.60 12.64 
Apr 8 10 0.22 2.16 
May 15 24 0.70 16.87 
Jun 21 35 0.50 17.34 
Jul 15 20 0.53 10.63 
Aug 9 10 0.41 4.12 
Sep 7 35 1.17 40.92 
Oct 14 26 1.26 32.63 
Total 144 234 0.53 168.88 
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Table 8: Distribution of wagon loads: HD 1.1 munitions 
Size of 
range (NEQ) 
te 
0 - 0.10 
0.10 - 0.25 
0.25 - 0.50 
0.50 - 1. 00 
1. 00 - 2.00 
2.00 - 3.00 
Note: 
a. Data obtained 
munitions from 
October 1988. 
Mid-Range No. of Proportion of 
value (NEQ) Loads all loads 
te wagons % 
0.05 76 32.5 
0.18 23 9.8 
0.38 11 4.7 
0.75 26 11.1 
1.50 83 35.5 
2.50 15 6.4 
through the survey of rail movements 
CAD Longtown between November 1987 
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of 
and 
4.6 Freight Train Accident and Transport Data 
Table A: Freight train kilometres travelled by locomotive 
type: 1986 
Locomotive kilome~res 
type X 10 
Diesel 47.4 
Electric 6.6 
All locomotives 54.0 
Source: Department of Transport1 
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Table B: Number of freight train accidents by accident 
type: 1986 
Accident type Number of 
accidents 
Collision * 113 
Derailment 158 
Fire 53 
All accidents 324 
Source: Department of Transport 1 
* Sawer, D.A.3 
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Proportion of 
accidents 
35 
49 
16 
100% 
Table C: Frequency of freight train accidents by accident 
type: 1986 
Accident type Freq~ency of accident 
(10- accidents/km) 
Collision 2.09 
Derailment 2.93 
Fire 0.98 
All accidents 6.00 
Note: 
a. Accident frequencies are derived from data given in 
Tables A and B. 
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Table D: Number of freight train collisions by collision 
type: 1986 
Collision type Number of Proportion of 
collisions collisions 
FT v FT 8 7 
FT v PT 1 1 
FT v ECS 10 9 
Buffer stops 55 49 
Animals 9 8 
Mise. obstaclesa 22 19 
Level crossingsb 6 5 
Other 2 2 
All collisions 113 100% 
Nota: 
a. Obstacles include trees, railway debris and 
miscellaneous items falling or maliciously placed on the 
track. 
b. Includes 4 collisions at protected and 2 at unprotected 
level crossings. 
Source: Sawer, D.A.3 
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Table E: Frequency of freight train collisions by 
collision type: 1986 
Collision type Frequ6ncy of collisions 
(10- accidents/km) 
FT v FT 0.15 
FT V PT 0.02 
FT v ECS 0.19 
Buffer stops 1. 02 
Animals 0.17 
Mise. obstacles 0.41 
Level crossings 0.11 
other 0.04 
All collisions 2.09a 
Nota: 
a. Discrepancy of value due to rounding. 
b. Collision frequencies are derived from data given in 
Tables A and D. 
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Tab1e F: Train* co1lisions at protected level crossings 
with road vehicles: 1986 
Collision type Number of 
Collisions 
Train vs. Car 13 
Train vs. Van 5 
Car vs. Train 5 
van vs. Train -
Total 23 
Note: 
a. * no data are available to distinguish between FT and PT 
accidents. 
b. Total number of crossings at the end of 1986 totalled 
8732 of which 7017 were unprotected. 
Source: Department of Transport 1 
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Table G: Number of train* accidents by principal cause 
and accident type: 1986 
Principal cause Number of accidents 
Collisions Derailments Fire Other Total 
Staff error 178(139) 114 4 22 318 
Technical defects + 34 (8) 69 146 11 260 
Other causes ++ 506 (119) 9 24 55 594 
All causes 718 (266) 192 174 88 1172 
Note: 
a. * no data are available to distinguish FT accidents. 
b. + includes vehicles, track and signalling. 
c. ++ includes accidents due to the weather, animals on the 
line and irresponsible acts by the public. 
d. Figures in brackets denote collisions between rolling 
stock, buffer stops and projections from rolling stock. 
Source: Department of Transport! 
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Table H: Rail accident casualties: 1986 
Hl: All casualties 
Accident type Numbers of people 
Killed Injured 
Major Minor 
Collisions 27 72 383 
Derailments - 5 26 
Fires - - 6 
Other - - 18 
Total 27 77 433 
Source: Department of Transport 1 
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Table H: continued 
H2: Railway staff casualties only 
Accident type Numbers of people 
Killed Injured 
Major Minor 
Collisions 5 - -
Derailments - 1* 3 
Fires - - 1 
Other - - 12 
Total 5 1 16 
Note: 
a. * freight train derailment. 
b. Railway staff include contractor staff. 
Source: Department of Transport1 
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Table H: continued 
H3: Railway staff casualties resulting from freight 
train derailment 
Year Deaths Serious Minor All 
injury injury casualties 
1986 - 1 - 1 
1985 - - 3 3 
1984 - 1 2 3 
1983 - - 8 8 
1982 - - 6 6 
1981 - - 4 4 
1980 1 1 5 7 
1979 - - 2 2 
1978 
- - 5 5 
1977 - 1 12a 13 
1976 - 2 ~b 11 1975 - - 7 
Total 1 6 63 70 
Note: 
a. Includes 2 passengers and 2 unclassified persons. 
b. Includes 1 unclassified person. 
Source: Department of Transport1 
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PARTB 
5.0 EXPLOSIVES SENSITIVITY: ACCIDENTAL INITIATION IN 
ROAD AND RAIL ENVIRONMENTS 
The need to quantify explosives sensitivity has led to 
numerous tests and a wealth of published literature. A 
comprehensive reference of data and tests pertinent to 
commercial explosives is given by Macek1 , whereas, the 
Sensitiveness Collaboration Committee2 have compiled a full 
list and description of tests relative to military 
explosives. In addition, the United Nations (UN) Committee 
of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods recommend a 
number of tests and criteria suitable for classifying both 
commercial and military explosives3. The tests are 
published as a handbook companion to the UN recommendations 
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods4. 
Explosives sensitivity testing is primarily performed so 
as to classify explosives into various hazard divisions and 
compatibility groups (see Section 6.1.1). More importantly 
here, explosives sensitivity test data enables judgements 
to be made on the vulnerability of explosives to stimuli 
which may be encountered during manufacture, storage and 
transport. In addition, the data are used by the Research 
and Laboratory Services Division (RLSD) of the Health and 
Safety Executive to highlight possible areas of concern and 
identify those explosives and tests requ1r1ng further 
research and developments. Testing by RLSD is undertaken on 
behalf of HM Explosives Inspectorate. Sensitivity tests are 
also carried out by a number of commercial 
manufacturers/users of explosives and by the 
Defence at various centres throughout the UK 
Ministry of 
(e.g. Royal 
Armament Research and Development Establishments (RARDE), 
Royal Ordnance, Nobels Explosives and IMI). 
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The problem of sensitivity in the context of this study, 
is one of identifying and quantifying stimuli which can 
cause explosives to initiate during road and rail 
transport. Fire and impact are considered here to be the 
most likely sources of initiation. 
It is generally accepted that under normal transport 
conditions, explosives can be conveyed with little risk of 
initiation6. Normal conditions refer to usual transport 
environments where extremes of heat, shock and vibration, 
etc. are not encountered. However, vehicular accidents 
often have the potential to cause initiation of explosives, 
either by introducing stimuli or amplifying normally 
passive environments. Typical initiation stimuli, being 
either accident induced or passively present, have been 
identified here and are discussed below. 
Note 
It is considered here that all initiated explosives 
ultimately cause explosion (i.e. those explosives 
undergoing chemical decomposition or more precisely self 
sustaining 
suitable 
exothermic reaction, as a result of 
initiation stimuli, explode) • The term 
contacting 
explosion 
is rather ambiguous. A popular definition is given by 
Uvarov and Isaacs7 
"[an explosion is] a violent and rapid increase of 
pressure in a confined space". 
155 
A more precise definition is given by Strehlow and Baker8 
" •••• an explosion is said to have occurred .•.•• if 
energy is released over a sufficiently small time 
and in a sufficiently small volume so as to 
generate a pressure wave of finite 
travelling away from the source". 
amplitude 
The author has been unable to find a concise 
"scientific" definition of the term explosion. However, its 
use in this study refers to a sudden release of energy 
causing a pressure discontinuity, termed a blast wave. 
Furthermore, the term explosion refers to both deflagrative 
and detonative 
are 
explosions. Deflagrative and detonative 
described fully by Cook9, Baker10 and explosions 
Kinney11 . For the purposes of this study it is sufficient 
to note that detonative explosions, unlike deflagrative 
explosions, produce a reaction front travelling at greater 
than sonic velocity through unreacted explosive. Both 
explosions can cause extensive damage. However, the blast 
wave produced by a detonative explosion is much more 
destructive than that produced by a deflagrative explosion. 
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5.1 Shock and Vibration 
Shock is defined as a sudden and severe non-periodic 
excitation of an object. Most available data quantify shock 
in terms of acceleration in an identical manner to that 
found in vibration measurement. Unlike shock, vibration is 
a periodic oscillating motion. However, in normal transport 
environments vibrations are usually characterised by non-
periodic oscillations accompanied by changing amplitude. 
Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between shock and 
vibration, since high amplitude short term vibration, as 
experienced in vehicular accidents, can also be classed as 
shock. 
During transit, and under normal 
heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) are 
shocksl2 of approximately 100 m/s2. 
transport environments, 
subjected to maximum 
It should be noted here 
that such measurements are often expressed in terms of "g" 
where g refers to acceleration due to gravity (e.g. in this 
case 100 m/s2 equates to approximately lOg). Provided 
packages are secure, such shock levels can be effectively 
neglected as a means of initiating explosives. However, it 
has been known for structures attached to road and rail 
vehicles to experience ~xcitations above those of the 
transporting vehiclel2. Excitations of the order of 200 
m/s2 have been recorded for loads carried by HGVs, whilst 
the HGV itself has experienced much lower shock levels. 
There is no evidence to suggest that shock amplification is 
a new phenomenon. Although large excitations are not 
commonplace, shock amplification is considered part of the 
normal transport environment. As a consequence of this, it 
is assumed here that shock amplification has little or no 
significant 
explosives. 
effect on transport 
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incidents involving 
Sensitivity of explosives to shock has been analysed 
since the early 1930's when Muraourl3 devised a rudimentary 
test known as the "Gap Test". From its infancy it has grown 
to become one of the main internationally recognised 
sensitivity tests. As shown in Figure 1, a shaped charge 
known as the "acceptor" is separated from a "donor" charge 
by an inert barrier of thin metal 
typically 0.25 mm thick. Both the 
or plastic 
donor and 
strips, 
acceptor 
being gap geometries 
thickness. 
terms of 
are fixed, the only geometric variable 
Consequently, shock sensitivity is measured in 
gap thickness; the smaller the gap the less 
sensitive is an explosive, and vice-versa. The thickness of 
the gap is determined when the acceptor has a 50% chance of 
detonating. Detonation is deemed to have occurred when a 
"witness plate" located on the acceptor suffers mechanical 
damage. This effectively indicates that sufficient 
propagation velocity has been attained and, hence, the 
charge has detonated. 
The shock wave emanating from the donor charge consists 
of two distinct waves, namely pressure and thermal waves. 
Due to the gap thermal waves are isolated ensuring that 
only pressure waves reach the acceptor. The mechanism of 
initiation is essentially thermal. As the pure shock waves 
travel through ___ the_acceptor chemical reaction/molec;ular 
disruption is induced as a result of intense compression 
and consequent adiabatic heating. If the heat produced is 
of a sufficient temperature, whereby the reaction becomes 
self sustaining, shock waves are reinforced with reaction 
energy and after a transient delay steady state detonation 
results. 
158 
The results obtained from Gap Tests are relative to each 
particular test (i.e. gap material, charge composition and 
dimensions, etc.). Ordering of explosives sensitivity 
usually remains consistent regardless of material and 
parameter changes. Further information on the concepts of 
shock sensitivity, current testing procedures and equipment 
can be found through Kaye and Herman14 • 
Results gained from shock sensitivity tests are of 
little use for the provision of "real 
quantification. This is because the 
life" sensitivity 
stimuli used are 
idealised and their rates of input far too large compared 
with those experienced in vehicular accidents15. As a 
consequence of this, shock sensitivity test results are of 
little value to this study except as a means of comparing 
the relative shock sensitivity of explosives. Typical Gap 
Test results for various explosive materials are listed in 
Table 1. 
Although it is difficult to determine precise shock 
levels for explosives during conveyance, it is generally 
agreed that those shocks and vibrations experienced under 
normal transport environments are insufficient to cause 
explosive initiation6,12. However, it is thought that shock 
and vibration resulting from vehicular impacts have a 
finite likelihood of attaining suitable magnitudes to cause 
initiation. It is suggested here, that in vehicular 
accidents shock/vibration stimuli, sufficient to cause 
initiation, are accompanied by impact stimuli of magnitudes 
so great that initiation is much more likely as a result of 
impact. In addition to this, shock/vibration stimuli are 
difficult to distinguish and measure separately and 
therefore, initiation is often assumed to occur as a result 
of impact. 
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Table 1: US Naval laboratory gap test 
Material Cast or Densi3y Gap 
pressed (g/cm ) thickness (cm) 
RDX pressed 1. 640 8.20 
Pentolite cast 1. 684 6.70 
Tetryl pressed 1. 615 6.63 
Comp. B pressed 1. 663 6.05 
Comp. A pressed 1.590 5.34 
Comp. B cast 1.704 5.24 
TNT pressed 1.569 4.90 
Amatol cast -- 4.12 
TNT cast 1. 600 3.50 
Tritonal cast 1. 750 2.90 
Source: Macek1 
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' Figure 1: Typical gap test configuration: US Naval Ordnance 
gap test for solid explosives 
witness plate 
"acceptor" 
gap cards 
wood block 
detonator 
Source: Macekl 
5.2 Impact 
Impact can be defined as the collision of a single 
moving object with another moving or stationary object. 
Such impacts are absent in the normal transport 
environment. However, impact usually occurs in vehicular 
accidents. Collisions with other moving vehicles may cause 
direct and/or indirect collision of the explosives under 
conveyance. Direct collision refers to actual contact 
between explosives and the offending vehicle(s), whereas, 
indirect collision refers to contact between separately 
packaged explosives and/or ancillary equipment and/or 
interior parts of the transporting vehicle. A similar 
analogy can be expressed for single 
involving impact, such as, collisions 
objects and structures. 
vehicle 
with 
accidents 
unyielding 
Although it is thought that impact initiation is thermal 
in origin, why explosives ignite (sometimes) as a result of 
impact is not fully understood. On the basis of thermal 
initiation caused by the creation of localised thermal 
energy, known generally as "hot-spot" generation, energy 
transferred during impact must be greater than or equal to 
the Arrhenius energy of acti vation12. In this_ .. instance -
Arrhenius energy is the energy required to cause a small 
amount of explosive to decompose. It is believed that 
impact causes this decomposition by creating "hot-spots" 
above the explosives initiation temperature. This is 
thought to occur as a result of 
162 
a. friction between grains of explosive and/or grit 
particles, 
b. adiabatic compression of small air cavities, 
c. viscous heating caused by rapid extrusion, 
d. localised adiabatic deformation of thin layers of 
explosive as a result of mechanical failure. 
A full account of these initiation mechanisms is given by 
Heavens and Fieldl6 and Field et al17. 
Upon decomposition by one or more of the above heat 
generation mechanisms, additional energy is 
activates neighbouring material and so 
liberated which 
propagates a 
sustained reaction. There is a tendency for such exothermic 
reactions to become faster and rapidly increase the rate 
of heat production which ultimately leads to deflagration 
or detonation. For solid explosives the area over which 
energy is delivered appears to be an important criterial2. 
If the area is too small, neighbouring material will not 
receive sufficient energy to cause further decomposition 
and therefore explosion will not occur. In comparison, 
liquid explosives, including slurries and pastes, tend not 
to be critically dependent on the area over which energy is 
delivered. The reasons for this are not explained. For 
liquid explosives there is a tendency for energy to be 
recorded and measured in terms of energy per unit time 
(J/s) rather than energy per unit area (J/m2) as with solid 
explosives. 
Impact testing is well established as a standard 
explosives sensitivity test, although it is often 
acknowledged as a crude art rather than an exact science. 
This statement can be inferred from typical hammer impact 
tests, as described by Macek1 and Bowden et allB, and from 
"Susan" impact tests described by Parzel and Wardl9. Unlike 
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the determination of shock sensitivity, where event 
initiation can be related back to a pure shock wave, impact 
initiation can be attributed to many factors. Such factors 
are in the main attributable to impact velocity, pressure, 
friction, viscous heating and explosive fluidity. Many more 
problems accompany impact testing. However, those mentioned 
above serve to demonstrate the complexity surrounding 
impact sensitivity testing and measurement. An in-depth 
discussion of the problems associated with impact testing 
is given by Macek1 and Marshal et al20. 
The most common impact sensitivity test consists of a 
hammer of known weight being dropped from a pre-determined 
height onto an anvil layered with powdered explosive (see 
Figure 3) . The distance between the hammer and explosive 
(height) is recorded as that distance which results in a 
50% chance of detonation. The weight of the hammer is 
recorded and together with the height, which is found by 
trial and error, both are used as a measure of impact 
sensitivity. Since detonation is extremely rare during 
testing, an event is deemed to occur when an appreciable 
amount of noise, gas, odour, smoke or other suitable by-
product is observed. Unfortunately, the results obtained 
from impact tests are of little value in real terms, except 
as a means of ordering explosives sensitivity to impact and 
highlighting the risk of impact initiation. Typical impact 
test results for various explosive materials are listed in 
Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
It is suggested here that vehicular impacts associated 
with vehicular collisions are capable of initiating 
explosives. Evidence to support this stems from data 
collected on HGV and freight train (FT) speeds, upon and 
prior to collision, and data made available on the results 
of "Susan" impact tests1 9. Susan impact tests consist of 
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steel projectiles loaded with 0.45 kg of explosive which 
are propelled at various speeds (within and exceeding the 
range of vehicular impact speeds) into unyielding surfaces. 
The results of such tests indicate that explosives have a 
range of probable impact initiation speeds and that some 
explosives are much more sensitive than others. More 
importantly, the results indicate that a number of 
explosives can be initiated by impact at speeds which can 
be experienced in severe 
an impact initiation 
vehicular collisions. For example, 
speed of 52 
115 mph, which as shown 
m/s 
in 
equates 
Chapter 
to 
6.0, approximately 
Section 6.5.1, is an attainable impact speed in head-on 
collisions between certain HGVs. A similar example is also 
shown in Section 6.5.1 for FT collisions with rolling 
stock. In addition to the above it is important to note 
that the reportl9 from which the Susan test data are taken 
(and detailed here in Table 4) states that 
"a blanket assumption cannot be made that all 
warheads have survived a 15 m/s impact" 
Vehicular collisions at such an impact speed (34 mph) or 
greater are not uncommon, as shown by the data presented in 
Chapters 3.0 and 4.0, Sections 3.2 and 4.3 respectively. 
Consequently, it is thought here that regardless of energy 
absorption by vehicles during collision and protection 
offered by packaging, etc., certain vehicular impacts are 
capable of initiating a number of military and commercial 
explosives. 
165 
Table 2: US Naval laboratory impact test 
Material Height (cm) 
PETN 13 
RDX 24 
HMX 26 
Pento1ite 38 
Tetry1 38 
Comp. A3 60 
Comp. B 60 
Tritona1 107 
Amato1 116 
TNT 200 
Ammonium nitrate >320 
Note: 
a. 2.5 kg hammer, 35 mg sample. 
b. Height - 50% chance of detonation/event. 
Source: Macek1 
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Table 3: Fall hammer impact sensitivity 
Explosive Height 
(cm) 
Gelignite 5 - 10 
NitroglycerineC 20 - 30 
RDX 25 - 30 
Ammon gelignite 30 - 40 
PETN 60 - 80 
RDX/TNT 80 - 100 
TNTC 160 - 200 
TNT >200 
Note: 
a. 0.5 kg hammer 
b. Height - 50% chance of detonation/event. 
c. powder 
Source: Bowden and Gurton18 
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Table 4: Impact initiation of explosives: Susan tests 
Explosive Impact speed Mean p 0 at 
Initiation Survived 3.05 m 
(m/s) (m/s) (kN/m2) 
PBXN-105 52 32 1.1 
EDC 38 65 78 8.1 
OCTOLITE 70/30 66 62 51.8 
CTX-1 67 51 19.6 
EDC 29 77 66 12.6 
EDC 37 79 80 4.1 
EX 62 80 51 11.9 
EDC 24 84 64 2.0 
HMX/TNT 85/15 86 98 50.3 
CW3 89 so 3.2 
EDC 15 90 53 15.7 
TORPEX 2A 98 87 0.7 
HMX/POLY 85/15 120 89 3.6 
RGPA TYPE 2 140 82 2.4 
RDX/TNT 60/40 A 143 87 7.0 
RGP 154 82 2.0 
BX4 156 118 s.s 
TORPEX 4D/TF 185 135 9.3 
RDX/WAX/A1 2B 203 114 9.0 
PE4 228 125 8.7 
EDC 35 246 157 3.0 
CPX 200/M5 285 108 26.6 
Note: 
a. p 0 - peak overpressure 
Source: Parzel and Ward19 
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Figure 3: Hammer impact sensitivity test 
~hammer 
exp!osive 
anvil 
~high tensile steel 
source: RARDE2 and Fordham22 
5.3 Friction 
Friction sensitivity of explosives has been investigated 
by many researchers since the late 1930'sl8,21, Many tests 
have been devised, the most common ones being the Torpedo 
Test, Friction Wheel and Sliding Friction Test (see Figure 
4). Sensitivity testing by the aid of a friction wheel has 
been established for many years22, Simply, a small amount 
of explosive is smeared on the surface of a rotating disc 
on which rests a rod which can be varied in weight. The 
higher the speed of rotation and the greater the load 
before initiation the less sensitive is an explosive. In 
comparison, the sliding friction test essentially consists 
of a pendulum, anvil and plate. The plate is layered with 
explosive and the pendulum designed so as to slide the · 
anvil over the plate perpendicular to the force vector and 
at a pre-set constant velocity. Initiation is detected by 
observation or with the aid of an infra-red analyser which 
can detect small amounts of decomposition gases. Typical 
friction test results are listed in Table 5. 
Results gained from friction tests provide a measure of 
friction sensitivity which can be loosely extrapolated to 
frictional forces experienced in transport environments. 
For example, Hercules Inc. USA23 through the Allegancy 
Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) have employed a sliding 
friction machine to determine whether explosives can be 
initiated by friction under normal transport environments. 
The results, which are detailed in terms of combined 
pressure and velocity, confirm that normal transport 
environments do not provide sufficient frictional stimuli 
to initiate explosives. Hercules found that the most 
sensitive explosive tested, Gel-Power A-2 slurry, when 
subjected to a rubbing velocity of 3 m/s, required a 
pressure of 3.7 x 108 N/m2 to commence initiation. During 
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transit Hercules suggest that loads experience velocities 
far below 3 m/s and pressures above 2.8 x 108 N/m2 are 
unlikely to be encountered. 
Frictional stimuli are inherent in impact initiation. It 
is considered that in transport environments frictional 
stimuli are largely a result of severe vehicular 
collisions, and are therefore often masked by impact 
stimuli. One initiation mechanism associated with friction 
and impact is 
argued that 
stimulus2 4 • 
that of "stab-initiation•. However, it can be 
stab-initiation is basically a frictional 
through 
adhere 
For example, a metal rod 
an explosive may cause a thin 
to the rod surface. This 
piercing 
layer of 
can cause 
and passing 
explosive to 
frictional 
rubbing between the adhered layer and surrounding explosive 
resulting in localised heat generation. It is considered 
here that such an initiation mechanism in an accident 
environment would require large impact forces sufficient to 
breach vehicle bodies, packaging and casing, etc. As a 
consequence of this, it is generally thought that stab-
initiation is as much (if not more) an impact stimulus as 
it is a frictional stimulus. 
In the absence of impact stimuli capable of initiating 
explosives, frictional stimuli may attain sufficient 
magnitude to cause initiation. Such frictional initiation, 
under certain conditions is possible from the stimulus of 
sliding frictional force. This is measured as the force 
required to overcome resistance to horizontal motion and is 
recorded in terms of normal force per unit area (N/m2) • For 
explosives to be initiated by sliding frictional force 
during transit, a spillage of explosive 
"rubbing• velocity12 of approximately 3 
requires a 
m/s between 
package/equipment 
"hot-spots• of 
and explosive. Such action can 
sufficient temperature to cause 
produce 
thermal 
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decomposition and hence, initiation. Incidents resulting 
from such action are extremely unlikely (though not 
incredible). This is because in addition to insufficient 
pressure packaged explosives rarely lose their integrity 
and cause spillage when exposed to normal transport 
environments. Furthermore, unless acted upon by large 
external forces, load movements are subjected to 
velocities far below 3 m/s. Large forces resulting in load 
velocities above 3 m/s are possible from vehicular 
accidents. However, it is unlikely that vehicular accidents 
other than collisions involving severe impacts will cause 
packages to lose their integrity, thereby subjecting 
explosives (possibly) to sliding frictional forces above 3 
m/s. In conclusion, it is thought here that severe 
collisions are more likely to cause initiation through 
impact than friction. 
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Table 5: Friction sensitivity 
Explosive Torpedo frictionb Friction wheelc 
(cm) (kg) 
RDX 10 - 20 --
Gelignite 40 - 60 4 
PETN 35 - 40 10 
RDX/TNT 40 - 45 --
Ammon gelignite 40 - 60 30 
TNT 80 - 120 >50 
TNT a 100 - 120 >50 
Nitroglycerinea . >150 >50 
Note: 
a. powder , 
b. 1 kg at 80° 
c. 0.5 m/s 
d. Values given are those which may cause an event. The 
chance of an event is not given. 
Source: Fordham22 
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Figure 4: Friction sensitivity tests 
a. Torpedo friction test 
head 
anvil 
Source: Fordham22 
b. Friction wheels 
explosive 
-l 
explosive 
Source: Fordham22 
c. Sliding friction test 
variable load ecrew 
load indicator 
pendulum 
cylinder 
1-r--,.---r:::ol--" 
steel bar 
cm. 
I ! I I I I I 
scale 
Source: Bowden and Gurton18 
load screw 
5.4 Thermal Energy 
All explosives can be initiated by thermal stimuli. 
Initiation occurs when an exothermic reaction is realised 
or the rate of heat generation is much greater than the 
rate of heat loss. The critical temperature 
explosion occurs is dependent not only on 
composition but also explosive geometry and 
above which 
explosive 
length of 
exposure to thermal stimuli. In addition, Arrhenius 
activation energy, thermal conductivity and heat capacity, 
to name just a few, are contributing factors which affect 
thermal sensitivity of explosives. A thorough analysis of 
these factors and the techniques required to determine 
sensitivity are given by Longwe11 2S and Anderson26. 
Determination of critical explosion temperature is 
mainly performed using thermal "cook-off" techniques. These 
usually involve the immersion 
in molten solutions27, the 
of small amounts of explosive 
employment of differential 
scanning calorimetric equipment, where exothermic onset 
temperature is evaluated, or by the adoption of 
differential thermal analysis28,29. 
Results gained from thermal sensitivity tests are 
dependent on factors particular to each individual test. 
However, the results are useful in providing a guide to 
thermal stimuli which are capable of initiating explosives. 
It is apparent from the results given by the US Army 
Materiel Command27 that explosives are extremely unlikely 
to be initiated by thermal stimuli when exposed to normal 
transport environments. This point is tentatively supported 
by the high temperatures required to initiate explosives. 
For example, TNT requires a temperature of 465°C sustained 
for a minimum of 10 seconds or 520°C for 1 second to 
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undergo initiation12. In comparison, a typical Hercules 
manufactured dynamite when subjected to a temperature 
increase of lOct/min yields an onset exothermic temperature 
not much greater than 1450c. Unfortunately, Kloeber et all2 
have not expanded upon these results. The quantity and 
geometry of explosives used and the source of heat are not 
detailed. Therefore, the applicability of these results, 
with respect to the quantification of thermal sensitivity, 
is not clear. 
Ignition temperature for a number of explosive materials 
under various conditions is given in Table 6. 
It is concluded by Kloeber et al and the US 
of Transportl2 that the temperatures cited 
especially the rate of temperature increase, are 
Department 
above, and 
extremely 
unlikely to 
environments. 
be encountered under normal transport 
Military explosives have in fact been 
subjected to temperatures as 
undergoing truck shipment through 
and in excess of 650c during 
high 
Death 
air 
as 46 oc, whilst 
valley, California, 
travell2. However, 
explosives are characterised by poor heat dissipation. This 
can lead to thermal decomposition when exposed to prolonged 
high temperatures and may ultimately cause explosives to 
ignite. 
In transport environments the main threat of 
initiation from thermal stimuli is that of 
explosives 
fire. This 
statement 
Appendix 
and work 
Armament 
is supported by historical incidents (see 
B), data collected by the us Materiel Command2 7 
carried out in the early 1980's at the Royal 
Research and Development· Establishment (RARDE). 
The results of this work illustrate that many explosives 
will initiate and burn to deflagration, and in some cases 
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detonation, when subjected to engulfing or torch fires 
similar to those experienced 
accidents. It has been shown by 
in store and transport 
Dyer et al30 that the time 
required for the initiation of munitions in pallet fire 
tests and torch flame tests varies with respect to the type 
of fire and explosive used. For standard 155 mm shells 
filled with 11.5 kg of explosive (RDX/TNT or CW3) typical 
initiation times for pallet fire tests range from 0.6 
minutes to approximately 18 minutes. Dyer et al note that ~ 
shell case temperatures vary from between 370°C (or less) 
to over 590°c, and that there appears to be no correlation 
between case temperature and detonation. However, only a 
minority of the tests actually result in shell detonation. 
It is thought that case failure, causing loss of 
confinement, inhibits transition from deflagration to 
detonation. From this it can be surmised that explosives 
subjected to vehicular fires are more likely to deflagrate 
than detonate (especially commercial explosives which are 
unlikely to be confined). The short duration times from 
fire inception to initiation recorded by Dyer et al are 
thought to be a consequence of ignition at metal/explosive 
interfaces rather than any internal self-heating effect. 
This suggests that vehicular fires, which are usually of a 
short duration and similar intensity to that of pallet fire 
tests, have the potential to cause initiation of 
explosives. In fact vehicular fires, especially HGV fires, 
may be fuelled by petroleum or diesel thereby increasing 
heat intensity and the likelihood of initiation. Physical 
orientation to heat and flame also has a notable effect on 
the length of exposure before initiation. For example, the 
average time for 155 mm shells to initiate when subjected 
to pallet fires increases substantially from 3.5 minutes 
when laid horizontally to over 11 minutes when 
vertically30. The reasons for this are thought 
positioned 
to result 
from the greater uniformity and intensity of heat endured 
by explosives when shells are laid horizontally. 
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The fundamental causes of vehicle and load fires and 
their likelihood of occurrence are discussed in Chapters 
3.0 and 4.0. Probability of initiation given engulfing 
vehicle fire is discussed in Chapter 6.0, Section 6.5.2. 
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Table 6: Ignition temperatures of explosives 
Min. hot-spot temp. 
for initiation by 
Explosive Ign. temp. a Friction Impactb 
<CC) (cC) (cC) 
Tetrazene 160 400-430 
Mercury fulminate 170 500-550 
Tetryl 180 
Nitroguanidine 185 
Nitrocellulose 187 
Nitroglycerine 188 450-480 
PETN 205 400-430 400-430 
RDX 213 
TNT 240 
Lead Styphnate 250 430-500 500-550 
HMX 300 
Lead azide 350 430-500 500-550 
Note: 
a. The Royal Military College of Science 
b. Impact initiation in the presence of grit. 
Source: Bowden and Gurton18 
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5.5 Chemical Instability/Reactivity 
Both 
certain 
commercial 
conditions 
and military explosives 
or over long periods of time 
can under 
decompose 
to provide a risk of unintended initiation. For example, 
dynamites containing nitro-glycerine decompose during long 
storage periods and ultimately become liable to accidental 
initiation. Also, if such explosives are contaminated with 
other chemicals, such as, nitric acid, they decompose 
violently and become unstable. 
However, the initiation of explosives by chemical 
reactivity during transport, either autogenously or by the 
introduction of external agents, is an extremely unlikely 
event. All commercial and military explosives are designed 
and manufactured so that they can be transported and 
handled without loss of integrity, thus avoiding possible 
decomposition. In addition, explosives are packaged with 
compatible materials which protect against internal and 
external stimuli. It is suggested here, that due to the 
factors outlined above the possibility of explosive 
initiation by chemical 
is highly unlikely. 
5.6 Electrical Energy 
reactivity in transport environments 
' 
Explosives can be initiated by electricity if sufficient 
energy is discharged. All explosives have a specific 
ignition energy level, above which initiation will occur. 
Most explosives have ignition energy levels below, for 
example, the energy released from arcing of electrical 
equipment. However, initiation is not only dependent upon 
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the specific electrical properties of the explosive, but 
also environmental generation, storage and discharge 
mechanisms. 
Electrical energy can take one of three forms, 
a. current electricity, 
b. electromagnetic radiation, 
c. static electricity. 
Current electricity is a common means of initiating 
explosives, especially explosives linked to electric 
detonators and ignition systems. However, in transport 
environments current electricity is unlikely to be 
encountered except in extreme cases where electricity sub-
stations are encountered and breached or contact is made 
with "live" overhead power lines. Similarly, 
electromagnetic radiation poses a threat of accidental 
initiation only to those explosives forming electro-
explosive devices. Stray radiation waves from transmitters 
may emit energy levels capable of initiating such devices. 
Sources of radiation waves stem from radio transmitters to 
citizen band (CB) frequency amplifiers. However, electro-
explosive devices are packaged in anti-induction 
configurations and materials, thereby effectively 
eliminating initiation unless (intentionally or 
unintentionally) package.integrity is breached. 
The main electrical hazard is that 
electricity. Under certain conditions up to 
electro-static energy can accumulate on the 
of static 
0.02 J of 
human body 
(although this is extremely uncommon) • Such energy is 
sufficient to initiate certain sensitive explosives. For 
example, some ether/oxygen and lead styphanate mixtures 
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have ignition energy levels below 0.05 mJ and even common 
explosives such as PETN, nitro-cellulose and various 
cordites have ignition energy levels between 0.015 J and 
0.1 J. For transport purposes, with respect to static 
electricity, explosives can be chiefly divided into those 
explosives which are liable to initiate below 0.02 J and 
those which require greater energy input. 
Electro-static sensitivity testing of explosives 
essentially consists of a series of charged capacitors, 
which can be controlled to discharge electrical energy 
between 5 x 10-4 J and 5 J. Initiation is either physically 
observed or verified with the aid of an infra-red analyser 
to detect decomposition gases, as previously mentioned. 
Tests performed by H~rcules Inc. USA23, with capacitors 
charged to 5000 volts, found that TNT and Gel Power A-2 
slurry initiate at energy levels of 0.075 J and 1.26 J 
respectively. However, the Allegancy Ballistics 
Laboratory23 (ABL) indicate that possible electro-static 
discharge paths in normal transport environments are 
unlikely to discharge sufficient energy levels to cause 
explosives to initiate. For example, from an isolated 
conductor, having a surface area of approximately 400 cm2, 
ABL found the discharge energy to be less than 0.02 J. 
Similarly, other tests conducted at the same time could 
find no sources of energy approaching a level required to 
cause TNT to initiate. 
It should be noted that all the tests performed by ABL 
were on unpackaged explosives. Packaging 
suggested here, often isolate explosives 
static discharge, reducing further the small 
would, it is 
from electro-
possibility of 
initiation from such stimuli. In conclusion, under normal 
transport environments or even in the event of vehicular 
accidents, the possibility of explosives being initiated by 
185 
electro-static discharge is extremely unlikely. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Accidental initiation of commercial/military explosives 
is possible in principle from a number of stimuli, namely 
a. shock and vibration, 
b. impact, 
c. friction, 
d. fire (thermal energy), 
e. chemical instability/reactivity, 
f. static electricity (electrical energy). 
However, as this chapter illustrates by far the most likely 
stimuli 
impact 
to be 
to cause initiation in transport environments are 
and fire. Initiation by shock/vibration is thought 
unlikely except when accompanied by large impact 
forces, where it becomes difficult to distinguish between 
shock/vibration initiation and impact initiation. 
Similarly, initiation by friction is thought to be unlikely 
without the presence of large impact forces capable of 
breaching packages and instigating sliding frictional 
forces; or large impact forces capable of piercing 
packages and explosives thereby instigating friction/impact 
stimuli associated with stab-initiation. The data and 
arguments presented in this chapter assume that all 
explosives are transported in a serviceable/perfect 
condition, or as termed by the Armed Forces in an "Al" 
condition. Similarly, vehicles are assumed to be in good 
condition and explosives packaged and designed so as to 
prevent contact with substances liable to cause 
decomposition. Thus, initiation as a result of chemical 
instability/reactivity is considered here to be extremely 
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unlikely. Explosives are also packaged and designed so as 
to prevent initiation by electrical stimuli. In transport 
environments electrical stimuli likely to cause initiation 
are characterised by energy levels below that necessary to 
cause initiation. Therefore, initiation as a result of 
electrical energy is also considered to be extremely 
unlikely. 
Finally, from the discussion given in this chapter it 
can be concluded that at present explosives sensitivity 
cannot be quantified in exact units of measure. In-fact 
collated data only provide a comparative means of assessing 
explosives sensitivity. More importantly, however, 
initiation of explosives is not so much dependent on the 
amount of energy delivered, but rather on its rate of 
delivery {i.e. energy density, expressed in watts/kg). This 
latter point has recently been acknowledged and work begun 
to relate explosives sensitivity to energy density3 1 • It is 
hoped that such an approach will provide an absolute 
measure of explosives sensitivity regardless of the way in 
which energy is delivered. 
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PARTC 
6.0 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Risk assessment provides a means of quantitatively 
assessing hazards so that objective judgements can be made 
on their acceptability. The discipline is not only useful 
in the assessment of incidents which have occurred and 
therefore have accumulated historical data, but also for 
incidents which have not occurred but have a certain 
likelihood, however small, of realisation. 
The majority of risk assessment methodologies have been 
developed for fixed installations whose surrounding and 
on-site populations are clearly identified1,2. Such 
methodologies are only useful as a guide to the development 
of methods suitable for the assessment of transport risks. 
This is because transport environments add a degree of 
complexity to the risk assessment process. For example, 
unlike fixed installations, transport incidents have a 
certain likelihood of occurring at any point along a 
transport route. This provides an uncertainty of incident 
location and therefore variability in the numbers of 
exposed individuals. 
meteorological conditions 
additional assessment 
Similarly, 
change along 
considerations 
consequences and exposure. 
geographical and 
the route presenting 
with respect to 
The methodology developed here encompasses a number of 
features from previous analyses on the 
hazardous goods3, 4,5 together with the basic 
transport of 
methodologies 
of quantitative risk assessments. The incidents considered 
are vehicular accidents and/or vehicular fires. Incidents 
have been quantified by their frequency of occurrence and 
consequence, and both are used to determine the level of 
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risk. The list below outlines the basic approach which has 
been employed as the means of assessing the risks and 
hazards associated with the transport of explosives by road 
and rail in Great Britain6,7. 
a. Description 
requirements 
of the problem, 
and classification. 
data collection, 
b. Identification and assessment of accident scenarios. 
c. Evaluation of the frequency and consequences of 
explosion. 
d. Sensitivity assessment. 
6.1 Problem Description 
It is important from the outset to clearly define the 
transport problem. The problem in the context of this study 
is the transport by road and/or rail of explosives. A clear 
and concise definition helps to formulate a coherent 
strategy when assessing the risks of those exposed to 
hazards. 
Essentially the problem arises from the need to 
transport explosives from location "A" to location "B". The 
problem itself results from the requirement to transport 
these explosives in 
a. a safe manner minimising the likelihood of hazard 
realisation, 
b. a manner which conforms to regulations enforceable by 
law, 
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c. an economical, viable and profitable manner. 
In order to formulate a "problem description" a simple 
series of questions need to be answered. 
1. What is being transported ? 
2. How much is being transported ? 
3. How often is it being transported ? 
4. How is it being transported ? 
5. From where and to whom ? 
6. What is the hazard ? 
7. Who is exposed to the hazard ? 
Full and concise answers to these questions ensures that 
a. accident rate and explosion rate estimates reflect 
the transport and accident environments associated 
with the movement of explosives, 
b. the hazard of accidental initiation is known, 
c. those exposed to the hazard are identified. 
The series of questions (1 to 7 listed above) are 
addressed below. Each question is in some 
to the type of movement or explosives 
consequence of this the transport of 
respects specific 
conveyed. As a 
commercial and 
military explosives are discussed here in general terms. 
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6.1.1 What is being transported ? 
Commercial and military explosives are 
substances or articles which can cause harm or 
essentially 
damage or 
effects. both as a result of explosive and/or pyrotechnic 
The United Nations Committee of Experts8 on the 
of Dangerous Goods (UN Committee) define an 
Transport 
explosive 
substance as 
" •..• a solid or liquid substance (or a mixture of 
substances) ..• capable by chemical reaction of 
producing 
and at 
gas at such a temperature and 
such a speed as to cause damage 
surroundings". 
pressure 
to the 
A pyrotechnic substance is defined as 
" .... a substance or mixture of substances designed 
to produce an effect by heat, light, sound, gas or 
smoke or a combination of these as the result of 
non-detonative self-sustaining exothermic chemical 
reactions", 
and an explosive article is defined as 
" an article containing one or more explosive 
substances". 
Such goods are classed by the UN Committee as class 1 
dangerous goods and depending on individual 
substance/article characteristics are assigned an 
additional "divisional" category. These hazard divisions 
are detailed in Table 1. 
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In addition to the adoption of a divisional category 
class 1 dangerous goods are assigned to one of twelve 
compatibility groups. (Designated by a letter A through to 
S, excluding I and M through to R) . The purpose of the 
groups is to ensure that mixing of explosives does not 
significantly increase either the probability of explosion, 
or for 
effects. 
a given quantity, 
(Unfortunately the 
the magnitude 
UN Committee do 
of explosion 
not explain 
what is meant by a significant increase) . As a general rule 
explosive substances and/or articles can be transported 
together provided they bear the same compatibility group 
letter. Where hazard division categories differ the load 
must be treated as belonging to the division having the 
smallest number. 
Compatibility groups and classification procedures are 
detailed more fully in two publications issued by the UN 
CommitteeB,9. For completeness here the compatibility 
groups are illustrated in Table 2. It should be noted that 
packaging can greatly affect the hazard associated with 
explosive substances/articles, and therefore the assignment 
of a particular division and/or compatibility group. As a 
consequence of this explosive substances and articles are 
not always characterised by the same hazard division and 
compatibility-group. 
The most commonly conveyed commercial explosives are 
those based on ammonium nitrate and nitroglycerine. 
Ammonium nitrate is used in conjunction with fuel oils (to 
give the common explosive ANFO) or water to produce typical 
blasting explosives used extensively by the mining and 
quarrying industries. Solid mixtures are manufactured by 
the crystallisation of ammonium nitrate and the addition of 
sensitisers, such as, nitroglycerine (NG) and 
trinitrotoluene (TNT). Nitroglycerine is so sensitive that 
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it is used mainly as an additive in solid or semi-solid 
(gelatines) explosives. However, one explosive whose only 
active ingredient is NG is commonly known as dynamite. This 
explosive is basically a solid stick of siliceous earth 
impregnated with NG by the process of adsorption. Other 
popular NG explosives are those containing nitrocellulose, 
such as plastic gelatines. These explosives are popular 
because they can be easily shaped, they provide high bulk 
strength and are resistant to the effects of water. 
Resistance to water is an important characteristic for 
explosives based on NG. Water contamination of NG 
explosives can 
precipitation 
give rise to hydrolysis, 
of nitrates and nitric 
and hence the 
acid causing 
spontaneous decomposition. Other commercial explosives are 
those based on TNT and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN). 
Although more sensitive than ammonium nitrate based 
explosives they are not as sensitive as NG based 
explosives. In terms of manufactured quantity, TNT and PETN 
based explosives account for only a small proportion of all 
commercial explosives. 
Military explosives mainly consist of mixtures of TNT 
and cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), and TNT and 
cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX), together with 
additional binders and sensitisers. Such mixtures tend to 
form the bulk of shell and warhead fillings. 
TNT is manufactured by the nitration of pure toluene and 
is surprisingly of low toxicity. Once produced it is 
relatively safe to handle and can be readily mixed with 
other explosives. However, TNT is oxygen deficient and for 
complete combustion requires 
substances, such as ammonium 
mixing with oxygen rich 
nitrate. These explosive 
compounds are commonly known as "amatols". RDX and HMX are 
produced by the nitration of hexamine solutions and are 
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considered 
thermally10. 
to be 
However, 
very stable 
they are 
both chemically 
extremely sensitive 
and 
to 
impact and friction and are usually desensitised by mixing 
with wax. RDX is also mixed with mineral jellies or similar 
materials to form plastic explosives. Other common military 
explosives include PETN and tetryl. PETN is very sensitive 
to both impact and friction and like RDX and HMX is 
considered chemically and thermally stable10. Its use is 
mainly in the form of pentolite, which is a mixture of PETN 
and TNT. Mixed with plasticised nitrocellulose or synthetic 
rubbers PETN is also used as a plastic explosive. Tetryl is 
considered to be moderately sensitive to friction and 
shock. As a consequence of this it is commonly used in 
priming devices initiated by friction or percussion. 
Explosives used in priming devices, which find not only 
military but also commercial application, include mercury 
fulminate, lead azide, lead styphnate and tetrazene. For 
reasons of storage and initiating power lead azide is a 
popular initiating explosive. However, it has two 
drawbacks, firstly, in moist conditions it tends to be 
chemically unstable and secondly it is relatively 
insensitive to flame initiationlO. The add~tion of gelatine 
and/or lead styphnate improves the sensitivity of lead 
azide to flame impingement and therefore its application in 
electric and delay initiating devices which are ignited by 
"spark". Mercury fulminate and tetrazene are fast losing 
popularity as a result of chemical instability and poor 
initiating power respectively. 
Rapid 
volumes 
and controllable combustion producing large 
of hot gas as a means of 
function necessary 
deflagration 
are propelled 
of propellants. 
propulsion is the 
Such controlled 
is the means by which cartridges and rockets 
through space. Although propellants are based 
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on explosive compounds they are not intended to cause 
detonative explosion or damage to surroundings. Propellants 
are classed as either single-base, double-base or triple-
base and can be powder, solid block or liquid. Single-based 
propellants only contain one explosive ingredient, this 
being nitrocellulose. Double-based propellants contain two 
explosive ingredients, nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose, 
whereas triple-based propellants also contain 
nitroguanidine. In addition to these ingredients 
propellants contain various plasticisers, burning rate 
moderators, lubricants and flash inhibitors, the 
compositions of which vary depending on application. As a 
result of the need for long storage periods propellants 
have good chemical stability. Storage life is commonly 
between eight and ten years. The greatest thrust is 
provided by triple-based propellants and as a consequence 
of this they find application in rockets and large guns. 
Triple-based propellants are difficult to ignite compared 
with single-based and double-based propellants, hence they 
tend not to be used in small arms ammunition. A 
disadvantage of double-based propellants is their 
incompatibility with certain plasticslO. As a consequence 
of this and the apparent geometric characteristics and 
needs of weapon systems both double-based and single-based 
propellants are used extensively in small and medium sized 
munitions/weapons. 
In conclusion typical loads conveyed 
simply consist of single explosive 
by road or rail may 
substances or a 
combination of "compatible" explosives. Loads such as these 
form the bulk of commercial movements. In comparison, 
military movements consist mainly of loads containing 
explosive articles. Additional hazards may be presented by 
explosive articles which contain priming devices (i.e. 
fuses and detonators, etc.) and "boosters" (i.e. explosive 
charges with or without means of initiation used to 
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increase the initiating power of detonators) • As a 
consequence of this a significant hazard may be presented 
by the priming device or booster in addition to, or instead 
of the main explosive charge (where the main explosive is 
unlikely to initiate) . In addition, the likelihood of 
accidental main charge initiation may increase due to the 
greater likelihood of priming device and/or booster 
initiation. However, it should be noted that most explosive 
articles have independent protective features designed to 
prevent main charge initiation in the event of accidental 
operation and/or initiation of priming devices and 
boosters. 
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Table 1: Class 1 explosives: Hazard divisions 
Division 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
Consequence description 
Substances and articles which have a mass 
explosion hazard (a mass explosion hazard is 
one which affects the entire load virtually 
instantaneously) . 
Substances 
projection 
hazard. 
and articles which 
hazard but not a mass 
have a 
explosion 
Substances and articles which have a fire 
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a 
minor projection hazard or both but not a 
mass explosion hazard. 
This division comprises substances and 
articles which 
a. give rise to considerable radiant heat, 
b. burn one after another, producing minor 
blast or projection effects or both. 
Substances and articles that present no 
significant hazard. 
This division comprises substances and 
articles which present only a small hazard 
in the event of ignition or initiation 
during transport. The effects are largely 
confined to the package and no projection of 
fragments of appreciable size or range is to 
be expected. 
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Table 1: continued 
Division Consequence description 
1.5 Very insensitive substances which have a 
mass explosion hazard. 
This division comprises 
a. substances which have a mass explosion 
hazard but are so insensitive that there 
is very little probability of initiation 
or of transition from burning to 
detonation under normal conditions of 
transport, 
b. articles which contain only extremely 
insensitive detonating substances and 
which demonstrate a negligible 
probability of accidental initiation or 
propagation • 
. 
Source: UN CommitteeS 
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Table 2: Classification codes (Compatibility groups) 
.--------------------,------~~~~--~---. 
Description of substance or article 
to be classified 
Primary explosive substance 
primary Article 
explosive 
containing 
features 
containing a 
substance 
two or more 
and not 
protective 
Propellant explosive substance or 
other deflagrating explosive 
substance or article containing such 
explosive substance 
Secondary detonating explosive 
substance or black powder or article 
containing a secondary detonating 
explosive substance, in each case 
without means of initiation and 
without a propelling charge, or 
article containing a primary 
explosive substance and containing 
two or more effective protective 
features 
Article containing a secondary 
detonating explosive substance, 
without means of initiation, with a 
propelling charge ((other than one 
containing a flammable or hypergolic 
liquid) 
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Comp. 
group 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Class. 
code 
l.lA 
l.lB 
1.2B 
1.4B 
l.lC 
1.2C 
1. 3C 
1.4C 
l.lD 
1.20 
1.40 
1.50 
l.lE 
1.2E 
1.4E 
Table 2: continued 
Description of substance or article 
to be classified 
Article containing a secondary 
detonating explosive substance with 
its own means of initiation, with a 
propelling charge (other than one 
containing a flammable or hypergolic 
liquid) or without a propelling 
charge 
Pyrotechnic substance, or article 
containing a pyrotechnic substance, 
or article containing both an 
explosive substance and an 
illuminating, incendiary, 
lachrymatory or smoke-producing 
substance (other than a water-
activated article or one containing 
white phosphorus, phosphide or a 
flammable liquid or gel) 
Article containing both an explosive 
substance and white phosphorus 
Article containing both an 
substance and a flammable 
gel 
explosive 
liquid or 
Article containing both an explosive 
substance and a toxic chemical agent 
Explosive substance 
containing an explosive 
presenting a special 
isolation of each type 
or article 
substance and 
risk needing 
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Comp. 
group 
F 
G 
H 
J 
K 
L 
Class. 
code 
l.lF 
1.2F 
1.3F 
1.4F 
l.lG 
1.2G 
1.3G 
1.4G 
1.2H 
1.3H 
l.lJ 
1.2J 
1.3J 
1.2K 
1.3K 
l.lL 
1.2L 
1.3L 
Table,2: continued 
.Description of substance or article Camp. Class. 
to be classified group code 
Substance or article so packed or s 1.4S 
de~i<:?ned that any hazardous effects 
ar~s~ng from accidental functioning 
are confined within the package 
unless the package has been degraded 
by fire, in which case all blast or 
projection effects are limited to the 
extent that they do not significantly 
hinder or prohibit fire fighting or 
other emergency response efforts in 
the immediate vicinity of the package 
Note: 
a. Comp. - compatibility. 
b. Class. - classification. 
c. The term primary explosive refers here to initiating 
explosives (i.e. those explosives which readily ignite 
or detonate as a result of small mechanical or 
electrical stimulus - those explosives commonly found in 
priming devices) • 
d. The term secondary explosive refers to those explosives 
which can be made to detonate and are used to produce 
work on their surroundings (i.e. those explosives which 
are used as blasting agents and/or used as the main 
explosive in articles sometimes termed high 
explosives). 
Source: UN CommitteeS 
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6 .1.2 How much is beinq transported ? 
It is not known with any certainty the total quantity of 
commercial and military explosives transported annually 
either by road or rail. Such details are confidential and 
not for public knowledge. However, from personal contacts11 
it is thought that between 33,000 te and 37,000 te (NEQ 
i.e. net weight of explosives excluding casings and 
packaging, etc.) of commercial explosives are transported 
annually in the UK. Most commercial explosives 
movementsll,l2 are known to be by road, it is estimated 
that the proportion conveyed by rail is probably less than 
10%. In comparison, it is thought that about 60% of 
military explosives (NEQ) go by rail and 40% by road13. 
6.1.3 How often is it beinq transported ? 
From discussions1l,l2 with those involved in the 
manufacture and distribution of explosives, it is estimated 
that commercial explosives, which are mainly transported by 
road, are conveyed over three to four million kilometres 
per year. Explosives movements by road are chiefly divided· 
into primary and secondary movements. Primary refers to 
movements from manufacturing plants to depots and secondary 
refers to movements between depots and depots, and depots 
and customers. It is known that secondary movements account 
for over 60% of annual travel distance and that about 35% 
of the total distance covered involves empty journeysll,l2. 
In comparison, it is estimated that military explosives are 
annually conveyed over one to two million kilometres and 
that between 60% and 75% of this distance is covered by 
road. 
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6.1. 4 How is it beinq transported ? 
Subject to quantity limits explosives can be conveyed by 
road in four different ways (termed modes) . 
a. In a vehicle being used to carry passengers for hire 
or reward. 
b. In a private motor car and any other method of 
conveyance which does not fall under any other mode. 
c. In a goods vehicle with basic safety precautions. 
d. In a goods vehicle with additional safety 
precautions. 
The majority of explosives moved by road are conveyed in 
dedicated heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) which comply with the 
Conveyance of Explosives by Road Regulations 1989 (i.e. 
modes "c" and "d" listed above) . The net explosives 
quantity (NEQ) for dedicated HGVs is 5 te or 16 te for 
special vehicles. Special vehicles are those vehicles which 
have additional fire protection and convey explosives in 
freight containers. Although the limit for special vehicles 
is set at 16 te (NEQ) in reality this is never achieved. 
This is due to the requirement for gross vehicle weight not 
to exceed 90% of a vehicles "plated weight". ·All HGVs 
conform to the following requirements. 
a. Engine fuels do not give off flammable vapours at 
temperatures less than 150°F. 
b. Fuel feed pipes are fitted with quick acting "cut-
off" valves. 
c. A clear gap of at least six inches exists between HGV 
cab and the body of the vehicle. 
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d. Fire resistant screen (carried to within twelve 
inches of the ground) protects HGV body from exhaust 
system. 
e. HGV body (including cargo floor area) is completely 
covered externally with sheet steel. 
f. Cargo floor is lined with asbestos or wood treated to 
render it flame retardant. 
g. Load area does not open except at the rear or as 
approved by HM Inspectorate of Explosives. 
It has been found in the course of this study that often 
additional safety measures are taken by road hauliers. 
Pennine Transportll who convey explosives for Explosives 
and Chemical Products Limited (ECP) insist on the following 
additional requirements. 
a. An electrical isolation switch. 
b. Vehicle body constructed of high strength aluminium 
mounted on the chassis in a slightly forward position 
(so that in the event of a rear collision the 
majority of impact energy is absorbed by the 
chassis) . 
c. Anti-lock braking systems to prevent "jack-knifing" 
of articulated vehicles. 
Although 
exempt from 
Regulations 
practicable 
regulations. 
military movements of explosives by 
the Conveyance of Explosives 
1989, it is understood that 
military movements are to abide 
road are 
by Road 
wherever 
by the 
Typical HGVs used for the conveyance of commercial and 
military explosives are illustrated in Appendix C. 
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Explosives are conveyed by rail in dedicated single-
destination rail wagons. Single-destination implies that 
explosives are not off-loaded en route. Commercial 
movements are limited to 36.25 te total weight (NEQ, plus 
casings and packaging) per train, whereas military 
movements, specified as British Rail (BR) class 1.1 goods 
(equivalent to UN hazard division 1.1) are limited to 40 te 
(NEQ) per train. There are no limits imposed on military 
explosives specified by BR as class 1.2, 1.3 or 1.4 
(equivalent to UN hazard divisions 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). Mixed 
consignments of commercial and military explosives must not 
exceed 36.25 te total weight (NEQ, plus casings and 
packaging) . 
Rail wagons used for the conveyance of explosives are 
dedicated wagons constructed mainly of wood and steel, 
although in recent years aluminium has been used. The most 
popular wagon for conveying commercial explosives is a 2-
axle air-braked wagon having a carrying capacity of 29.5 te 
and unladen weight of 16.6 te. Military explosives are also 
conveyed in these wagons. Other common wagons used for 
military movements include 
a. 2-axle, air-braked, 29 te capacity wagons constructed 
of aluminium and steel (wooden floor - unladen weight 
17 te) , 
b. short wheel base, 2-axle, air-braked, 12 te capacity 
wagons constructed mainly of wood (unladen weight 7.7 
te) . 
The short wheel based wagons are only used on long-
established 
curvatures. 
sidings and depots having 
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sharp track 
All rail wagons used for the conveyance of explosives 
conform to the following basic requirements14,15. 
a. Wagon body and floor free ~rom dents (greater than 19 
mm), distortion and excessive deterioration (holes, 
etc.) caused by oxidation or other 
effects. 
deleterious 
b. Interior is free from protrusions (except those 
forming part of the wagon) . 
c. Roof is secure (water-tight) and free from cracks. 
d. Floor is free from cracks and protrusions. 
e. Where necessary spark-guards are fitted to braking 
systems. 
f. Electrical wiring is securely fixed and protected 
against moisture and mechanical damage. 
g. Lighting is only by means of incandescent electric 
bulbs protected from moisture and mechanical damage. 
Typical rail wagons used for the conveyance of commercial 
and military explosives are illustrated in Appendix C. 
Explosives themselves (including articles) are packaged 
or palletised depending on their geometry, use and storage 
requirements. Above· all other considerations, however, 
explosives which are transported on. public roads and 
railways must be packaged and stowed in such a manner as 
not to increase risks to health and safety16. Typical 
packages for commercial explosives consist of simple fibre-
board and secure metal boxes. Military explosives are 
packaged in a similar fashion, although palletisation is 
much more common. Typical palletised loads consist of 
shells, missiles and bar mines. Once loaded into either 
road vehicles or rail wagons packages and pallets 
(commercial and military) are secured by tie ropes and/or 
"packing" (wooden posts/strips, etc.) to prevent movement 
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under normal transport environments. 
6.1.5 From where and to whom ? 
Explosives are conveyed throughout the year supplying 
mining and related industries, firework manufactures, royal 
ordnance factories (ROF) and the Armed Forces. The majority 
of commercial movements are between storage depots and 
customers. As mentioned in Section 6.1.3, such movements 
are known as secondary movements by commercial road 
hauliers. The vehicles used for secondary road movements 
are usually 5 te (NEQ) capacity dedicated rigid 2-axle 
HGVs. Primary movements essentially consist of movements 
between explosive manufactures and storage depots. These 
movements are most commonly performed by special vehicles 
using freight containers of 16 te (NEQ) capacity (see 
Section 6.1.4). In comparison, military movements are not 
classed as either primary or secondary. Movements include 
travel between army depots, ammunition storage facilities, 
naval ports, airfields, ROF, armed units, manufacturers, 
testing ranges, refurbishment establishments and disposal 
sites. The vehicles used for these movements include 
dedicated ·rail wagons, dedicated rigid 2-axle HGVs and 
special HGVs. Vehicle characteristics for both commercial 
and military movements are discussed in Section 6.1.4 and 
illustrated in Appendix C. 
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6.1. 6 What is the hazard ? 
By virtue of motion and/or physical presence both road 
and rail transport are hazardous activities. This is 
because both road and rail transport have the capacity to 
cause harm and damage. Explosives by their very nature are 
hazardous. Explosives are designed and manufactured to 
perform work on their surroundings either by exerting 
pressure, causing fragmentation and missile generation 
and/or thermal radiation. Thus, the transport of explosives 
provides a physical situation which has the potential to 
cause human injury, property damage and environmental 
damage. 
6.1. 7 Who is exposed to the hazard ? 
Regardless of whether explosives are transported by road 
or rail at various times throughout a journey .it is almost 
certain that members of the public are exposed to the 
hazard. This is because it is impractical if not impossible 
to avoid certain built-up areas. Wherever practicable 
built-up areas are avoided. However, residences along 
roadsides, communities surrounding depots, factories, rail 
stations, rail terminals and marshalling yards all have 
either "static" or "mobile" populations (or both in varying 
quantities). Populations referred to as "static" are those 
in and around permanent places of residence and/or work and 
those referred to as "mobile" are those populations in and 
around rail stations and other places where population size 
can vary from a few to hundreds or even thousands. In 
addition to members of the public, transport crews are also 
highly likely to be exposed and in certain circumstances 
(such as fire) personnel from the emergency services 
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(police, fire and ambulance) are also vulnerable to 
exposure. Determination of those exposed and the number of 
exposed individuals is detailed in Section 7.4. 
6.2 Data Collection - Data Sources 
There is an abundance of information and statistics on 
road and rail transport. Data sources stem from government 
departments through to learned institutions. However, the 
methods of collecting and recording data tend to vary. As a 
consequence of this identical information is often 
interpreted differently. For example, the Department of 
Transport classify a goods vehicle as a heavy goods vehicle 
(HGV) if its unladen weight is greater than, or equal to, 
1.5 te. In comparison, the Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory (TRRL) in certain reports have classed goods 
vehicles as HGVs if their unladen weights are in excess 
of 3 te. Such variation in data representation is important 
to note when using statistics, otherwise erroneous mixing 
of supposingly similar data may occur. 
The 
referred 
data sources listed below have either been used or 
to in compiling the transport and accident data 
within this study. It is suggested that where contained 
possible all data should be cross-checked 
integrity by consulting and comparing 
for 
with 
independent/other sources. The list given below consists of 
data sources most likely to provide information suitable 
for use in the assessment of road and rail transient 
hazards. 
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1. Governmental Departments and Related Organisations 
a. Central Statistical Office, (Directorate of 
Statistics), 2 Marsham Street, London. 
b. Department of Transport (Railway Inspectorate), 2 
Marsham Street, London. 
c. Explosives Storage and Transport Committee (ESTC), 
St. Mary Cray, Orpington, Kent. 
d. Explosives Inspectorate, Health and Safety Executive, 
Magdalen House, Bootle, Liverpool. 
e. United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (Safety and 
Reliability Directorate), Culcheth, Warrington. 
2. Learned Institutions and Similar Organisations 
a. Accident Research Unit (Department of Transportation 
and Environmental Planning, University of Birmingham) 
b. Institution of Chemical Engineers, Railway Terrace, 
Rugby. 
c. Institution of Explosive Engineers, Epic 
Charles Street, Leicester. 
House, 
d. Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Birdcage Walk, 
London. 
e. Plant Engineering Group, University of Technology, 
Loughborough, Leicestershire. 
f. Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA), Watling 
Street, Nuneaton, Warwickshire. 
g. National Transportation Research Board, Washington 
DC, USA. 
h. Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL), 
Crowthorne, Berkshire. 
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3. Miscellaneous 
a. British Rail, Director of Operations, Paddington 
Station, London. 
b. Explosives and Chemical Products Limited, 
Commonwealth House, New Oxford Street, London. 
c. Freight Transport Association, Hermes House, St. 
Johns Road, Tunbridge Wells, Kent. 
d. Imperial Chemical Industries ( ICI) I Nobel's 
Explosives eo. Limited, Nobel House, Stevenston, 
Aryshire. 
e. London Fire and Civil Defence Authority, Albert 
Embankment, London. 
f. Pennine Transport, Alfreton, Derbyshire. 
g. Road Haulage Association, New Kings Road, London. 
h. United Kingdom Petroleum Industries Association, 
Kingsway, London. 
6.3 Basic Data Requirements 
The first requirement in the assessment of transient 
hazards is the determination of the number of historical 
accidents/incidents which have occurred during transit over 
a measurable period. This can then be compared with the 
total distance travelled during this period, thereby 
providing the rate of historical accidents/incidents per 
measured period, and the rate of accidents/incidents per 
unit distance during this period. Determination of the 
number of movements/journeys per period, the number of 
vehicles used and identification of vehicle types is 
required so as to ensure that accident/incident rates are 
fleet related. It should be noted that the number of 
journeys and overall distance travelled is required in a 
form by which the final risk is to be measured. Commonly 
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• 
such data are expressed as a total per year or per month. 
However, it may be required to express the risk as a 
function of, for example, the number of vehicles. In such 
cases data are needed in the form of miles travelled per 
"N" vehicles (where "N" is a pre-set number used as the 
standard of measure) • Depending upon consequence model 
complexity, required assessment accuracy and more often 
than not availability of data, the average number of 
journeys and average distance travelled per measured period 
or per vehicle may be sufficient. 
So as to calculate the individual risk of those involved 
in actual transport operations the -number of journeys 
undertaken by crew members is required. However, unless a 
detailed account of individual risk for each crew member is 
needed it is suggested that a mean estimate for all crew 
members is sufficient. In order to determine incident 
consequences data are required on the number of vehicles 
per movement (i.e. road convoys, rail cars), vehicle 
weights (laden/unladen), load types and load distributions. 
In most instances it may well be impractical to assess each 
vehicle/journey individually and mean values are best 
employed. Explosives packaging and means of securement (in 
load area) may affect the hazard or its likelihood of 
realisation. As a consequence of this packaging and 
securement details need to be considered. Finally, details 
are required on the physical and chemical properties of the 
explosives conveyed. The data are used as input into 
consequence models and also as a means of assessing the 
likelihood of explosive initiation resulting from stimuli 
encountered during normal transport and accident 
environments. 
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Table 3: Summary of basic data requirements 
Number of historical accidents/incidents 
Distance travelled 
Number of movements/journeys 
Number of vehicles used 
Vehicle description/specification (type) 
Number of journeys undertaken by crew 
Number of vehicles per movement 
Vehicle weights (unladen/laden) 
Type of load conveyed 
Distribution of load(s) 
Packaging and securement of load(s) 
Physical and chemical properties of load 
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6.4 Classification of Data 
6.4.1 Vehicle Classification 
Initially vehicles under analysis need to be classified 
so as to provide a starting point for the determination of 
vehicle accident rates. Heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) can be 
classified by both body type and axle configuration, as 
shown in Table 4. If required, these classes can be 
further sub-divided into "makes" of vehicle. However, for 
all intents and purposes this is unnecessary, regardless of 
manufactured origin most HGVs having the same body type and 
axle configuration are similar in all respects. 
If it is intended to assess a fleet of HGVs whose body 
and axle configurations differ greatly then the best 
accident rate estimation will be gained from assessing HGVs 
individually. However, if the fleet is large individual 
assessment may prove time consuming and impractical. In 
such cases it may suffice to classify HGVs in grouped sets. 
For example, ignoring axle configuration HGVs may be 
classed as simply "rigid" or "articulated". Classification 
of HGVs can also be based solely on axle configuration or 
load capacity. However, in order to obtain good estimates 
of HGV accident rates it is best to classify HGVs on two or 
more criteria. If this is not possible generalisation of 
the whole fleet (or part of) may have to be adopted. This 
suggests that the accident rate used is the same for all 
HGVs in the fleet (or part of) . It should be noted that 
accident rates vary considerably between HGV types (see 
Section 3.6, Table F). For example, it has been found in 
the course of this study that on non built-up class A roads 
3-axle HGVs have an accident rate twice that of 2-axle 
HGVs. Thus, careful judgement is needed when classifying 
vehicles, since poor "grouping" and/or approximations at 
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this stage may culminate in unrepresentative accident 
rates and ultimately unmeaningful risk assessment results. 
For rail transport, classification of accident rates can 
take either of two forms, namely, classification by 
locomotive type (e.g. diesel multiple unit (DMU) or 
electric multiple unit (EMU)) or by rail wagon. As with 
HGVs, locomotives and rail wagons can be sub-divided 
further by weight, load capacity and bogie type, etc .. 
Locomotives are best classed as either diesel or electric. 
This is because there are insufficient data for further 
categorisation. However, 
useful where data suggest 
further distinction may prove 
that certain locomotive types are 
more susceptible to particular accidents/fires than other 
locomotives. For example, before rectification in the early 
1980's, class 47 diesel multiple units were prone to oil 
leaks causing these locomotives to form a large proportion 
of all locomotive fires on British railways17. Obviously, 
if it is clear that certain locomotives are more accident 
prone than others this fact should be catered for and 
reflected in the assigned freight train (FT) accident rate. 
It should be noted, however, that the author has found few 
identifiable trends linking specific locomotives with 
certain accident types. Rail wagon classification may take 
many forms, from differing load size through to the type of 
bogie employed. However, it is suggested here that due to 
limited accident and transport data on individual rail 
wagons, classification for accident rate purposes is best 
left with locomotive type. Further distinction with respect 
to rail wagons can be included when addressing the 
consequences of rail accidents (i.e. the likelihood of 
puncture, weight of wagon, load capacity, geometry and 
buffer protection, etc.). 
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Table 4: Classification of heavy goods vehicles 
Rigid Articulated 
2-axle 3-axle 
3-axle 4-axle 
4-axle+ 5-axle+ 
Note: 
a. axle+ - number of axles or more. 
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6.4.2 Route Classification 
Identifying and categorising the routes taken by 
vehicles is an important step towards refining accident 
rates. Accident rates vary widely with respect to rural and 
urban areas. For HGVs rural and urban areas can be 
sub-divided further into categories based on road class, as 
shown in Table 5. 
Simply, the routes taken by HGVs are divided into the 
parts shown in Table 5 together with specific distances 
attributed to each part. Current data sources class roads 
as either built-up or non built-up. Built-up roads have 
speed limits of 40 mph or less whereas non built-up roads 
have speed limits in excess of 40 mph. Built-up and non 
built-up road notation has replaced built-up and non built-
up area notation used previously by the Department of 
Transport. The main reason for the change in classification 
results from the difficulty in correctly identifying built-
up and non built-up areas. However, built-up and non built-
up roads chiefly correspond to built-up and non built-up 
areas (i.e. urban and rural areas respectively). 
Similarly, FT accident rates can be sub-divided further 
into urban and rural classes. Accident rates not only vary 
with population alongside railway track, but also with 
population distribution. Freight train accident rates can 
be determined for single sided track (i.e. population only 
on one side of track) and double sided track (i.e. 
population on both sides of track). However, it is 
suggested here that such distinction is best dealt with 
when considering incident consequences. This is because 
most consequence models can readily adapt to varying 
population density and the distance of exposed populations 
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from hazard sources. 
For completeness the meteorological and geographical 
conditions alongside transport routes should be considered. 
Meteorological data requirements usually pertain to 
conditions which may affect explosion consequences or 
accident frequencies. For example, a greater number of 
accidents may occur at locations where rainfall is 
particularly heavy or where visibility is poor due to 
frequent bouts of persistent fog. Similarly, it is known 
that atmospheric conditions can affect blast overpressure. 
In the far field Lees 1B describes the increase in 
overpressure resulting from surface temperature inversion 
conditions. However, 
meteorological .data 
in most explosives consequence models 
are not required. This is because 
common weather conditions have little or no influence on 
explosion consequences (especially in the near field) . 
The collection of geographical data is primarily 
concerned with the strength and type of rock/material upon 
which vehicles travel and/or may contact accidentally. Such 
data are used to assess the initiation vulnerability of 
explosives upon impact with naturally occurring and/or man-
made materials. Data may also be required on the physical 
characteristics of vehicle routes with respect to 
gradients, embankments, rivers and bridges, etc. together 
with meteorological conditions, in order to identify 
a. areas where accidents are most likely to occur and/or 
are most likely to cause incidents, 
b. conditions which may affect explosion consequences. 
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It should be noted that in the main both meteorological 
and geographical data are used at the consequence analysis 
stage and need not always be reflected in accident rates. 
Important note 
Provided there is sufficient data detailed vehicle and 
route classifications should be used. However, care should 
be taken to avoid over-classification so as to eliminate 
obviously ludicrous and unrepresentative categories. 
Unfortunately, 
impractical to 
classifications. 
then data . are 
data are often scarce and it may prove 
follow detailed vehicle and route 
If only generalised data are available 
best combined to form a single 
classification. For example, where data do not discriminate 
between vehicle types, or data on certain vehicle types are 
limited, then an all engrossing or combined classification 
is best used. This will ensure that a risk assessment is 
representative of a complete fleet of vehicles (collective 
representation) even though it will not represent any 
specific class of vehicle. This point is illustrated by 
reference to HGV accident rates. The accident rate of a 
rigid 3-axle HGV on a class A road designated as being non 
built-up is over twice that of an articulated 4-axle HGV 
over identical road, the rates being 0.74 x 10-6 and 0.33 x 
10-6 accidents per km respectively. This compares with the 
"all HGVs" accident rate of 0.66 x 10-6 accidents per km. A 
similar example could also be portrayed for FT accidents. 
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Table 5: Route classification of highways 
Urban Rural 
A roads A roads 
B roads B roads 
motorways motorways 
other roads other roads 
Note: 
a. Unless data are specific motorways are best classed as 
rural. This is because most available data tend to class 
motorways as rural regardless of individual accident 
locations. 
b. Roads designated as "other" refer to minor roads and 
roads which are unclassified. 
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6.5 Incident Sequence Identification and Quantification 
Regardless of the quality and mass of collated accident 
data it cannot by itself provide a means of identifying 
incidents. The series of events leading to an incident and 
hence explosion require detailed analysis of accident 
types, accident consequences and the stimuli ·liable to 
cause explosives to initiate. With respect to incident 
analysis, accident types have been well documented in 
Chapters 3.0 and 4.0 and provide a strong base for•accident 
categorisation. Similarly, stimuli liable to cause 
initiation of explosives have been chiefly identified as 
impact and fire, and therefore aid the direction of 
consequence analysis. As a result of the two main 
initiation stimuli, impact and fire, it is suggested that 
analysis is best divided into those incidents associated 
with fire and those incidents where fire is absent (i.e. 
fire incidents and non-fire incidents) . 
6.5.1 Non-Fire Incidents 
Explosives vary considerably in their vulnerability to 
impact initiation. As Chapter 5.0, Section 5.2 outlines, 
quantifying explosives impact sensitivity is far from an 
exact science. Not only is it difficult to provide a 
measure of sensitivity which is meaningful, but explosives 
suffer from initiation variability. This variability may 
manifest itself in one of two ways. Relative ranking of 
explosives may differ depending on the conditions of. the 
test (environmental and physical) or more commonly on the 
type of test used. Such cause of initiation variability may 
produce results which contradict previously recorded 
results. Secondly, an identical explosive tested under 
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identical conditions may provide very different results 
from that expected. This type of variability is hard to 
measure and explain satisfactorily. On occasion it has been 
known for impact speed test results 1 9 to differ by as much 
as 60% (recorded impact initiation speed). 
One impact sensitivity test which appears to have some 
relevance regarding the assessment of vehicular impacts is 
the "Susan" test 1 9. The test was initially developed to 
ascertain whether impact from aircraft crashes could cause 
conventional explosives, within nuclear devices, to 
explode. Basically, the test consists of a projectile 
loaded with explosive which is propelled at high speed into 
an unyielding surface. Results from the test are recorded 
in terms of impact speed (m/s) and therefore can be related 
to vehicular impacts. However, as with all sensitivity 
tests it suffers from initiation variability of explosives 
and its results contradict many established relative 
ranking lists. For example, some military explosives 
composed of ammonium perchlorate, aluminium and active 
binders are classed as very sensitive when compared on the 
Susan scale (relative ranking list) but insensitive when 
compared on certain gap test scales1 9. The least sensitive 
explosives measured by the Susan test tend to be those 
based on TNT, these have impact initiation speeds well in 
excess of 100 m/s. Those explosives of moderate sensitivity 
are in the main mixtures of RDX and TNT, which have impact 
initiation speeds between approximately 80 m/s and 150 m/s. 
The most sensitive explosives are those composed of, or 
containing, HMX/nitrocellulose, RDX/nitrocellulose and 
HMX/RDX. Some of these explosives have impact initiation 
speeds as low as 15 m/s. 
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To cause initiation of munitions and/or commercial 
explosives it can be argued that a greater impact speed is 
required in vehicular collisions than that required in 
Susan tests. This is because during transit many munitions 
and commercial explosives are encased and/or packaged 
providing some protection from impact. Furthermore, in many 
vehicular collisions the vehicle itself will offer 
protection (i.e. absorption of impact as a result of 
construction and vehicular materials etc.). These features 
provide mitigation against impact initiation. However, the 
degree of protection is difficult to assess. Its estimation 
would require Susan tests to be performed on packaged/cased 
explosives together with tests on the behaviour of loads in 
road vehicles/rail wagons during 
consequence of this it is acknowledged 
Susan test data to assess the 
collisions. As a 
here that the use of 
impact initiation 
vulnerability of explosives in vehicular collisions will 
tend to over-estimate explosives sensitivity to vehicular 
collisions. 
Impact initiation of explosives as a result of vehicular 
collisions is largely dependent on speed and weight. 
Accidents which have the potential to cause impact 
initiation can be estimated through the application of 
momentum - theory. Although momentum theory is rather 
simplistic and can only consider idealised impacts it 
provides a means of quantifying incidents in terms of 
impact speed which can be compared with Susan impact test 
data. A number of simplifying assumptions are necessary in 
order that vehicular collisions can be treated as idealised 
collisions, these assumptions are listed below. 
, 
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1. Vehicles act as idealised masses (i.e. mass is evenly 
distributed) . 
2. Explosives form part of the conveying vehicle's 
idealised mass and therefore the change in velocity 
of the explosives is the same as the change in 
velocity of the conveying vehicle. 
3. Vehicles do not overturn during or after collision 
(for road vehicles 95% of overturning occurs in 
single vehicle accidents20) . 
4. Collisions are inelastic (see note). 
5. Vehicle rotation has negligible effect on impact 
velocity and therefore can be ignored20. 
6. Vehicles remain in contact upon impact (full surface 
contact is assumed) . 
Note: 
As regards assumption 4; in practice all collisions 
experience "rebound" (i.e. masses collide 
certain rebound velocity) . However, the 
and part with 
mild steels 
a 
of 
which vehicles are made are such good energy absorbers 
(about 95% absorption2 0) that rebound is minimised and 
therefore collisions between vehicles are almost inelastic. 
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Consider an idealised head-on collision between a rigid 
2-axle HGV (MA) loaded with explosives and an articulated 
5-axle HGV (MB) . The impact speed and laden weight of MA 
and MB are 50 mph and 75 mph, and 13 te and 32 te 
respectively. The explosives carried by MA are vulnerable 
to impact initiation at speeds of 35 m/s or more. 
MA 
) 
fve 
VA 
< > Vc 
Applying momentum theory 
Vc = MAVA + MBVB 
(MA + MB) 
• . • • • • • • . . . • 1 
where 
MA = mass of A (13 te) 
MB = mass of B (32 te) 
VA = velocity of A (22. 35 m/s) 
VB = velocity of B (33.52 m/s) 
< 
vc = velocity of both A and B after 
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M a 
Pre-Impact 
VB 
-ve 
Impact 
impact 
Substituting for MA, VA and MB, VB in (1) 
Vc = (-) 17.4 m/s 
Assuming part of the explosives load breaks from its 
restraint during initial collision then the idealised 
impact speed, u, on the part is given by 
•••••••••.• 2 
Substituting for VA and Vc in (2) 
U = 39.8 m/s 
Thus, it is conceivable that a part of the explosives 
load may be subjected to an impact speed above the minimum 
required to cause initiation (i.e. 35 m/s). Therefore, it 
is suggested that such a collision has the potential to 
cause impact initiation of explosives. 
Using the momentum balance above it is possible to 
determine the minimum closing speed required .to cause 
impact initiation. 
Substituting for MA and MB in (1) 
Substituting for Vc in (2) 
U = 0.71(VA- VB) 
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minimum impact initiation speed = 35 m/s 
substituting 35 m/s for U in (3) 
VA- VB = 49.3 m/s = 110 mph 
Thus, 
estimated 
in this instance a closing speed of 110 mph is 
as the minimum closing speed required to cause 
possible impact initiation of the explosives. 
The probability that collisions occur at certain closing 
speeds can be estimated through data collected on vehicular 
impacts. For example, impact speed distributions can be 
modelled from impact data, such as that given in Section 
3.2. Combining impact speed distributions provides a means 
of estimating closing speeds for vehicular accidents. The 
combination of two separate impact speed distributions 
provides a combined impact speed distribution for 
specific collisions between those vehicles represented by 
the data. 
i.e. 
f (x3 ) = f (x1 ) + f(x2 ) 
where 
f(x 1) = impact speed distribution (vehicle 1) 
f(x2 ) = impact speed distribution (vehicle 2) 
f(x3) = combined impact speed distribution (closing speed) 
for impacts between vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 
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From the combined distribution, the probability, P, that 
a certain proportion of impacts, X, occur at closing speeds 
between xa and xb (for normally distributed data) is given 
by 
P [ (xl) < X < (x2) ) 
= P [ (xl - xl < z < (x2 - xl 1 
6 6 
= P [ (a) < z < (b) 1 
= I (a) - I(b) 
= p 
Values I(a) and I(b) are obtained from standard normal 
mathematical tables21. 
For the example given here, the probability that a head-
on collision between a rigid 2-axle HGV and an articulated 
5-axle HGV, occurs at a closing speed of 110 mph or more 
can be estimated from the impact speed data given in 
Section 3.2. Assuming that the collision occurs on a built-
up road and that the data given in Section 3.2, Table 5 is 
applicable for all collision types and all HGVs then 
f(xc) = f(x) + f(x) 
where 
f(xcl = combined impact speed distribution for all impacts 
between HGVs 
f(x) = impact speed distribution for all HGVs 
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Thus 
xc = x + x 
= 2x 
l = 62 + 62 c 
= 262 
6c = f6 
From the above, and using the data given in Section 3.2 
Xc = 2(30.6) 
= 61.2 mph 
6c = 2 (12 .2) 
= 17.3 mph 
Using the usual formula the combined impact speed data 
can be represented by a normal distribution (see Chapter 3, 
Figure 1) • For the HGV collision considered here the 
probability that it occurs at 110 mph or more is calculated 
below as 2.3 x 10-3 (assuming a maximum obtainable 
combined impact speed of no more than 130 mph). 
i.e. 
P[ (110) <X< (130)] 
= P[ (110 - 61.2) < Z < (130 - 61.2)] 
= 
= 
= 
= 
17.3 
P[(2.82) < Z < (3.98)] 
I (3.98) - I (2.82) 
0.9999 - 0.9976 
2.3 X 10-3 
17.3 
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A similar approach to that given above can be used to 
quantify train collisions, and hence relate impact speeds 
to Susan test data. However, unlike road vehicle collisions 
where the load is contained within the impacted vehicle 
(enabling load impact speed estimates to be easily 
derived), freight wagons are often isolated from the 
initial collision. Freight wagon damage and subsequently 
load damage is most commonly the result of secondary 
collisions between adjacent wagons or objects alongside the 
track. Train collisions can be modelled identifying impact 
speeds of individual wagons. Unfortunately a relationship 
between wagon impact speed and damage is difficult to 
correlate due to a number of uncontrollable variables. For 
example, in head-on collisions regardless of individual 
wagon loads, wagon impact speeds tend to decrease towards 
the rear of the train. This suggests that damage is related 
to distance, and therefore, in head-on collisions wagons 
located towards the rear of the train suffer less damage 
than those located towards the front of the train. This 
damage pattern has been shown to exist by Westbrook22 and 
the author7 in two different but equally simple train 
damage and train impact analysis models. However,. such 
models do not account for wagon derailment. Derailment is 
related not only to speed but also to wheel base, wheel 
type and track type. As far as impact speed analysis is 
concerned wagon derailment is difficult to model and 
predict with any confidence. Derailment can cause wagons 
having relatively low impact speeds (compared with other 
wagons in the train) to incur extensive damage. 
to these problems train impact analysis suffers 
unpredictability of wagon numbers per train 
respective loads. 
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In addition 
from the 
and their 
Although the simulation approach discussed above could 
be explored further a much more simple means of identifying 
and quantifying train accidents, liable to cause initiation 
of explosives, can be obtained through the study of train 
accidents, together with data collected on train impact 
speeds. The author 
Inspectorate accident 
majority of train 
has examined almost 200 
reports and it is concluded 
accidents which are likely 
Railway 
that the 
to incur 
sufficient impact stimuli (to cause explosives to initiate) 
are those accidents which result in casualties and/or 
extensive train damage, such as 
a. high speed collisions between rolling stock, 
b. high speed collisions between trains and road 
vehicles at level crossings, 
c. high speed collisions of trains with massive objects, 
d. high speed collisions/derailments causing wagons to 
fall from bridges/viaducts onto hard surfaces. 
The accident speed data given in Chapter 
4.3, can be used to estimate the probability 
4.0, 
of 
Section 
freight 
train collisions which occur at specific impact speeds. 
With respect to collision types and the impact sensitivity 
of explosives, expected train damage and hence impact 
initiation (of explosives) are assumed to be functions of 
collision speed. For example, the probability that if a 
freight train collides with another train it does so 
at a closing speed of 70 mph or more is calculated below to 
be 5.6 x 10-4 (based on a mean freight train closing speed 
of 27 mph) . Whether such a train impact has the 
potential to cause initiation of explosives (which are 
sensitive to impacts below 70 mph) is open to argument and 
is obviously collision type and impact location dependent. 
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i.e. 
p ( (X) < X] 
= P[ (70 - 27) < Z] 
13.18 
= P[(3.26) <Z] 
= I (3.26) 
= 5.6 x 10-4 
The sequence of events for explosion from non~fire 
initiated incidents can be illustrated by the use of fault 
trees. Consider a rigid 2-axle HGV laden with 1 te of 
military explosives sensitive to impacts of 35 m/s or more. 
The munitions vehicle has a gross weight of 13 te and is 
travelling along a non built-up road designated as class A. 
On approaching a bend in the road at 50 mph it collides 
head-on with a 32 te articulated 5-axle HGV travelling at 
75 mph. As shown previously by the application of simple 
momentum theory such an accident has the potential to cause 
explosives to initiate. Similarly, consider a 7 wagon FT 
conveying 3 wagons of explosives which are sensitive to 
impacts of 30 m/s or more. As the FT negotiates an 
intersection one of the wagons laden with 5 te of 
commercial explosives is hit by a leading locomotive of an 
express train at 80 mph causing the explosives to initiate. 
The incidents described above are represented in Figures 
1 and 2 by simple fault trees. Both fault trees can be 
further developed (as the fault trees imply) . For example, 
the type of HGV collision will greatly affect closing 
impact speed and therefore accident severity. Exposure of 
explosives is dependent on packaging, loading and vehicle 
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construction as well as crash orientation. Similarly, the 
type of FT collision will greatly affect impact speed and 
accident severity. Furthermore, wagon exposure will depend 
largely upon crash orientation and the energy absorbing 
characteristics of the trains/structures involved. 
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Figure 1: Fault tree for crash initiated explosion: Road 
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Figure 2: Fault tree for crash initiated explosion: Rail 
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6.5.2 Fire Incidents 
Almost all explosives are sensitive to thermal 
initiation and therefore it is prudent to assume that all 
explosives have a likelihood, however small, of initiating 
as a result of fire. The incidence of fires can be 
quantified 
Chapters 
through the application of data given 
3.0 and 4.0. Fire incidents can be divided 
in 
into 
those fires resulting from vehicular accidents, known here 
as crash fires, and those fires caused by other means, 
known as non-crash fires. 
Regardless of whether fire is a result of crash or not, 
for explosion to occur it is generally agreed that 
explosives must be exposed to an engulfing fire for a 
reasonable duration11 ,12, 13,23, 2 4. For military explosives 
the mean delay from fire inception to explosion has been 
estimated to b~ as low as 3 minutes25. Stone26 suggests 
that in transport incidents this delay is too short and 
that between 10 and 15 minutes is a better estimate. From a 
series of pallet fire tests performed by the Royal Armament 
Research and Development Establishment2 4 (RARDE), it is 
estimated here that once munitions are engulfed between 5 
and 10 minutes is a typical time for-munitions to burn to 
explosion. The time for commercial explosives to burn to 
explosion is generally thought to be longer than that for 
military explosives, although not excessively27 • However, 
it should be noted that the common practice of conveying 
detonators, separated from, but alongside commercial 
explosives, is likely to reduce burn-to-explosion time in 
engulfing fires27, 
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In addition to explosives burn-to-explosion time, the 
time taken for vehicles/wagons to become engulfed affects 
the delay from fire inception of vehicles/wagons to 
explosion. One estimate given by the London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority28 is that typical HGVs take between 3 and 
4 minutes to become engulfed. It is thought that the time 
for typical rail wagons (authorised to convey explosives) 
to become engulfed is no less than that for HGVs, and as a 
result of the absence of fuel pipes and vehicular furniture 
etc. is possibly greater. However, it should not be 
forgotten that many rail wagons are constructed mainly of 
wood and if not treated for fire retardency may hasten 
engulfment. 
It should be noted here that not all fires lead to 
engulfment. 
(detailed in 
Engulfment depends on a multitude 
Chapters 3 and 4, Sections 3.3 
For both HGVs and rail respectively) • 
of factors 
and 4.2.4 
wagons the 
probability of engulfing fir~ given a non-crash fire is 
estimated here to be between 5% and 40%. This range has 
Home been derived from data made available through the 
Office29, personal contacts28,30 and the FTA 
conducted by the author(see Section 4.2). Based on 
survey 
similar 
sources this probability range compares with a 
of engulfment given a crash fire of between 40% 
probability 
and 60%. 
These estimates were originally derived from data collected 
by the author during the assessment of the hazard of the 
transport of explosives6,? (conducted for the Ministry of 
Defence). The data are detailed in Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3 
and Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4. 
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The time taken for the fire services to attend vehicular 
fires is obviously location dependent. Fire brigades, 
through the guidance of the Home Office, divide areas into 
categories of risk. Each category is designated a minimum 
number of pumps (i.e. fire-engines) which are required to 
attend 
for the 
the scene. In addition, recommended 
arrival of pumps are stipulated. 
maximum times 
For vehicular 
fires a reduced attendance is common practice. Unless there 
are additional reasons for concern (e.g. a large number of 
calls regarding a particular fire, additional hazards or 
public/ministry advice) only 1 pump is dispatched to a 
vehicular 
Brigade2 8 
movements 
fire. From discussion with the London Fire 
and information on military and commercial 
the areas through which explosives are likely to 
be moved by road chiefly correspond to areas requiring a 
minimum attendance time of 20 minutes. The mean time for 
the fire services to attend vehicular fires in such areas 
is between 10 and 15 minutes. Taking into consideration 
a. the time for an HGV/MV to be entirely engulfed in 
flames (3 to 4 minutes), 
b. the time for explosives to burn-to-explosion 
(discussed previously), 
c. the fact that the fire services withdraw and attempt 
localised evacuation of the public when explosive 
loads are engulfed, 
then it is clear that the fire services are unlikely to 
arrive in time to prevent engulfment and hence explosion. 
Compared with road incidents, the fire services have 
additional problems when dealing with rail incidents, 
namely the problem of access. As a consequence of this, it 
is also unlikely that the fire services would arrive in 
time to prevent engulfment and hence explosion of rail 
wagons. 
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The numbers of individuals exposed to the hazard 
considered here may be reduced by evacuation of the 
surrounding area. Unfortunately evacuation is a time 
consuming exercise. The London Fire Brigade28 estimate that 
it takes in the region of 20 minutes to evacuate a typical 
urban area within 25 m of a fire. It is thought that if 
evacuation is implemented only a very small proportion of 
those exposed would be evacuated to a safe distance. Due to 
uncertainties in 
a. burn-to-explosion time, 
b. delay in the notification of the fire services, 
c. speed of fire service response, 
' d. problems of co-ordination and execution, 
it is considered that the effect of evacuation 
the numbers of exposed individuals (if 
implement in such a short time) is very small. 
on reducing 
possible to 
The probability of explosion given engulfing fire is 
dependent on the type of explosive engulfed. Rather than 
explode it has been remarked that thin cased or lightly 
clad munitions, as they are often termed, suffer only 
violent pressure bursts and that the chances of actual 
explosion ·are ~---remote31 ;·- ~In-- comparison,·- heavily clad 
munitions are thought to have a greater probability of 
explosion31, possibly in the region of 20% - 30%. It has 
also been suggestedl3,31 that munitions classed by United 
Nations classification, as being HD 1. 2, (hazard division) 
are less likely to explode as a result of fire than those 
munitions classed as HD 1.1. Commercial explosives based 
on nitroglycerine are known to be extremely sensitive to 
thermal stimuli. A view whi~h has been expressed on a 
number of occasions1 1 , 12 is that nitroglycerine based 
explosives will almost certainly explode if engulfed in 
flames. This compares with ammonium nitrate based 
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explosives, such as commercial slurries and emulsions, 
whose chances of explosion when engulfed in flames are 
estimated to range between 1% and 10%. 
Identification and quantification of the sequence of 
events which lead to explosion can be best illustrated by a 
series of examples. Consider a rigid 2-axle HGV travelling 
along a built-up road designated as class A. The vehicle is 
loaded with 1 te of commercial explosives which are 
sensitive to thermal initiation. If engulfed in flames it 
is thought that the explosives packaging will not retard 
the onset of initiation. Towards the end of the journey a 
fuel leak develops which is subsequently ignited by hot 
engine parts. The crew of the vehicle are unable to 
extinguish the fire and before the fire services arrive at 
the scene the load area is engulfed in flames. The fire 
services attempt to extinguish the fire but are unable to 
prevent the explosives being engulfed for a period 
exceeding that which the explosives can withstand, and 
hence explosion occurs. Similarly, consider a 10 wagon FT 
conveying 4 wagons of military explosives (HD 1.1) which 
are sensitive to thermal initiation and whose packages 
offer no thermal protection. As the train reduces speed 
sparks from worn brake blocks ignite oil/dirt deposits on 
the bogie of a munitions wagon. The train crew are unable 
to extinguish the fire, the fire services arrive too late 
to prevent a prolonged engulfing fire, and hence explosion 
occurs. 
A diagrammatic representation of the sequence of events 
for both of these incidents can be illustrated by a simple 
fault tree, shown here in Figure 3. The fault tree can be 
further developed for both HGV and FT non-crash fires (as 
the !'diamond" events shown in the fault tree imply) • For 
example, fuel leaks may result from fuel line blockages, 
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development of pipe cracking as a result of stress 
corrosion or ageing, and the deterioration of seals etc •• 
Whereas, ignition sources may arise from bearings 
overheating through to faults in electrical circuitry. 
Failure of the crew to extinguish the fire or at least 
prevent engulfment of the load may result from lack of 
suitable fire-fighting equipment through to inappropriate 
use of equipment or just simple ·failure to discover the 
fire before it becomes well established. In comparison, 
failure of the fire services to extinguish the fire may 
result from a delay in their notification, their response 
time and/or the fact that not all means of extinguishing 
the fire can be employed as a result of load engulfment and 
imminent explosion. 
The 
result 
sequence of events which lead to 
of crash fire incidents can be 
explosion 
illustrated 
as 
in 
a 
a 
similar fashion ·to that given above for non-crash fire 
incidents. Consider the two examples given previously for 
non-crash fire incidents except in this case assume that 
a. the HGV collides with a motor car 
tank and subsequently spilt fuel 
the HGV, 
rupturing 
ignites 
its fuel 
engulfing 
b. the FT is hit by a motor car whilst passing over a 
level crossing causing extensive damage to one of the 
munitions wagons which subsequently becomes engulfed 
in flames. 
These two incident scenarios are illustrated in Figure 4 as 
a simple fault tree. 
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As with the fault tree developed for the non-crash fire 
examples, shown in Figure 3, the fault tree given in Figure 
4 for the two crash fire scenarios can be developed 
further. The reasons for the fire services not successfully 
extinguishing fires are the same as those given for non-
crash fire scenarios. However, it is more probable that 
crew members might suffer disabling injuries during crash 
incidents reducing their ability to perform first aid fire-
fighting. In addition, fires may not only result from the 
ignition of spilt fuel but also as a result of localised 
heat generation caused by shearing of vehicle parts etc •• 
Furthermore, fires may be dependent on crash orientation 
(i.e. frontal, side or rear impact) as well as the speed of 
impact and the type of colliding vehicle. 
Very little data are available which can help quantify 
the causes of HGV and FT fires, especially the root causes 
of fires. The data which are available are detailed in 
Chapters 3.0 and 4.0 and have been collated mainly through 
a number of personal communications and material published 
by the Department of Transport. 
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Figure 3: Fault tree for non-crash fire initiated explosion: 
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7.0 EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCES: EVALUATION 
Damage caused to both property and people, as a result 
of explosion, requires detailed analysis so that credible 
risk assessments may be performed. Most data on explosion 
effects refer to outdoor environments although to a large 
extent the problem is one of assessing indoor environments 
(i.e. individuals spend most of their time indoors). The 
following sections describe explosion consequences and 
illustrate how certain effects can be quantified. Where 
data are available reference is made to indoor 
environments. 
Since the beginning of the 1950's the vast majority of 
work in explosion theory and effects has concentrated on 
nuclear explosions. However, the damage caused by nuclear 
explosions is not easily extrapolated to the damage 
associated with chemical explosions. This is because 
explosions are essentially yield related. Consequently, 1-
thermal and pressure impulses differ between nuclear and 
chemical explosions, and hence each type of explosion 
produces different degrees of damage. As a consequence of 
this it is difficult to compare nuclear explosions, having 
typical yields of 100,000 tonnes or more, with the low 
yield chemical explosions of interest here (i.e. no more 
than approximately 40 te). In addition, data from nuclear 
explosions include the effects of ionising radiation 
together with other nuclear peculiarities, such as, thermo-
nuclear pulse. As an example of their differences consider 
the case of nuclear and conventional fireballs. The black 
body temperatures of nuclear initiated fireballs are orders 
of magnitude greater than their chemical counterparts. 
Radiation temperatures for nuclear explosions 
to 10 7 K, which is over 2000 times that of 
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approximate 
many high 
explosive and propellant explosionsl. Similarly, nuclear 
weapons emit energy in the range 0.01 nm to 10 nm compared 
with 200 nm to 500 nm for conventional explosives. 
Unfortunately, there are no simple scaling laws which 
can be used to relate chemical and nuclear explosions, or 
simple 
data 
means of isolating ionising effects etc., so 
can be readily extrapolated. Consequently, 
that 
the 
following sections, where possible, only refer to chemical 
explosions. This is because the inclusion of nuclear data 
may lead to erroneous assumptions and conclusions being 
made on the effects of relatively low yield chemical 
explosions. 
7.1 Blast Damage and Injury 
The term blast wave is used here to mean the shock wave 
caused by an explosion and should not be confused with the 
detonation wave. Upon detonation a detonation shock front 
travels away from the charge causing the temperature of the 
surrounding air to rise1 . This initial shock front is known 
as the detonation wave (or confusingly, the initial shock 
wave) . After a short distance of travel the detonation wave 
is overtaken by a new shock front which leaves a zone of 
rarefied air immediately behind it. This new shock front is 
known as the blast wave and although its peak pressure and 
initial velocity is lower than that of the detonation wave 
it decays much more gradually and therefore exerts its 
force over a greater distance1 • The blast wave from all 
chemical explosions·has a definite and measurable 
Upon detonation a sudden and violent release 
causes the 
creating a 
surrounding 
region of 
air pressure to rise 
positive pressure 
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pattern. 
of energy 
rapidly 
known as 
"overpressure". As the blast wave moves away from its 
source at high velocity (supersonic) ' the overpressure 
increases sharply to a peak value, known as the peak 
overpressure, and then gradually recedes. The overpressure 
phase is followed by a region of negative pressure or 
"underpressure". This pressure is generally insignificant 
compared with the overpressure phase, although such 
negative pressure can cause moderate damage especially at 
clos~ distances from the charge. 
The characteristics of blast waves are discussed by 
Lees2 and detailed accounts are given by Kinney3 and Baker 
et a1 1 • It is sufficient here to simply identify a means by 
which blast wave characteristics, in particular 
overpressure, can be estimated so that their effects on 
buildings and people can be quantified. 
Damage and injury as a result of explosion is largely a 
consequence 
and drag •. 
of two loading effects, 
Diffraction loading is 
known as diffraction 
related to the peak 
overpressure of a blast wave as it passes over and around 
an object or structure. Peak overpressure refers to the 
pressure above ambient at a given location (often termed 
side-on overpressure) • In this instance overpressure refers 
to the pressure above ambient upon blast wave interaction 
with an object or structure. Diffraction loading refers to 
the force exerted on an object or structure during blast 
wave envelopment. The loading consists of t~o components; 
firstly, that resulting from the pressure differential that 
exists between the front and back of an object/structure 
prior to envelopment and secondly, static loading 
("crushing" forces) due to the pressure differential 
between internal and external environments. The process of 
envelopment is described in detail by Glasstone and 
Dolan4 . Essentially, upon striking an object or structure 
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blast wave reflection occurs. This not only changes blast 
wave direction but also its momentum as it collides with 
the "winds" following its passage. Such collision results 
in a rapid rise in pressure termed the reflected 
overpressure. As the pressure drops the blast wave bends or 
"diffracts" over and around the structure loading other 
faces (peak overpressure). In comparison, drag loading is 
related to dynamic pressure. This is the air pressure 
behind a shock front and unlike overpressure has no 
reference to ambient pressure. Forces exerted by drag 
loading are the result of transient winds which accompany 
the passage of a blast wave. 
For very large explosions (peak overpressure greater 
than about 4.8 bar) dynamic pressure is greater than peak 
overpressure. As a consequence of this drag loading tends 
to be the main cause of damage in large explosions. This 
can also be the case where objects and structures present 
little resistance to blast waves. For example, buildings 
whose walls, windows and doors rapidly fail during blast 
wave interaction cause prompt equalisation of interior and 
exterior environments. This in turn can reduce the duration 
and magnitude of 
level 4 . (This is 
diffraction loading 
diffraction loading to a 
one means by which the 
can be minimised). For the 
negligible 
effects of 
types of 
explosions considered here peak overpressure is greater 
than dynamic pressure and therefore damage is largely the 
result of diffraction loading. However, this is not always 
true. It should be noted that all objects and structures 
simultaneously suffer both diffraction and drag loading. 
This is because overpressure and dynamic pressure both 
exist during blast and cannot be separated. The relative 
importance of each load type is largely dependent on size, 
shape, weight and resistance of objects and structures. 
Closed or semi-closed structures, such as buildings with 
small openings or large tanks, etc. are vulnerable to 
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diffraction loading, whereas, tall thin objects and 
buildings with large openings are vulnerable to drag 
loading. The discussion given here~ together with Table 1, 
provides a rough guide in judging the type of load most 
important to particular objects and structures. A detailed 
appraisal of the behaviour of objects and structures to 
diffraction and drag loading is given by Glasstone and 
Dolan4 . 
Blast wave damage is most commonly related to 
overpressure. This is probably due to its ease of 
measurement and estimation compared with other damage-
relation criteria. However, blast wave damage is also a 
function of rate of pressure rise and wave duration. As a 
consequence of this, impulse is also used as a measure of 
blast damage. Impulse is a function of both overpressure 
and wave duration and therefore is often considered a 
better measure of blast wave damage. However, using impulse 
as a damage-relation criterion can cause confusion. For 
example, based solely on impulse blast waves may be assumed 
to posses certain damage potential but in fact be unable to 
deliver this due to insufficient overpressure1•5. 
Overpressure itself is not an entirely satisfactory measure 
of blast damage. This fact has been acknowledged and has 
led to .the development of pressure-impulse correlations 
commonly known as P-I diagrams or curves. Similarly, 
distance-charge relationships have been derived (R-W 
correlations) relating distance and yield to structural 
response. Unfortunately, both of these techniques suffer 
from lack of usable data. This is not to say that the 
techniques are ineffective or unusable, current opinion 
suggests that P-I and R-W correlations provide improved 
means of assessing blast damage compared with the 
traditional overpressure-damage relation1 •5. 
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It is 
defined 
apparent that blast damage 
by a single parameter, 
is 
but 
not 
P-I 
adequately 
and R-W 
correlations, have as yet, limited use due to lack of data 
(as previously mentioned). Attempting to relate a number of 
criteria to the assessment of blast damage is not new. 
Limits of damage with respect to peak overpressure were 
suggested by Robinson6 as long ago as 1944, and more 
recently by the Explosives Storage and Transport Committee7 
(ESTC) . The empirical relationship devised by the ESTC and 
described by Jarrett7 is the foundation of the British 
Safety Distances for military and commercial explosivess. 
Basically blast damage is split into various categories and 
each category related to yield, distance and housing 
damage. These relationships and damage categories are 
illustrated here in Table 2. Using the work described by 
Jarrett and that of AsshetonB, Scilly and HighS illustrate 
not only damage with respect to overpressure and damage 
category (described by Jarrett 7 ) but also with respect to 
the mass of explosive consumed. The data given by Scilly 
and High are reproduced here in Table 3. For further detail 
on damage categories reference should be made to the 
original work of Jarrett7. 
From the discussion given above, and the fact that much 
work relating overpressure and blast damage has been 
performed and recorded, for most practical purposes 
overpressure provides a good estimation of blast wave 
damage. An additional reason for the adoption of 
overpressure as the primary measure of blast damage is 
possibly due to the fact that in addition to diffraction 
loading, drag loading can also be related to peak 
overpressure. This is because the dynamic pressure 
associated with drag loading is a function of wind speed 
and air density (behind the shock front) and both of these 
can be related to peak overpressure4 • 
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As a consequence of all the factors discussed above 
overpressure is used henceforth to describe blast damage. 
For further details on the rate of pressure rise, wave 
duration, pressure-impulse and distance-charge correlations 
(in relation to blast damage) reference should be made to 
either Baker et all, Kinney3, Scilly and HighS, Baker9 or 
Glasstone and Dolan4. 
A multitude of scaling laws have been devised which 
relate blast overpressure, charge size and distance etc .. A 
number of these are discussed by Baker9. Far the most 
popular and widely used is based on the "principle of 
similarity" proposed by HopkinsonlO in 1915. Provided the 
scales used to measure blast from any explosive are altered 
by the same factors as the dimensions of the relative 
charges then the properties will be similar. Rather than 
use the dimensions of the charge it is more practical to 
use charge 
compact and 
develop what 
weight and assume that explosive charges are 
symmetrical. This method has been used to 
is commonly known as the "cube root" law. 
Based on the fact that overpressure is related to distance, 
the scaled distance, z, at which peak overpressure is known 
can be found. 
Where 
z = scaled distance (m/kgl/3) 
R = distance from charge (m) 
W = charge size (kg) 
Strictly the scaling law is based on available energy. 
However, for simplicity it is assumed that the energy 
released is proportional to the mass of explosive. 
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Using the scaled distance in conjunction with Figure 1 
the peak overpressure at distance, R, can be estimated. The 
graph of peak overpressure vs. scaled distance, shown in 
Figure 1, is taken from Lees2 and is based on data given 
by Baker9 for the explosion of TNT. Similar graphs are 
given by Kinney3, Brasie and Simpson1 1 and Stull12 and more 
complex ones by Baker9. However, the ·graph presented here 
' is considered to be a good approximation' of peak 
overpressure with respect to scaled distance. This is 
because the values obtained from it tend to correspond well 
with other works3,11,12. 
Before further discussing the effects of blast it should 
be noted· that the terms "primary", "secondary" and 
"tertiary" are not well defined in the literature. Workers 
appear to use the terms differently. So as to avoid 
confusion, 
directly 
in this section primary refers to 
attributable to the blast wave 
all effects 
(e.g. lung 
haemorrhage 
all indirect 
and eardrum rupture), secondary refers 
effects such as bodily translation 
to 
and 
tertiary refers to the damage a~sociated with the secondary 
effect of translation. 
Blast damage can effectively be divided into two 
discrete categories, namely, building damage and human 
damage. With respect to building damage large amounts of 
data exist describing and quantifying the effects of 
overpressure. Robinson6 provides an extensive analysis of 
minor and serious damage resulting from blast and Eisenberg 
et al13, using data supplied by Fugelso et all4, derive 
probit equations relating structural damage to peak 
overpressure. A summary of blast damage with respect to 
peak overpressure is given by Clancey15 and reproduced here 
in Table 4. G~nerally an overpressure of 0.07 bar (1 psi) 
. ' is considered \sufficient to cause partial demolition of 
' 
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typical British brick and concrete constructions, whereas, 
0.70 bar (10 psi) is taken as resulting in total 
demolition. However, these figures are not agreed upon by 
all. Turnbull and Walter10 quote 1.5 bar as the onset of 
considerable building damage. This disagreement may well 
stem from the omission of certain blast criteria. Unlike 
human damage, the estimation of building damage tends to be 
sensitive to the response time of structures and blast 
reflection. Regardless of these additional criteria it is 
generally considered that overpressure is adequate in 
assessing building damage. 
Human damage, or as it is more commonly termed injury, 
is either due to direct blast wave contact or secondary 
effects, such as, whole body translation and missile 
impact. The most susceptible parts of the body to blast 
damage are those organs possessing large density 
differences amongst neighbouring tissue16. As a consequence 
of this most deaths from blast overpressure (i.e. primary 
effects) are a result of lung haemorrhage and heart 
failure. In comparison, minor injury is often based on 
eardrum rupture, since the ear, although not a vital organ 
is exceptionally sensitive to pressure. An increase in 
pressure of only 2 x 10-5 N/m2 (2.1 x 10-9 psi) will cause 
the eardrum to move less than the diameter of a single 
hydrogen mo1ecule 17 . Eisenberg et al13 have derived probit 
equations relating peak overpressure to the likelihood of 
death. The probit is based on lung haemorrhage and is given 
by 
Pr = -77.1 + 6.91 ln p 0 
Where 
Pr = 
PO = 
probit (originally given as Y) 
peak overpressure (N/m2) 
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Similarly, they derive a probit equation for minor injury 
based on eardrum rupture. 
Pr = -15.6 + 1.93 ln p 0 
A sample of the results gained using 
given in Tables 5 and 6. The equations 
early risk assessments and still remain 
their accuracy has been questioned. 
these equations is 
were developed for 
popular although 
Predicting lung haemorrhage and eardrum rupture is an 
extremely difficult task and many researchers present 
differing results. In comparison to the results given by 
Eisenberg et al 13 shown in Tables 5 and 6, Turnbull and 
Walter10 quote a figure of 3 bar rather than 1.4 bar as the 
pressure needed to cause 50% fatalities from lung 
haemorrhage. Similarly, Baker et al 1 using the results of 
Vadala1B, Henry19 and Reider20 have produced a plot of the 
percentage 
the plot 
of eardrum ruptures vs. peak overpressure. From 
they estimate that the probability of eardrum 
at 1 bar (14.5 psi) is approximately 50% and not 
given by Eisenberg et al. The plot presented by 
rupture 
90% as 
Baker et al is reproduced here in Figure 2. More recently 
Pietersen2 1 has described probit relations derived by TN022 
for the estimation of injury based on lung haemorrhage and 
eardrum rupture. The probits are derived in part from the 
abundance of work performed on explosion effects at the 
Lovelace Foundation23 in the US during the 1950's and 
1960's, in particular the work performed by Bowen et 
al24,25, White16 and Hirsch26. The probits based on lung 
haemorrhage and eardrum rupture illustrated by Pietersen 
provide similar results (marginally lower) to those given 
by Eisenberg et al13 and are therefore not detailed here. 
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Death and non-fatal injury from secondary effects, as 
previously stated, is generally the result of bodily 
translation or missile contact. The effects of missiles on 
the human body are dealt with in Section 7.2 and are not 
discussed here. Bodily translation or tertiary blast 
impact, as it is sometimes termed, consists of displacement 
and subsequent decelerative impact with the ground, 
building materials and/or other objects. Damage occurs as a 
result of the head or other vulnerable body parts colliding 
with hard surfaces causing fracture, concussion and/or 
haemorrhage. The degree of injury is related to impact 
velocity, duration, terrain, distance thrown, impacting 
surface and orientation. Baker and Oldham27 have developed 
a method of quantifying damage caused by bodily translation 
based on specific impulse and incident overpressure. Using 
the method together with data gained through White1 6 and 
Clemedson et al28 tertiary damage (caused by translation 
secondary effect) is expressed in terms of impact velocity. 
Abstracted results from Baker and Oldham2 7 are given in 
Tables 7 and 8. Longinow et al29 have also estimated 
tertiary damage. They derive a relationship between the 
probability of death and impact velocity. A graphical 
representation of the relationship is reproduced here in 
Figure 3. It can be seen that the values given by Baker and 
Oldham correspond well with the relationships given by 
Longinow et al for skull and whole body impact. 
Other characteristics associated with blast waves, such 
as, toxic gases, ground shock and crater are considered 
here to be insignificant compared with those effects 
described above. This is because such phenomena only become 
a serious hazard in exceptionally large or confined (toxic 
gases) explosions. Additionally, the likelihood of death or 
injury from such effects is small compared with death or 
injury from direct and indirect blast effects. Therefore, 
the effects of toxic gases, ground shock and crater are not 
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discussed here. Further information, with respect to these 
phenomena can be gained through Lees2 , Robinson6, Clancey15 
and Pietersen21. 
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Table 1: Principal loading vulnerability of structures 
and objects 
lA: Structures susceptible to diffraction loading 
' 
Multistory reinforced concrete buildings with 
concrete walls, small window areas, 3-8 stories. 
Multistory wall-bearing buildings, brick apartment 
houses, up to 3 stories. 
Multistory wall-bearing 
types, up to 4 stories. 
buildings, monumental 
Wood frame buildings, house types, 1 or 2 stories. 
lB: Structures and objects susceptible to drag loading 
Light steel frame industrial buildings, low 
strength walls which quickly fail, single story. 
Heavy steel frame industrial 
low strength walls which 
story. 
buildings, lightweight 
quickly fail, single 
Multistory steel frame office-type building, 
lightweight low strength walls which quickly fail, 
both earthquake and non-earthquake resistant, 3-10 
stories. 
Multistory reinforced concrete frame office-type 
building, lightweight low strength walls which 
quickly fail, both earthquake and non-earthquake 
resistant, ·3-10 stories. 
Highway and railroad bridges. 
Telegraph poles, electricity pylons 
Transport equipment and vehicles 
Trees and vegetation 
Source: Glasstone and Dolan4 
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Table 2: Housing damage categories in relation to the 
distance from condensed phase explosions 
Damage category Description 
(constant K) 
A ( 3. 8) Almost complete demolition. 
B (5. 6) 50-75% external brickwork destroyed or 
rendered unsafe, requiring demolition. 
Cb ( 9. 6) Houses uninhabitable - partial or 
total collapse of roof, partial 
demolition of one or two external 
load-bearing walls, severe damage to 
partitions requiring replacement. 
ea (2 8) Not exceeding minor structural 
damage, and partitions and joinery 
wrenched from fixings. 
D (56) Remaining inhabitable after repair 
- some damage to ceilings and tiling, 
more than 10% window glass broken. 
R - __ ---.JK~w'-'1:..:./_:3,.--.,-~< 
(1 + (3175/w2)) 176 
Where 
R = distance from condensed phase explosion (m) 
W = mass of explosive (kg) 
K = constant 
Note: 
a. "R", defines the average radii for idealised circles 
within which dwellings suffer the damage associated with 
a chosen category. Those dwellings that suffer damage 
for a given category outside the circle are balanced by 
those within the circle which do not suffer such damage. 
b. The formula and constants given above are given in 
imperial units by Jarrett. 
Source: Jarrett7 
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Table 3: Explosion damage with respect to overpressure, 
degree of damage and mass of explosive consumed 
Structure Damage Approximate peak 
or object overpressure (bar) 
1 te 10 te 100 te 
-
Window 5% broken 0.010 0.007 0.007 
panes 
50% broken 0.025 0. 017 0.014 
90% broken 0.062 0. 041 0.037 
Houses Tiles 0.044 0.029 0.026 
displaced 
Doors and 0.090 0.059 0.053 
window frames 
may be blown 
in 
Category D 0.045 0.030 0.029 
damage 
Category ea 0.124 0.079 0.076 
damage 
Category Cb 0.276 0.165 0.159 
damage 
Category B 0.793 0.359 0.345 
damage 
Category A 1. 827 0.793 0.758 
damage 
Telegraph Snapped 3.585 1. 793 1.655 
poles 
Large Destroyed 3.930 1. 793 1.655 
trees 
267 
Table 3: continued 
Structure Damage Approximate peak 
or object overpressure (bar) 
1 te 10 te 100 te 
Primary Limit of 0.014 0.010 0.008 
missiles travel 
Rail Limit of 1.827 0.793 0.758 
wagons derailment 
Bodywork 1. 379 0.600 0.579 
crushed 
Damaged but 0.793 0.393 0.379 
easily repair-
able 
Superficial 0.317 0.179 0.172 
damage 
Railway Limit of 14.13 6.688 6.412 
line destruction 
Note: 
a. All distances (overpressures) from the explosion source 
are measured to the furthest point of the structure or 
object. 
b. Overpressures originally estimated in imperial units 
(psi) . 
Source: Scilly and HighS 
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Table 4: Damage produced by blast 
Pressure 
(bar) 
Damage 
r--------+-------------------------------------~ 
0.0014 
0. 0021 
0.0028 
0.0069 
0.010 
0.020 
0.028 
0.034 
- 0.069 
0.048 
0.069 
0.069 
- 0.138 
0.090 
0.138 
0.138 
- 0.207 
Annoying noise (137 dB), if of low 
frequency (10 - 15 Hz) . 
Occasional breaking of large glass windows 
already under strain. 
Loud noise (143 dB). Sonic boom glass 
failure. 
Breakage of windows, small, under strain. 
Typical pressure for glass failure. 
"safe distance" (probability 0.95 no 
serious damage beyond this value). 
Missile limit (some damage to house 
ceilings; 10% window glass broken) . 
Limited minor structural damage. 
Large and small windows usually shattered; 
occasional damage to window frames. 
Minor damage to house structures. 
Partial demolition of houses, made 
uninhabitable. 
Corrugated asbestos shattered. Corrugated 
steel or aluminium panels, fastenings fail, 
followed by buckling. Wood panels (std. 
housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in. 
Steel frame of clad building slightly 
distorted. 
Partial collapse of walls and roofs of 
houses. 
Concrete or cinder block walls, not 
reinforced, shattered. 
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Table 4: continued 
Pressure 
(bar) 
0.159 
0.172 
0.207 
0.207 
- 0. 276 
0.276 
0.345 
0.345 
- 0.483 
0.483 
0.483 
- 0.552 
0.621 
0.689 
20.68 
Damage 
Lower limit of serious structural damage. 
50% destruction of brick work of house. 
Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial 
building suffered little damage. 
Steel frame building distorted and pulled 
away from foundations. 
Frameless, self-framing steel panel 
building demolished. 
Rupture of oil storage tanks. 
Cladding of light industrial buildings 
ruptured. 
Wooden utilities poles snapped (telegraph 
poles, etc.). 
Tall hydraulic press (40000 lb) in building 
slightly damaged. 
Nearly complete destruction of houses. 
Loaded train wagons overturned. 
Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not 
reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure. 
Loaded train box-cars completely demolished. 
Probable total destruction of buildings. 
Heavy machine tools (7000 lb) moved and 
badly damaged. 
Very heavy machine tools (12000 lb) survived. 
Limit of crater lip. 
Source: Clanceyl5 
270 
Table 5: Probability of fatality from lung haemorrhage for 
a given overpressure 
Probability of Peak overpressure 
fatality (%) (Bar) (psi) 
1 1.00 14.5 
10 1.20 17.5 
50 1. 40 20.5 
90 1. 75 25.5 
99 2.00 29.0 
Source: Eisenberg et al13 
Table 6: Probability of eardrum rupture for a given 
overpressure 
Probability of Peak overpressure 
eardrum rupture 
( %) (Bar) (psi) 
1 0.17 2.4 
10 0.19 2.8 
50 0.44 6.3 
90 0.84 12.2 
Source: Eisenberg et al13 
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Table 7: Criteria for tertiary damage (decelerative impact) 
to the head 
Skull fracture tolerance Related impact velocity 
(m/s) 
mostly "safe" 3.05 
threshold 3.96 
50 percent 5.49 
near 100 percent 7.01 
Source: Baker et al1,27 
Tab1e 8: Criteria for tertiary damage involving total body 
impact. 
Total body impact Related impact velocity 
tolerance (m/s) 
mostly "safe" 3.05 
lethality threshold 6.40 
lethality 50 percent 16.46 
lethality near 100 percent 42.06 
Source: Baker et al1,27 
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7.2 Missile Damage and Injury 
Fragment generation, as a result of explosion, can 
produce significant damage to the receiving medium. Energy 
delivered to fragments from blast waves causes fragments to 
become airborne and act as missiles characterised by 
velocity, 
classed 
range and penetration. 
as being either primary 
Such 
or 
missiles are often 
secondaryl. Primary 
missiles consist of casing and/or container fragments from 
the explosive item, whereas, secondary missiles consist of 
fragments from objects located close to the explosion 
source which have interacted with the blast wave. 
Unlike the one or two large fragments which result from 
typical storage vessel "bursts"l,30, the casings and 
packages of high explosives rupture into large numbers of 
small primary fragments. Although the fragments are small 
and irregular, they are generally of a "chunky" appearance 
(in as much that all linear dimensions are of a similar 
magnitude) 
region of 
and 
one 
missiles 
for typical shell casings weigh 
gram31,32. In addition, high 
have velocities over ten times 
in the 
explosive 
that of primary 
typical 
several 
pressure burst fragments; 
thousand metres per second 
velocities approaching 
are not uncommon31. 
Secondary missiles, as mentioned above, are the result 
of blast wave interaction with objects located near to the 
source of explosion. Such fragments are often termed as 
being either ''constrained" or "unconstrained". The 
terminology depends upon whether the blast wave tears them 
from their fixings 1 or simply "up-roots" them from their 
position. The fragments may take a multitude of forms from 
building materials through to vegetation. Velocity, range 
and penetration of secondary missiles are, in the main, 
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much less than those of primary types. However, it is not 
unknown for blast waves to accelerate secondary fragments 
to velocities where they become capable of inflicting serve 
impact damagel,32. 
It is not the intention of this study to explain in 
depth the means of calculating, from accidental explosions, 
missile projectory, penetration, range or velocity. Much 
work has already been done on these subjects. A brief 
description is given by Lees 2 and detailed accounts by 
Baker et all, ClanceylS and High33; all of these contain 
references to other works. However, 
brief description of the methods used 
for completeness a 
to calculate missile 
range, velocity and penetration are included here. 
Missile range (horizontal) can be estimated through the 
consideration of initial kinetic energy and initial 
fragment velocity. For typical fragments from cased charges 
the range varies from between 20% and 60% of the initial 
kinetic energy2. 
E = 0.5 * M * v2 
Where 
E = initial kinetic energy (J) 
M = mass of fragment (kg) 
V = initial velocity of fragment (m/s) 
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Initial 
Clancey15 
resulting 
follows. 
fragment velocity is difficult to calculate. 
estimates that for the majority of fragments, 
from TNT explosions, fragment velocities are as 
Thin case 
Medium case 
Thick case 
8000 ft/s (2438 m/s) 
6000 ft/s (1829 m/s) 
4000 ft/s (1219 m/s) 
The velocities have been estimated from empirical data 
on the assumption that any size charge will propel 
fragments .the same distance. Although this assumption is 
untrue, since large explosions propel fragments further 
than small explosions, the estimates do assist in 
preliminary analysis. Clancey15 also details an empirical 
calculation of missile range. Modifying the formula so as 
to incorporate SI units, the range is given by 
x = (wl/3; k * a) * (ln U/V) 
Where 
X = 
w = 
u = 
V = 
k = 
range (m) 
mass of fragment (kg) 
initial fragment velocity (m/s) 
fragment velocity (m/s) 
constant (0.002 velocity supersonic, 0.0014 
velocity subsonic) 
a = drag coefficient 
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Drag coefficients are a function of fragment shape and 
orientation during flight. Typical drag coefficients range 
between about 0.8 and 2.0, with regular symmetric type 
shapes tending towards the lower values. A number of drag 
coefficients for various shapes and flight orientations are 
given by Hoerner34. 
Missile penetration is examined in-depth by Clancey15 
and Baker et al 1 • However, the equations given below are 
from neither of these sources, but are considered here 
suitable 
materials 
for 
by 
approximating penetration 
fragments of less than 1 kg 
through building 
(this is useful 
here since casing fragments are generally much less than 1 
kg, as indicated previously) . The equations are taken from 
the High Pressure Safety Code35 which suggests that a 
safety factor of between 1.5 and 2 should be applied to the 
results. It should be noted that irregular fragments may 
have a penetration capability only half of that calculated, 
whereas, pointed fragments may penetrate even further. 
t = k * Ma * vb 
Where 
t = penetration (m) 
M = mass of fragment (kg) 
V = velocity of fragment (m/s) 
The constant "k" and indices "a" and "b" vary depending on 
target material, as shown below. 
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k 
Concrete 18 X 10- 6 
(crushing strength 35 MN/m2) 
Brickwork 23 X 10-G 
Mild steel 6 X 10-5 
Damage caused by missiles, needless to 
from superficial to extensive. As a guide 
Storage and Transport Committee36 (ESTC) 
lethal missiles, with regards to humans, 
a b 
0.40 1.5 
0.40 1.5 
0.33 1.0 
say, can vary 
the Explosives 
estimate that 
are missiles 
having approximately 80 J of kinetic energy. The ESTC also 
suggest that 1 fragment per 56 square metres provides 
individuals who are out in the open with a 1% chance of 
being hit. Buildings and other relatively large objects can 
be crushed or penetrated by missiles leading to minor 
hazards, such as, falling debris and glass breakage. 
However, impulsive loading during 
large heavy missiles, presents 
hazard. This is because impulsive 
impact, especially from 
the greatest indirect 
loads may instigate or 
encourage collapse of structures and/or escalate the amount 
and rate of falling debris and glass breakage. All of these 
missile effects may also lead to the initiation of 
secondary fires adding further injury. Secondary fires are 
discussed in Section 7.3. 
The term "indirect hazard" as used above refers to all 
damage caused to solid media, such as, building materials 
and vehicles which may then present a hazard to man. It 
follows that "direct hazard" refers to direct injury of the 
human body as a result of actual physical missile contact. 
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The majority of injuries from direct hazards relate to skin 
laceration and open wounds. If the velocity of the missile 
is sufficient and contact is made with vital organs then 
death may result. Experiments on skin penetration have been 
performed by Sperrazza and Kokinakis3 7 . They have found 
that a relationship exists between missile mass and exposed 
cross-sectional area (CSA) . This relationship is based on a 
limiting velocity cv50 ) which corresponds to a 50% 
probability of skin penetration. The tests, performed with 
steel cubes, spheres and cylinders impacting 3 mm thick 
human/goat skin, assume that all missile penetration causes 
se~e damage. Sperrazza and Kokinakis conclude that 
--------- --limiting velocity depends linearly on the ratio of fragment 
area and fragment mass, as shown below. 
Vso = k * (A/M) + b 
for A/M > 0.09 m2 /kg and M > 0.015 kg 
Where 
V so= limiting velocity (m/s) 
A = CSA of missile along trajectory (m2) 
M = mass of fragment (kg) 
k = constant (1247.1) 
b = constant (22.03) 
Other work has been performed on skin penetration. 
Unfortunately, direct comparisons with the findings of 
Sperrazza and Kokinakis are difficult to make as a result 
of the many differing approaches to the problem. However, 
Baker et all using a number of simplifying assumptions, 
have compared results compiled by other researchers, as 
shown in Figure 4. It can be seen from Figure 4 that the 
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relationship estimated by Sperrazza and Kokinakis compares 
well with the findings of Glasstone 4, White et al38, 
Custard et al39 and Kokinakis40. More recently Pietersen21 
has described a relationship derived by TNo22 relating the 
probability of skin penetration with fragment velocity and 
mass. The relationship is in the form of a probit equation, 
as shown below, and is applicable to fragments of less than 
0.1 kg. 
Pr = -29.15 + 2.10 ln S 
Where 
s = MV5.115 
M = mass of fragment (kg) 
V = velocity of fragment (m/s) 
Not all fragments are penetrating. Non-penetrating 
fragments may cause injury or death by virtue of their mass 
and velocity being so great that they inflict bodily 
translation and/or crushing effects. Such action usually 
results in 
and/or serve 
the effect of 
cerebral concussion, fracture, haemorrhage 
bruising of the victim. Ahlers41 has studied 
non-penetrating missiles on individuals, the 
results of which are 
Pietersen2 1 illustrates 
TN022 for the probability 
presented here in Figure 
two probit relations derived 
of death from such missiles. 
5. 
by 
For 
fragments between 0.1 kg and 4.5 kg the probit is related 
to kinetic energy (i.e. s = tMV2) 
Pr = -17.56 + 5.30 ln S 
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where M and V are as given above for skin penetration. For 
fragments greater than 4.5 kg the probit is related to 
skull fracture and given by 
Pr = -13.19 + 10.54 ln V 
where V is the fragment velocity. 
Further information on the effects of 
with respect to 
TNo2 2 , Clemsdon 
Kokinakis 4 0. 
humans can be gained 
et al28, Sperrazza and 
283 
missile impact, 
through White16, 
Kokinakis37, and 
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7.3 Thermal Damage and Injury 
Extensive thermal damage from explosions is usually 
caused by the phenomenon of fireball growth. Fireballs 
cause damage as a result of igniting combustible materials 
and injuring humans by direct immersion and intense 
radiation. Thermal damage may also occur as a result of 
secondary fires. These fires are initiated either by 
instantaneous combustion of materials due to radiation 
exposure above material threshold levels or by missile and 
blast interaction with ignition sources. The number of 
secondary fires caused by explosion is extremely hard to 
quantify. For propane explosions· Geffen et al42 have 
estimated the number of secondary fires as a factor of heat 
radiation threshold and building density. It is suggested 
here that a similar analogy could be employed for 
commercial 
fireballs, 
and military 
secondary fires 
explosives. 
present only a 
Compared with 
minor thermal 
hazard and, as such, their specific characteristics are not 
expanded upon here. Detailed information on secondary fires 
can be gained through Lees2, Geffen et al42 and Rausch et 
al43. 
As previously mentioned, the major hazard from fireballs 
is the effect of thermal radiation damage. As a result of 
this most investigations into fireball characteristics have 
concentrated on radiant rather than conductive and 
convective heat transfer. However, it has been suggested by 
Baker et a1 1 that for small fireballs, in which less than 
10 kg of substance are consumed, heat transfer by 
conduction and convection may play a substantial part in 
the heat transfer process. Regardless of this omission, for 
the purposes of hazard assessment, the current catalogue of 
research tends to support historical data collected on 
fireball incidents. The most authoritative work in this 
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field is given by Rakaczky 44 , with regards to munitions 
explosions, Gayle and Bransford45, High46, Bader et al47 
and Hasegawa and Sato48 with regards to liquid propellants 
and fuel explosions, and Roberts49 with regards to releases 
of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) . It should be noted that 
much work in this field relates specifically to nuclear 
explosions 4 . Unfortunately the results gained on fireballs 
from nuclear explosions do not correspond well with data 
collected on fireballs resulting from chemical explosions. 
This disparity should be borne in mind when attempting 
fireball analysis. This study is chiefly concerned with 
commercial and conventional military explosives, and 
therefore the following discussion on fireball growth and 
damage omits any reference to nuclear explosions. 
Evaluation of fireball consequences for hazard 
assessment requires the quantification of fireball 
temperature, fireball duration and fireball size. 
Temperature is dependent on the heat capacity of the fuel 
consumed and varies from approximately 1350 K for flammable 
gases to about 5000 K for chemical explosives. It is 
important to note this fact when using fireball models so 
as to avoid erroneous conclusions. For example, High's46 
predictions for fireball size and duration are based on 
liquid propellants .having fireball temperatures of 3600 K, 
whereas, Rakaczky's 44 estimates are for fuels, such as, 
propane, pentane and octane which have substantially lower 
fireball temperatures (i.e. approximately 2500 K). 
Similarly, Roberts 4 9 equations relate to propane fireballs. 
However, variations between fireball models are largely 
dependent upon the mass of substance consumed, and as such 
size and duration estimates may vary by as much as 50%. 
287 
As stated above, estimation of fireball size and 
duration varies from model to model. It is suggested by 
Baker et all that the results from the various models, used 
to estimate size and duration, are asymptotic or limiting 
cases of a more general solution. This claim is supported 
by the mathematical similarities between the models and the 
fact that some methods are suitable for use on fireballs 
consuming small quantities (i.e. less than 10 kg - Hasegawa 
and Sato48), whereas, others are best used on fireballs 
consuming relatively modest quantities of material (i.e. 
more than 20 kg - High46 and Rakaczky44). However, from a 
review of fireball models Roberts49 suggests that for a 
large range of releases (1 kg to over 100,000 kg) the 
following equation provides a reasonable approximation of 
fireball size. 
D = 5.8 * Ml/J 
where 
D = fireball diameter (m) 
M = mass consumed (kg) 
Similarly, Roberts suggests that for fireballs consuming 
less than 5 kg fireball duration is best estimated by 
T = 1.1 * M0.097 
and for quantities greater than 5 kg 
T = 0.83 * M0.3l6 
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where 
T = fireball duration (s) 
M = mass consumed (kg) 
Duration time, T, is referred to here as the period 
during which fireballs radiate heat. Further time-scales 
(of minor importance here) are those associated with 
duration of combustion with regards to momentum, buoyancy 
and deflagration and time for fireball "lift-off". These 
time-scales are discussed in detail by Roberts 4 9 together 
with three distinct stages of fireball development, namely 
a. rapid growth (rapid combustion, dominated by initial 
momentum of release, very bright flame), 
b. little change in size (dominated by buoyancy and 
combustion effects, flame cooling from bright yellow 
to dull orange), 
c. fireball lift (rapid cooling, dominated by buoyancy 
effects) . 
The main difficulty in estimating duration is 
essentially the absence of discrete fireball termination. A 
general consensus has not been reached on the estimation of 
duration and therefore large deviation is often found 
between fireball models. In comparison, the estimation of 
fireball size tends to be more consistent. This is because 
most hazardous materials generate fireballs which expand 
rapidly reaching a maximum size which is maintained for a 
measurable time until collapse. Rakaczky44 , in a literature 
review of explosions, observed that fireball size and 
duration can be expressed by 
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D = 3.76 * M0.3 25 
and 
T = 0.258 * M0.3 49 
Unfortunately, no limits of applicability are given for 
the equations above and therefore they should be used with 
caution. Baker et all, however, contend that Rakaczky's 
equations are for fireballs with temperatures approximating 
2500 K. Other researchers, namely High 46 and Hasegawa and 
Sato48, have evaluated similar equations, abstracted 
results of which are shown in Tables 9 and 10. It is 
suggested by Baker et al that High's equations should be 
used for liquid propellants having fireball temperatures of 
approximately 3600 K and where more than 20 kg of 
hazardous material is consumed, and that Hasegawa and 
Sate's equations be employed on fireballs consuming less 
than 10 kg. 
Hasegawa and Sato48 
D = 3.86 * M0.32 D = 5.25 * M0.314 
T = 0.299 * M0.32 T = 1.07 * MO.l81 
The models discussed above have yet to be refined so ·as 
to incorporate conductive and convective heat transfer 
mechanisms, which may greatly affect heat loss in small 
fireballs, as previously mentioned. In addition, the 
emissivity of fireballs has not been fully addressed. Most 
models assume emissivity values of between 0.7 and 1.0. 
However, some fireballs have extremely low "black-body" 
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capabilities rendering the above equations inappropriate 
(e.g. hydrogen fireballs). 
Fireball size and duration is summarised in Table 11. 
Further analysis is required if fireball 
are to be evaluated. Such analysis takes 
consequences 
the form of 
estimating thermal radiant heat flux and, subsequently, 
radiated thermal energy. The treatment and derivation of 
these 
upon 
Baker 
parameters are complex and too detailed 
here. A suitable explanation is given by 
et all. It is sufficient here to note 
to expand 
High33 and 
that the 
analysis is based on fireball size, temperature and 
duration. On the assumption that fireball size and 
temperature remain constant High derives the following 
equations for radiant heat flux, q, and radiated energy per 
unit area, Q. 
where 
q = 
Q = 
D = 
0 = 
R = 
M = 
F = 
G = 
= 
= 
heat flux (J/m2s - i.e. W/m2) 
radiated energy (J/m2) 
diameter of fire ball (m) 
temperature of fireball (K) 
distance to fireball (stand-off distance) (m) 
consumed mass (kg) 
transmission coefficient (161.7) 
transmission coefficient (5.26 x 10-5) 
bG = transmission product (2.04 x 10 4 ) 
291 
Both equations above are based on static fireball 
diameters. High33 (employing a time variant analogy) has 
shown that equations can be derived to allow for fireball 
growth. However, these are not expanded upon here since 
they add little to the assessment of fireball damage. 
Total radiated heat, E, is given by Roberts4 9 as 
E = F * M * Q 
T 
where 
E = total radiated heat (kW) 
F = fraction of total heat released 
M = mass consumed (kg) 
Q = heat of combustion (kJ/kg) 
T = fireball duration (s) 
(0.2 - 0.4) 
From the above the intensity of heat radiation on a 
target perpendicular to the direction of radiation (i.e. 
heat flux) is given by 
I = E 
--=---
where 
I = 
4 * i1 * L2 
intensity of 
referred to as 
heat radiation (kW/m2) (note; "I" is 
"q" in the equations given by High33) 
E = total radiated heat (kW) 
L = distance from centre of fireball to target (m) 
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Tt 
The effect of fire on buildings can be related directly 
to the intensity of radiated heat (i.e. heat flux). Most 
research has concentrated on the ignition of wood1,50. 
Lawson and Simms50 estimate spontaneous ignition of wood 
from the following equation. 
where 
q = heat flux (W/m2) 
qs= critical heat flux for spontaneous ignition 
(W/m2) (25400) 
t = duration of heat flux (s) 
k = constant (6730) 
The equation given above is based on empirical data and 
is a general relationship for all types of wood. The 
critical radiation intensity (i.e. heat flux) to cause 
spontaneous ignition of wood is given as 25.4 kW/m2. Other 
relationships for differing materials exist. However, the 
vast majority refer to nuclear explosions which are not 
strictly comparable with chemical explosions, as previously 
explained. For further information reference should be made 
to Glasstone and Dolan4 and Baker et al 1 . 
Damage to the human body from thermal radiation may 
result in death or injury from severe burns. Injury caused 
by radiation can be quantified by temporary or 
loss of sight. Miller and White5 1 have 
permanent 
derived 
relationships linking heat flux and choriorentinal burns 
with respect to time. However, thermal radiation injury is 
more commonly based on the burning of bare skin1,13,52. 
Buettner52 estimates human pain with respect to heat flux. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the relationship derived by Buettner 
with respect to heat flux for non-nuclear fires. The two 
lines shown provide a split between bearable and unbearable 
pain (second degree burns) . Unbearable pain is said to 
occur52 when a temperature of 44.8°C is exceeded at a skin 
depth of 0.1 mm. Exceeding such a temperature rapidly 
increases the victims pain. The pain then gradually fades 
indicating that total skin irradiation has occurred. It is 
stated by Hymes53 that for each increase of 1°C above the 
threshold the rate of injury is trebled. For example, 
compared with the threshold the damage rate is roughly 100 
times greater at soOC. 
The probability of death from second degree burns has 
been estimated by the us Department of the Army5 4 . They 
derive a plot of the probability of fatality vs. the 
percentage of second degree burns, as shown in Figure 7. 
Exposed skin varies from season to season but is estimated 
to average 42 about 27%. This estimate of skin exposure 
approximates to the exposure of the head and both arms. 
Thus, from Figure 7 it can be seen that the probability of 
fatality from second degree burns for average skin exposure 
is about 10%. 
A detailed review of the physiological and pathological 
effects of thermal radiation is given by Hymes53 together 
with new information. It is broadly concluded that those 
exposed to heat fluxes capable of inflicting third degree 
burns within 10 seconds are unlikely to survive. Precise 
probabilities of injury and survival are difficult to 
gauge. The effects of radiation burns are related to burnt 
surface area, depth of burn, age of recipient and clothing 
characteristics, etc .. All of these factors are discussed 
by Hymes53. 
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Probability 
body surface 
of death with respect to the proportion of 
area burnt is given by Pietersen21 and 
reproduced here in Table 12. As a "rule of thumb" it is 
suggested by Hymes53 that for 15% burnt surface area 
(adult, head and hands) and injury no worse than second 
degree-plus all healthy adults under 50 can be expected to 
survive, whereas, 50% of those over 60 can be expected to 
die. Compared with adults the proportion of infants 
surviving is somewhat lower. This is due to the greater 
surface area exposed (i.e. head and hands approximate 30% 
of infant surface area) and the greater medical attention 
required. The approximate distribution of adult surface 
area (skin) is given in Table 13. 
From a number of empirical relations13,55, and based on 
an average population, Pietersen21 derives probits relating 
burns and death (an average population is not defined) . The 
probits assume approximately 20% exposed surface area. 
Severity of injury is categorised by the depth of skin to 
which a temperature difference of 9 K occurs, such that 
lst degree burns < 0.12 mm skin penetration 
2nd degree burns < 2 mm skin penetration 
3rd degree burns > 2 mm skin penetration 
The probits given by Pietersen are as follows. 
Pr = -39.83 + 3.0186 ln(t * q413) 1st degree burns 
Pr = -43.14 + 3.0188 ln(t * q413) 2nd degree burns 
Pr = -36.38 + 2.56 ln(t * q4/3) lethality (death) 
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where 
Pr = probit 
t = exposure time (s) 
q = heat radiation (kW/m2) 
For completeness, certain radiation threshold levels and 
effects are detailed here in Tables 14, 15, and 16. 
Finally, it should be noted that transient and steady 
state fires (for both materials and humans) require 
differing magnitudes of heat flux for specific levels of 
damage. For example, first degree burns from secondary 
fires (steady state fires) are likely from heat fluxes 
approaching 4.5 kW/m2, whereas, similar damage from 
fireballs (transient fires) require over 25 times as much 
radiant heat. Tables 14 and 15, which are reproduced in-
part from the Rijnmond Public Authority Study56 into the 
hazards from a number of chemical installations, serve to 
illustrate this point. 
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Table 9: Comparison of methods estimating fireball duration 
Time ( s) 
Mass Rakaczky High Hasegawa 
(kg) and Sato 
1 0.26 0.30 1. 07 
102 0.58 0.63 1. 62 
10 1.29 1. 31 2.46 
103 2.87 2.74 3.74 
104 6.42 5. 72 5.67 
105 14 12 8.60 
106 32 25 13 
10 7 79 52 20 
Source: Baker et all 
Table 10: Comparison of methods estimating fireball 
diameter 
Diameter (m) 
Mass Rakaczky High Hasegawa 
(kg) and Sato 
1 3.76 3.86 5.25 
10 7.95 8.06 11 
102 17 17 22 
103 36 35 46 
10 4 75 74 95 
105 159 154 195 
106 335 321 402 
10 7 708 671 828 
Source: Baker et all 
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Roberts 
1.10 
1.72 
3.56 
7.36 
15 
32 
65 
135 
Roberts 
5.80 
13 
27 
58 
125 
269 
580 
1250 
Table 11: Fireball diameter and duration 
Diameter (m) Duration (s) 
A B A B 
High 3.86 0.320 0.299 0. 320 
Hasegawa & Sa to 5.25 0.314 1. 070 0.258 
Rakaczky 3.76 0.325 0.258 0.349 
Roberts* 5.8 0.333 0.830 0.316 
Roberts -- -- 1.100 0.097 
. 
Note: 
a. High46 liquid propellants and fuel explosions, 
fireball temperatur~~ approx. 3600 K, greater than 20 kg. 
b. Hasegawa and Sate liquid propellants and fuel 
explosio2~' less than 10 kg. 
c. Rakaczky - munition explosions, fireball temperatures 
approx. §500 K. 
d. Roberts 4 -propane, 1 kg to over 100,000 kg, * - less 
than 5 kg. 
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Table 12: Relation between age, proportion of body surface 
area burnt and mortality rate 
Body area Age (years) 
burnt ( %) 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 
93+ 1 1 1 1 1 1 
88-92 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1 
83-87 0.9 0.9 0.9 0. 9 0. 9 0.9 
78-82 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0. 9 
73-77 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
68-72 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
63-67 0.5 0.5 0.6 0. 6 0.6 0.7 
58-62 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0. 6 
53-57 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 
48-52 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
43-47 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
38-42 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
33-37 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 
28-32 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
23-37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13-17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8-12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 12: continued 
Body area Age (years) 
burnt ( %) 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 
93+ 1 1 1 1 1 1 
88-92 1 1 1 1 1 1 
83-87 1 1 1 1 1 1 
78-82 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 
73-77 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1 1 
68-72 0.8 0.8 0.9 0. 9 0.9 1 
63-67 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1 
58-62 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
53-57 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 
48-52 . 0. 4 0.5 0.6 0. 6 0.7 0.8 
43-47 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
38-42 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
33-37 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 
28-32 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
23-37 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
18-22 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
13-17 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
8-12 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
3-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 12: continued 
Body area Age (years) 
burnt (%) 60-64 65-66 70-74 75-79 80+ 
93+ 1 1 1 1 1 
88-92 1 1 1 1 1 
83-87 1 1 1 1 1 
78-82 1 1 1 1 1 
73-77 1 1 1 1 1 
68-72 1 1 1 1 1 
63-67 . 1 1 1 1 1 
58-62. 1 1 1 1 1 
53-57 1 1 1 1 1 
48-52 0.9 1 1 1 1 
43-47 0.8 1 1 1 1 
38-42 0.8 0.9 1 1 1 
33-37 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1 
28-32 0.6 0.7 0.9 1 1 
23-37 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1 
18-22 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 
13-17 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 
8-12 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 
3-7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
0-2 0 0.1 0. 1 0.2 0.2 
Source: Pietersen21 
301 
Table 13: Distribution of skin surface area (adult) 
Body part proportion (%) 
Head 7 
Trunk 35 
Arms 14 
Hands 5 
Thighs 19 
Legs 13 
Feet 7 
Table 14: Radiation intensity damage: Steady state fires 
Heat f~ux Effect (kW/m ) 
37.5 damage to industrial equipment 
25.0 minimum energy required to ignite 
wood at infinitely long exposure 
4.5 sufficient to cause pain to personnel 
if unable to reach cover within 20 s 
1st degree burns likely 
1.6 no discomfort to long exposure 
Source: Rijnmond Public Authority56 
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Table 15: Radiation intensity damage: Transient fires 
Heat flux (kW/m2) Effect 
375 3rd degree burns 
250 2nd degree burns 
125 1st degree burns 
65 threshold of pain, no reddening 
or blistering of skin 
Source: Rijnmond Public Authority56 
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Table 16: Pain and blister thresholds with respect to heat 
radiation intensity and time 
Heat f2ux Time ( s) 
(kW/m ) Pain Blister 
3.7* 20.0 ---
4.2 13.5 33.8 
5.2 10.1 ---
6.2* 10.0 ---
6.3 7.8 20.8 
8.4 5.5 13.4 
9.7* 5.0 ---
12.6 2.9 7.8 
16.8 2.2 5.6 
18.0* 2.0 ---
Note: 
a. Time to threshold of pain, data from Stoll and Greene, 
except time to unbearable pain (*) data from Buettner. 
Source: Stoll and Greene57, Buettner58 
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Second Degree Burns (:I:) 
7.4 Estimating the Numbers of Individuals Exposed to 
Transport Hazards: Road and Rail Incidents 
Factors which need to be considered when attempting to 
assess and quantify 
a. the 
b. the 
number of exposed individuals, 
type of individuals exposed (i.e. 
the public, emergency personnel, etc.). 
crew members, 
specific to transport hazards are discussed below. Most of 
the factors are applicable to all transport hazards, 
although emphasis is given to the hazard presented by. the 
transport of explosives. 
Transport hazards add a degree of complexity to the 
estimation of numbers exposed. Unlike fixed hazards, where 
exposed populations tend to follow familiar and predictable 
patterns, populations exposed to transport hazards 
continually change and can vary from one extreme to 
another. As a consequence of this, estimating the numbers 
of individuals exposed to transport hazards compared with 
fixed hazards is more complex and prone to miscalculation. 
Estimation essentially consists of estimating the density 
of surrounding populations together with 
a. the proportion of the population indoors and out in 
the open, 
b. the numbers of individuals entering/attending the 
scene, 
c. the numbers of individuals exposed in traffic (i.e. 
in cars and lorries, etc.). 
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For incidents involving commercial and military 
explosives 
to blast, 
it is necessary to determine the numbers exposed 
fragments and fire so that the numbers of 
casualties can be estimated. The number of people exposed 
is dependent on a multitude of factors which can be 
summarised as follows. 
a. Scale and severity of accident. 
b. Accident location. 
c. Action taken by individual members of the public. 
d. Response and actions of the emergency services. 
The most obvious individuals exposed to the hazard of 
explosion are those involved in the accident. These will 
involve the crew of the vehicle used to convey the 
explosives and often other road and/or rail users who may 
be involved in the initial/subsequent collision or fire. 
The numbers involved in the initial accident may vary from 
two or three in a road accident to well over one hundred in 
a multiple rail collision involving passenger trains. 
Average occupancy for private motor vehicles is given by 
the Department of Transport59 as 1.75. The author has been 
unable to obtain data on the average occupancy of heavy 
goods vehicles but it is thought to be less than that for 
private motor vehicles (possibly between 1 and 1.1). From 
the accident survey detailed in Chapter 4 together with 
other Railway Inspectorate reports, occupancy for freight 
trains is typically two or three. Passenger trains have the 
greatest variability in occupancy. Such traffic is greatly 
affected by routes and time of day. Therefore, average 
occupancy of passenger trains may well vary from tens to 
hundreds of individuals. 
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It should not be forgotten that a number of initially 
exposed individuals may subsequently relocate to an area 
at a distance too great to be affected by explosion or an 
area having other means of protection effectively 
eliminating or limiting the effects of blast, missiles and 
fire. Such relocation may be instigated by exposed 
individuals themselves or by the actions of crew members 
and emergency service personnel. 
Once the numbers of people involved in the vehicular 
accident have been determined then the numbers of 
individuals in the vicinity of the accident and individuals 
who subsequently attend the scene needs to be quantified. 
Members of the public may be exposed to the hazard as a 
result of 
a. living 
within 
or working close to the accident site and 
the blast/missile/thermal (BMT) range 
potential of the explosives, 
b. travelling past or near the accident site on foot or 
by other forms of transport and therefore being 
exposed whilst travelling through the BMT range, or 
being exposed for longer periods due to a build-up of 
traffic causing congestion as a result of blockages 
and diversions, 
c. attempting to help those injured by the initial 
accident or simply by viewing the scene and 
proceedings, 
d. reporting and recording the events unfolding at the 
accident site (i.e. media personnel). 
309 
Excluding 
is suggested 
those involved in the vehicular 
here that in built-up areas the 
those exposed to the hazard are members of 
accident, it 
majority of 
the public. 
Population densities vary with the type of housing exposed. 
Petts et a160 have investigated and reviewed population 
densities around major hazards and estimate that for dense 
terrace housing population densities approximate 15,000 
persons per km2. This compares with 10,000 persons per km2 
and 1000 persons per km2 for semi-detached housing and 
sparse detached housing respectively. The average UK 
population in built-up areas (urban) is about 4000 persons 
per km2 and in non-built-up areas (rural) 200 persons per 
km2. It is important to note that population densities may 
well exceed 15,000 persons per km2 where high density 
targets, such as high-rise flats, offices, and hospitals 
are exposed. In addition to these difficulties population 
densities vary during the day. Petts et al60 address this 
problem and detail those at home during different parts of 
the day. From this work the author estimates that during 
the school day (0800h-1600h) average house occupancy is 
1.26, during the working day (0800h-1830h) 1.72 and at 
night (1830h-0800h) 2.71 (based on 5% unemployment). 
The numbers of individuals exposed is 
limit by evacuation of the public to 
Evacuation may be impractical to 
ineffective due to the little time 
particular, if explosive initiation is 
difficult to 
safe areas. 
implement or 
available. In 
instantaneous 
obviously no evacuation is possible (i.e. impact initiated 
crash incidents). Even if evacuation is instigated it will 
be fraught with difficulties. These difficulties are 
chiefly 
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a. the time taken to identify the need for evacuation, 
b. co-ordination of the police force in implementing 
evacuation, 
c. the resources needed to evacuate people from 
buildings and traffic, 
d. the time required to relocate individuals to safe 
areas, 
e. the obvious complications that exist in evacuating 
hospitals, residential homes and schools, etc •• 
Much work has been done on the effectiveness, time-
scales and problems of evacuation, especially for nuclear 
installations. Of particular interest is the work performed 
by Urbanik61 and Technica62,63. 
In certain incidents (typically sparsely populated 
areas) the majority of those exposed (excluding those 
involved in the vehicular accident) may in fact be those 
requested to attend the accident scene. These will include 
personnel from the 
and ambulance), 
explosives experts 
three emergency services (police, fire 
possibly specialist medical staff, 
and in the case of accidents involving 
military explosives personnel from the Joint 
Ordnance Disposal Operations Centre. 
Service 
The speed of attendance and the number of individuals 
dispatched by the emergency services will depend to a large 
extent on the quality of information received and inter-
service liaison. The quality and depth of information with 
regard to the scale and severity of an accident ·will 
fashion the size and speed of initial police, fire and 
ambulance response. Other important points affecting the 
quality of information on which the emergency services 
formulate their response can be summarised as follows. 
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a. Accident location. 
b. Number and type of vehicles involved. 
c. Estimate of the number of casualties. 
d. Indication of the severity of injuries. 
e. Possibility and likelihood of future or imminent 
casualties. 
f. Danger to the emergency services. 
On arrival at the accident scene each emergency service 
has its own priorities which shape the size of individual 
service attendance. The first priority for all three 
services is to save life. However, the numbers of personnel 
from .each service will depend on the help that they can 
provide, their resources and the need for their 
assistance64 ,65,66. For example, the numbers of police are 
determined by the need to 
a. maintain public order, 
b. enforce the law, 
c. co-ordinate communication and assistance between the 
emergency services, 
d. regulate traffic, 
e. collect information for any subsequent enquiries 
and/or court proceedings, 
f. possible evacuation of the local vicinity within the 
hazard (BMT) range, 
g, protect property, 
h. restore normality. 
The above is by no means a complete list of the demands 
on the police force at an accident site, however, it does 
illustrate the main pre-occupation of the police force. In 
comparison, the numbers of fire service personnel are 
determined by the need to 
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a. control, extinguish and prevent fires, 
b. rescue individuals (i.e. remove people from crumpled 
and distorted vehicles), 
c. clear and remove potentially hazardous materials, 
d. determine the necessity for evacuation (often in 
conjunction with expert advice), 
e. ensure rescue work is conducted in a safe environment 
and manner. 
Similarly, the numbers of ambulance personnel are 
determined by the need to 
a. provide initial first-aid and subsequent first-aid 
cover, 
b. care for injured individuals, 
c. transfer casualties to hospital. 
A typical road accident involving injury and fire would 
probably be attended by 1 police patrol car (2 
individuals), 1 fire tender (4-5 individuals) and 1 
ambulance (2-3 individuals) providing about 10 additional 
individuals at the scene67,68. Obviously where hazardous 
goods are involved, time permitting, the response is likely 
to be greater. Those most likely to be first at the scene 
are the fire service (2-3 fire tenders) exposing up to 15 
additional individuals. Emergency service attendance is 
similar for rail accidents67,68. However, speed of 
attendance at rail accidents is often hampered by poor 
tra'ck access. It should be noted here that in many cases 
most emergency service P,ersonnel are likely to arrive after 
explosion (see Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2). 
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As noted previously, specialist medical staff may 
be present at the accident site. Usually such staff 
attend major disaster accidents where there are 
severely injured people. In addition, a number 
explosives experts may be called upon to assess 
a. the hazard to and from the explosives, 
also 
only 
many 
of 
b. the means of eliminating the chances of explosion, 
c. safe removal and/or disposal of explosives. 
Where military explosives are concerned such 
given by the Joint Service Ordnance Disposal 
Centre (JSODOC) and one or more representatives 
advice is 
Operations 
may attend 
the scene. However, attendance is extremely unlikely from 
JSODOC staff or medical specialists prior to explosion or 
if imminent explosion is likely. 
In addition to the individuals already detailed above, 
the numbers around an accident site may increase as a 
result of 
a. the arrival of vehicle recovery personnel, 
b. accidents occurring in tunnels, at railway 
stations and ports. 
For example, at a road accident members of the public or 
the police force may request the assistance of a private 
vehicle recovery firm. Depending on arrival time recovery 
personnel may be exposed to the explosion hazard, although 
this is unlikely. Similarly, accidents occurring in tunnels 
or stations/ports may not only expose large numbers of the 
general public but tunnel/station/port staff. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the numbers of 
exposed individuals at accident sites may not only be high 
but extremely concentrated (e.g. high-rise flats, offices, 
hospitals, rail stations, etc) . In addition, the 
concentration of people at such sites, especially where 
individuals are distributed unevenly, may greatly affect 
the number of expected casualties. This is because fatality 
models often adopt a fixed population density which is 
assumed to be evenly distributed. In addition, it is not 
uncommon for the effects of accidental explosions to be 
directional as a result of protection offered by the 
surrounding environment and other coincidental factors. 
7.5 Consequence Models 
As can be inferred from the information and data 
presented in this chapter, the evaluation of explosion 
effects is often detailed and prone to inaccuracy. 
Estimating the number of casualties and extent of building 
damage is hindered by a multitude of factors, namely 
a. mass of explosive consumed, 
·b. distance from source to target, 
c. blast duration, 
d. terrain, 
e. exposure, 
f. fragment generation, velocity, range and projectory, 
g. heat intensity, 
h. structural and material building characteristics. 
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Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish between 
fatalities simply caused by overpressure effects, bodily 
translation and missile impact. Other causes of death which 
are hard to distinguish include asphyxia following burial, 
carbon monoxide poisoning and chronic illness aggravated by 
shock. In addition to these problems the majority of urban 
populations will be indoors during an explosion. Only a 
limited amount of research has been conducted on the 
effects of explosion with regards to "indoor" populations. 
The US Department of Transportation43 have attempted to 
produce credible methodologies in order to quantify indoor 
population damage. However, "indoor" and "outdoor" 
environments are not easily related and no simple scaling 
laws or means of extrapolating external blast damage to 
internal blast damage are available. Consequently, the 
assessment of damage to indoor populations is limited and 
the accuracy of results poor. 
As a consequence of the differences between indoor and 
outdoor environments, and as a result of the problems 
outlined above, there are very few simple consequence 
models which are useful in estimating damage and casualties 
from explosion. A number of models have been developed for 
vapour cloud explosions but very few for those explosions 
of interest here (i.e. condensed phase explosions from the 
accidental initiation of commercial/military explosives) • 
It is apparent from those concerned with explosives safety, 
that a simple and accurate means of estimating damage and 
casualties from condensed phase explosions would be very 
useful. It is thought here that the best means of achieving 
this is by the analysis of historical events to produce 
empirical methods of evaluation. Work at the University of 
Technology, Loughborough69, has adopted this approach and 
produced a model suitable for the assessment of condensed 
phase explosions, occurring without warning in built-up 
areas. 
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The consequence 
Withers and Lees69 
model developed at Loughborough by 
is applicable only to those explosives 
which have a mass explosion hazard (i.e. UN hazard division 
1.1 explosives). Fatalities are estimated from data 
collected on historical events and empirical data collected 
on the effects of blast overpressure. Historical events 
include World War II bombings, chemical explosions, 
domestic gas explosions and a number of natural disasters 
such as earthquakes and tornadoes. Empirical data consist 
primarily of relationships linking injury and blast 
overpressure. Due to the difficulties encountered in 
estimating fatalities cause of death is split into primary 
and secondary types. Primary deaths are classed as those 
which occur in the near field and are entirely due to 
overpressure. The likelihood of death from overpressure is 
related to impulse and duration. In comparison, secondary 
deaths are related to housing damage, specifically the 
number of dwellings made uninhabitable. For every 10 
dwellings made uninhabitable 1 secondary death is assumed. 
Both primary and secondary deaths are related to distance 
and mass of explosive consumed and hence are categorised by 
primary and secondary radii. Individuals who survive within 
the radii are balanced by those who survive outside the 
radii. The explosion consequence model is detailed here in 
Figures 8 and 9. An example of model use is given in 
Chapter 9.0. 
It should be noted that the terms "primary" and 
"secondary" are used by the workers at Loughborough in 
relation to deaths; they are used by the present author in 
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 to refer to damage/injury and missiles 
respectively. 
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The explosion effects model developed at Loughborough69 
suffers from one or two omissions, namely the 
deaths resulting from casing/packaging fragments 
from primary and secondary 
estimates well the number of 
fires. However, 
fatalities from a 
absence of . 
and deaths 
the model 
number of 
historical incidents. Of particular interest is the 
estimate of fatalities from low yield explosions. The model 
approximates favourably fatalities from V-2 rocket/bombing 
raids. The net explosives quantity (NEQ) of such rockets is 
estimated to be 0.64 te and this value is in the range of 
typical NEQs encountered during the road and rail transport 
of commercial and military explosives. 
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Figure 8: Primary and secondary causes of death !or man: 
Mass of explosive and distance for 50' mortality 
source: Withers and Lees69 
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PARTD 
8.0 AN OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
8.1 Historical Background and Review 
It is suggested that risk assessment is an extension of 
both reliability engineering and operational research1 
(OR). Reliability engineering has its roots in the aircraft 
industry of the 1920's and 1930's, where the development of 
multi-engined propulsion necessitated the need to estimate 
engine failures2. In comparison OR3, 4 was developed 
primarily for the Armed Forces during the late 1930's. The 
technique was used to determine economical allocation of 
resources and efficient use of equipment. Two early uses of 
OR4 are found in the development of radar to detect enemy 
aircraft (1937-38) and in the development of effective air 
campaign procedures against German U-boats (1941). During 
the 1960's the nuclear industry, followed in part, and 
extensively a decade latter, by the chemical industry, 
adopted these techniques and developed methodologies 
capable of assessing risks from major hazard installations, 
such as nuclear power stations and chemical plantss. 
Initially, the techniques developed concentrated on 
producing methodologies to estimate the frequency of 
undesired events in process and safety equipment. Once 
these techniques had been refined (and confidence gained) 
techniques progressed to assess the consequences of 
undesired events, in particular the risks posed to the 
public. 
It is accepted that the first major risk assessment 
study which encompassed, refined and advanced risk 
assessment techniques was instigated by the United States 
Atomic 
report6 
event 
Energy Commission. Known commonly as the WASH 1400 
and published in 1975 the methodology· utilised 
trees, fault trees and consequence modelling 
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techniques. Although heavily criticised7 (which is not 
uncommon for "pioneering" work) WASH 1400 is acknowledged 
as the first study to successfully highlight the techniques 
and benefits of risk assessments8. In fact it is claimed 
with good cause that WASH 1400 directly influenced future 
risk assessment techniques not only in the USA but also in 
the UK9. 
The first major risk assessment study in the UK was 
performed by the Safety and Reliability Directorate (SRD) 
of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, who between 1976 and 
1978 estimated the risks from existing and proposed petro-
chemical plants at Canvey Island, Essex. Publication of the 
(first) Canvey Report 1 0 in June 1978 led to both praise and 
criticism being levelled at the methodology and assumptions 
usedll,l2. The criticism led to a further investigation 
culminating in the publication of a second Canvey Reportl2 
in 1981. Regardless of criticism (both reports are thought 
to ·over-estimate risks and imply that high levels of 
calculated risks are acceptablel2), the reports were, and 
still are, of unquestionable value in the understanding of 
risk and its assessment. 
Probably as a result·of the concern and attention given 
to hazards from fixed installations detailed assessment of 
transport hazards is not much more than a decade old. Early 
studies were essentially simple hazard analyses assessing 
risks in qualitative terms. In 1971 the MONO Division of 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) instigated a study into 
the carriage of liquid chlorine by road and raill3. The 
methodology used, although simple by today's standards, 
encompassed the estimation of accidents which could cause 
spillage, probability of spillage and consequence analysis. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the study to a number of 
fundamental calculations was considered. The major 
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criticism of the study is its limited scope. For example, 
fires and spillage not resulting from collision are 
ignored* and comparison between road and rail is based on 
the assumption that all traffic goes either by road or by 
rail. Despite these drawbacks, in a similar fashion to WASH 
1400 and Canvey the study provided a basis for discussion 
and development of risk assessment methodologies, in this 
instance directly applicable to transport operations. (It 
is perhaps worth noting that the study preceded both WASH 
1400 and Canvey and therefore could not draw upon the 
advances made in risk assessment during the late 1970's). 
Similar work to that initiated by rcrl3 was mirrored at the 
same time in the United States (US), albeit on a much 
larger scale, the work being initiated by the US Department 
of Transport and the US National Transportation Research 
Board. Perhaps the one study of greatest acclaim (more for 
consequence analysis rather than methodology development) 
is that attributed to Eisenberg et al1 4 . Known as the 
"Vulnerability Model" the study concerns itself with the 
consequences of maritime spills of hazardous materials. 
Much of the work, however, is applicable to other transport 
modes particularly with regards to the quantification of 
fatalities from fire and explosion. Of particular interest 
is the attempt to relate external environments to the 
damage suffered by "indoor" populations. Other early 
studies of note include those performed by Simmons et 
al15,16 on the risk of material spills. A number of other 
risk assessment studies are listed in the t,;(,lography. .t-
From these early beginnings a large number of extensive 
risk assessment studies on the transport of hazardous goods 
have been published. At present the most noteworthy of 
these are from the USA, although over the last few years 
* From this study and other workl?,18 it is known 
the frequency of roaa and rail non-crash fires can be 
greater than crash fires and therefore non-crash fires 
present a much greater hazard than crash fires. 
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that 
much 
can 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) together with SRD 
have initiated detailed studies into the risks associated 
with the transport of hazardous goods by road, rail and 
barge in the UK. These studies have yet to be made publicly 
available and therefore are not detailed here. In addition 
to the HSE and SRD, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) through 
the Explosives Storage and Transport Committee (ESTC) have 
initiated studies into the risks associated with the 
transport of military explosives by road and rail. These 
studies have been conducted by the Plant Engineering Group 
of the University of Technology, Loughborough, headed by 
Professor F.P. Lees. As yet the reports are not publicly 
available. However, much of the work undertaken at 
Loughborough has provided the momentum for this study. 
The following pages review some of the more important 
and useful risk assessment studies which are publicly 
available. Each review provides a brief description of the 
study and highlights useful data, results and points of 
interest. A number of studies are also listed in the 
bibliography. It is envisaged that much useful data and 
techniques are detailed in internal HSE, SRD, MOD and ESTC 
risk assessment studies. 
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Risk Assessment of Air versus other Transportation Modes 
for Explosives and Flammable Cryogenic Liquids 
Kloeber, G. et al. (December 1979). ORI, Inc., Silver 
Spring, Maryland, USA. NTIS, PB80-138480. 
Risks associated with the conveyance of class A 
explosives and cryogenic liquids by aircraft, truck, rail 
car and barge are estimated and compared for six different 
routes. Class A explosives chiefly correspond to United 
Nations class 1 dangerous goods. All cryogenic liquids are 
assumed to be characterised by liquid hydrogen. The routes 
are compared by the derivation of an expected risk value 
based on the likelihood of 
a. accidents, 
b. incidents as a result of accidents, 
c. fatalities, injuries and property damage. 
The expected risk value is defined as "the likelihood of a 
loss-generating event times the amount of loss resulting 
from that event" and is characterised by the likelihood of 
certain severity levels resulting from specific accidents 
and events. 
Although the report contains a multitude of detailed 
transport and accident data together with various simple 
consequence models, confidence is lost in the risk 
assessment results and conclusions due to a number of 
simplifying assumptions. Firstly, accident rates 
vehicles conveying hazardous goods are assumed to be 
for 
the 
same as vehicles conveying non-hazardous goods. It is shown 
in this thesis that such an assumption can lead to results 
of questionable accuracy (i.e. risk assessments employing 
common accident rates disregarding vehicle type and use are 
inherently misleading, even though they may loosely 
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approximate overall risks). Secondly, populations are 
assumed to be evenly distributed along journey routes 
(varying only by county) . Such an assumption magnifies 
risks in areas of low population, such as rural areas, and 
provides an aggregated risk estimate which in reality does 
not represent the route analysed. Finally, casualties are 
calculated in relation to overpressure and fire intensity 
in a similar way to the consequence evaluation methods 
detailed in Chapter 7.0 of this study. However, all 
individuals are assumed to be affected by an incident as if 
they are situated out in the open. At any time of day the 
vast majority of individuals are indoors and therefore, for 
any given population, only a small minority of individuals 
are exposed to the direct effects of explosion and fire. 
The culmination of the assumptions described above, 
together with the policy of conservatism where data are 
scarce, leads to little confidence in the risk assessment. 
It may be argued that a relative risk comparison can be 
made between the four transport modes. However, as a result 
of the assumptions on population distribution and 
rates and the difficulty in attributing 
"conservatism" to assumptions (as claimed), it is 
whether such an argument can be substantiated. 
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accident 
equal 
doubtful 
An Assessment of the Risks of Transporting Propane by Truck 
and Train 
Geffen, C.A., et al. (1980). Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington, DC, USA. NTIS, PNL-2133. 
Individual and societal risks are estimated using the 
probabilistic risk assessment methodology developed by 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory19. The methodology is 
discussed in "An Assessment of the Risks of Transporting 
Gasoline by Truck" reviewed later in this section. 
Assessment of risks resulting from propane transport is 
essentially the same as that for gasoline transport. Data 
and discussion are given on material characteristics, truck 
and rail car characteristics, or~g1n and destination 
details and the transport and accident environments. It is 
estimated that two thirds of all propane consumed in the 
United States is moved by road and only about 3% by rail, 
the remainder being transported by pipeline. Significant 
road accidents are propane releases resulting from 
estimated to total 14 per year 
significant release every 2 years 
compared 
caused by 
with only 
accidents 
1 
on 
the rail network. Expected number of annual fatalities from 
road and rail incidents total no more than about 17 and 2.5 
respectively. 
suggests the 
As the expected number of annual fatalities 
those 
risks 
risks from rail transport are much less 
from road transport. The report concludes that 
than 
the 
to the public from the road and rail transport of 
' propane are comparable with many 
than those from the transport of 
common risks and are less 
gasoline by road. 
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Consequences of propane releases are quantified in terms 
of fatalities from the assessment of 
a. direct flame exposure, 
b. radiant heat, 
c. secondary fires, 
d. explosion effects. 
As a result of shielding offered by buildings and 
vehicles etc. and possible reduction in the numbers of 
exposed individuals by evacuation efforts only 10% of the 
available population are assumed to be exposed. Deaths from 
direct flame exposure and radiant heat are related to 
fireball exposure, size and duration. It is assumed that 
all persons in direct contact with flames are killed. 
Deaths from radiation are related to distance and severity 
of burns. Second degree burns are used as the fatality 
criterion. It is estimated that the threshold for second 
degree burns is 5 cal/cm2 and for average skin exposure 
(27% of body surface area), which equates to both arms and 
the head, the probability of death is given,.as 10%. The 
number of deaths from secondary fires is estimated from the 
number of subsequent building fires. All buildings are 
assumed to be constructed of whitewood so that a simple 
correlation between spontaneous ignition and radiant heat 
intensity can be used. The definition of whitewood and the 
reason for its choice is not given, but it is assumed that 
its choice is a direct result of the wide-spread use of 
wood in American buildings. Fatalities caused by explosion 
are based on the effects of overpressure and missiles. 
Consumed propane is equated in terms of TNT from which 
overpressure and missile generation can be estimated. All 
persons within the limit of total building destruction 
(0.69 bar) are assumed to be killed, whereas only 10% and 
0.1% are assumed killed within the limits of serious 
structural damage (0.17 bar) and missile generation (0.02 
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bar) respectively. 
As 
thought 
with gasoline assessment (reviewed 
here that the risk assessment 
later), it 
methodology 
is 
is 
applied conservatively (i.e. over-estimates the risks) and 
many assumptions are pessimistic. For example, all truck 
and rail car fires are assumed not only to be engulfing but 
to be immediately engulfing. However, sensitivity 
assessments have been performed and indicate that fires 
account for only a small proportion of the risks and that 
impact and puncture incidents account for over 80% of the 
estimated risks. 
Risk Assessment 
Transportation 
Transportation 
(November 1983) . 
Processes for Hazardous 
Research Board, Washington, 
NTIS, PB84-143635. 
Materials 
DC, USA. 
Risk assessment techniques which may be of interest to 
local authorities in their attempts to identify 
a. risks to communities from the transport of hazardous 
goods, 
b. mitigation strategies to reduce community 
vulnerability, 
are reviewed. It is concluded that enumerative index models 
provide the simplest and most cost-effective risk 
assessment techniques for local authorities. Regression 
models, such as the one developed by Urbanek et al20,21 are 
disregarded for two reasons; firstly, the magnitude of 
accident consequences are inadequately assessed and 
secondly, the models are more adapt at comparing transport 
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routes than 
distribution 
assessing overall risks. 
models 22 ,23,24 are disregarded 
reasons, whereas, probabilistic risk 
Network and 
for similar 
assessment 
models19,25,26,2? are considered 
and detailed for application by 
to be too time consuming 
local authorities. The 
enumerative index model chosen is a simplified version of 
the model developed by Russell et al28. A risk iridex 
formulated from a simple scoring system based on traffic 
flow, route distance and accident consequences, etc., 
provides a means of assessing risks in relation to a pre-
determined scale. Unlike the model developed by Russell et 
al28 the simplified model is intended for use only on three 
hazardous goods, namely, gasoline, chlorine and anhydrous 
ammonia. The reasons for this simplification are based on 
the assumption 
community risk 
that if these materials posses a low 
then other hazardous materials will also 
posses a low community risk. This line of thought stems 
from the fact that for hazardous goods transport in the 
United States over 50% of all multiple fatality incidents 
involve these materials. 
In addition to the development of the simplified model 
the report also provides a short review of the hazardous 
goods accident environment in the United States and details 
briefly the role of authorities, governments and academia 
in risk and community vulnerability assessment. It is 
interesting to note that the report states that fewer than 
400 hazardous goods shipments from an annually estimated 
total of over 250,000 actually result in casualties. 
Between 1971 and 1980 more than 111,000 accidents involved 
hazardous goods causing a total of 248 fatalities and 6873 
injuries. The average number of fatalities per year is 
estimated to be 25, of which 80% are attributable to 
highway shipments and 18% to railroad shipments. 
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The major criticism of this model is that it only 
provides a relative measure of risk, classifying risks as 
either low, medium or high. In addition, although the 
report criticises other models on account of being route 
specific and inadequate with regards to consequence 
assessment, these charges can be directed at this model. 
However, the risk assessment technique is simple to apply 
requiring little risk assessment knowledge and the data 
required as input to the model is readily accessible. 
An Assessment of the Risks of Transporting Gasoline by 
Truck 
Rhoads, R.E., et al. (November 1987). Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington, DC, USA. NTIS, PNL-2133. 
Accident occurrence together with accident consequences 
are investigated and related providing a measure of 
individual and societal risk. The probabilistic risk 
assessment methodology used is based on a model previously 
employed at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for the 
risk assessment of the transport of radioactive 
materials29,30. Risk is characterised by the simple 
addition of the individual products of risk (frequency) and 
consequence from all accidental releases. All risk values 
and consequences are tempered according to the amount and 
loss of material, prevailing weather conditions and 
population exposure. 
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The methodology is split into five discrete areas, 
a. system description, 
b. release sequence identification, 
c. release sequence evaluation, 
d. environmental consequence evaluation, 
e. risk calculation and assessment. 
System description essentially sets the scene identifying 
material characteristics, truck characteristics and origin 
and destination details. It is estimated that gasoline 
represents about a third of all hazardous material 
shipments in the United States and that for 1980 1.14 x 
10 11 gallons of gasoline are transported providing a total 
of 1.36 x 10 7 shipments. An average shipment is thought to 
consist of a truck conveying 8400 gallons of gasoline over 
50 miles. 
Following system description the 
investigated so as to identify 
accident environment is 
and evaluate release 
sequences and thereby provide a basis for fault tree 
formulation. Special 
puncture and abrasion. 
emphasis is given to 
These four accident 
fire, impact, 
environments are 
considered the most likely causes of tank failure. Fires 
are estimated to occur in 1.6% of all truck accidents and 
have durations from as little as a few minutes to several 
hours. A typical vehicle fire having a mean temperature of 
101ooc is considered to be sufficient to cause tank 
failure. However, it is thought that large quantities of 
gasoline may vaporise and escape through pressure relief 
valves before tank failure diminishing the consequences of 
such events. Impact is assessed in terms of velocity and 
kinetic energy. It is estimated that side impacts of the 
tank into flat barriers at speeds as low as 18.7 mph can 
cause tank failure. Tank failure by puncture is considered 
to result whenever a probe having a length of six inches or 
341 
more contacts the tank wall. This estimate is based on 
stress analysis of aluminium tank walls together with the 
energy available in truck accidents and assumes that probes 
exceed 0.4 inches in diameter. Abrasion is discussed in 
terms of skid velocity with respect to various road 
surfaces. Depending on road surface tank failure is 
considered likely at skid velocities as low as 20 mph. 
Consequences of gasoline releases are assessed in terms 
of pool fires and vapour clouds. Of particular interest is 
the estimation of building damage and casualties. It is 
considered that total·destruction of buildings, serious 
structural damage and missile.damage can be expected at up 
to 30 ft, 75 ft and 300 ft respectively from the centre of 
an explosion. All occupants of destroyed buildings are 
assumed to be killed, whereas 10% of occupants in buildings 
suffering serious damage and only 0.1% of occupants within 
the missile range are assumed to receive fatal injuries. In 
addition, all vehicle occupants involved in initiating road 
accidents are considered to die. Unfortunately "road-side". 
and "street·~ populations are disregarded and therefore 
fatality estimates may be under-estimated. 
The report concludes that individual risk (deaths/year) 
to a member of the public is comparable with that expected 
from natural disasters, such as tornadoes and lightning 
strikes. Societal risks are presented in the form of a 
frequency-consequence curve and are reproduced here in 
Figure 1. Two sensitivity assessments have been performed. 
The first identifies that over 90% of all spills result 
from punctures, impact and abrasion. It is postulated that 
increasing tank resistance to such failure stimuli by an 
order of magnitude reduces the expected annual number of 
deaths by as much as 70%. Secondly, the installation of 
accident activated fire suppression systems is assessed and 
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it is concluded that such systems have the potential to 
reduce expected fatalities to less than one per year. 
However, it is acknowledged that neither the results nor 
the sensitivity assessments provide a definitive basis for 
establishing socio-political acceptability levels of risk. 
It is suggested that the risk assessment provides a base 
for cost-benefit analysis and hence judgement on 
acceptability. 
In addition to the methodology and risk analysis much 
information is provided on tank truck construction, 
operating procedures, the physical properties and 
characteristics of gasoline and general truck accident 
data. Of particular interest is the distribution of truck 
accidents with respect to pre-accident speed. From an 
analysis of 10,838 truck accidents in the state of Texas it 
is estimated that almost 54% of all accidents occur at 20 
mph or less, about 27% between 20 mph and 40 mph, a little 
over 19% between 40 mph and 70 mph and only about 0.5% at 
speeds greater than 70 mph. 
Finally, it is thought here that the risk assessment 
methodology is applied conservatively (i.e. over-estimates 
the risks) and therefore does not instil confidence in the 
accuracy of the derived risk values. However, the 
methodology is a well developed and proven approach to risk 
estimation and has been used extensively in the United 
States for assessing the transport of hazardous materials. 
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Figure 1: Societal risks tor release ot gasoline from tank 
truck accidents: 1980 
Source: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Washington, USA. 
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8.2 Benefits, Limitations and Problems 
Risk assessment studies involve systematic examination 
of intended operation and unintended operation of one or 
more systems. Such examination helps to 
a. identify, illustrate and quantify the environment to 
which a system is exposed, 
b. identify, illustrate and quantify the harmful effects 
from a system. 
In addition to the above, risk assessment studies 
a. lead to the improved understanding of risks and their 
component parts, 
b. identify actions which can be taken to reduce or 
eliminate risks. 
Thus, risk assessments provide a foundation from which 
judgements can be made on the acceptability of system 
risks. The Canvey investigation is a good example of a risk 
assessment study identifying and quantifying risks and 
suggesting ways in which risks can be reduced3 1 . For 
example, the individual risk from Canvey (for those most at 
risk32> was estimated as 2.57 x 10-3 deaths per year. 
Safety measures were recommended and once implemented 
estimated individual risk was assessed as 7.0 x 10-5 deaths 
per year (both estimates are considered conservative - i.e. 
over-estimates) . This reduction in risk highlights the 
benefits of risk assessment studies. Not only does it 
provide a means of determining risk reduction, it also 
provides a logical way of judging the benefits of 
implementing safety measures. 
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Although the benefits of risk assessment outweigh any 
criticism there are a number of limitations and problems. 
Perhaps the most criticised is the quality of data used. 
Assessments are only as good as the data they are based on. 
Therefore, 
paramount 
prediction 
the relevance and reliability of data are 
to the validity of assessments in their 
of system behaviour. Unfortunately, data are 
often scarce, incomplete or not directly applicable to the 
system under consideration. Consequently, assumptions have 
to be made which may necessitate the need to simplify the 
assessment. As a result of this a degree of uncertainty is 
introduced and confidence may be lost in assessment 
results. Such loss of confidence can also arise as a result 
of uncertainties in consequence modelling and vulnerability 
assessment. 
It is important to note that risk assessments have been 
shown to omit a number of undesired events and that risk 
assessments 
complete33, 
of major hazards are thought to be at best 
So as to minimise these problems it 
80% 
is 
essential that analysts have a thorough understanding of 
risk assessment techniques together with an appreciation 
and knowledge of the system being assessed. Poor 
appreciation of all possible factors which may affect 
events can produce results which are at best questionable. 
One study conducted in the USA estimated a figure for an 
LPG spillage of lo-5 3 per year. This figure is believed to 
be the lowest estimated in any risk assessment study3 4 • It 
is suggested by Van de Putte35 and Farmer36 that values 
below about 10-6 should be treated with caution as often a 
sub-event has been omitted. Farmer also suggests that 
estimates below about 10-6 are meaningless if the parts 
forming them are not rigorously assessed and validated. 
However, there are many instances of estimated values in 
the range 10-6 to 10-9. For example, the probability of 
being struck by lightning in the UK37,38 is estimated as 
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10-7 per year, and the probability of death in the USA39 
from a major railroad crash is estimated as 8.4 x 10-9 per 
year. 
The benefits, limitations and problems of risk 
assessment studies are summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Benefits, limitations and problems associated with 
risk assessment studies 
Benefits 
1. Identify, illustrate and quantify, 
a. system environment, 
b. harmful system effects. 
2. Improve understanding of risks. 
3. Identify measures to improve safety and hence, reduce 
risk. 
4. Quantify risk reduction measures. 
5. Provide a basis from which the acceptability of risks 
can be judged. 
Limitations and Problems 
Assessment accuracy, applicability, validity and 
confidence can be lost as a result of the following. 
1. The need for "quality" data, which is 
a. relevant, 
b. reliable. 
2. The need to use assumptions as a result of 
a. scarce data, 
b. incomplete or limited applicability of data. 
3. Risk assessment studies may fail to identify all 
possible events as a result of 
a. poor understanding of techniques by analysts, 
b. poor appreciation and knowledge of systems under 
investigation. 
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8.3 Presentation of Results (specific to this thesis) 
The two most widely used expressions of 
"individual" and "societal" and it is these 
which are used in Chapter 9.0 of this study. 
risk is defined by The Institution of Chemical 
as 
risk are 
expressions 
Individual 
Engineers40 
"the frequency at which an individual may be 
expected to sustain a given level of harm from the 
realisation of specified hazards" 
and societal risk is defined as 
" the relationship between frequency and the number 
of people suffering from a specified level of harm 
in a given population from the realisation of 
specified hazards". 
The difference between individual risk and societal risk 
is implicit in the definitions given above, namely, that 
individual risk takes no account of the numbers exposed. 
Individual risks and societal risks are commonly expressed 
in terms of deaths per unit time and both provide a basis 
for the comparison of risks from activities which can cause 
harm. Death is usually chosen as the measure of harm since 
it is easily identifiable and definite. However, there is a 
problem of delayed deaths from the realisation of a hazard. 
Most risk assessments avoid delayed deaths by the 
consideration of "instant" deaths or deaths within a 
measurable period. A method of accounting for delayed 
deaths from radiation exposure has been proposed by 
Bishop41, As yet no detailed proposals have been 
for the assessment of delayed deaths from 
explosions. 
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suggested 
chemical 
Individual risk is characterised by a single value 
indicating the chance of harm per unit time for a specified 
individual at a specified location. The fundamental 
expression of risk can be given by the following equation. 
R = f X p 
where 
R = individual risk (e.g. deaths/year) 
f = frequency of an event with the potential to cause a 
specified level of harm 
p = probability that an event causes a specified level of 
harm 
As mentioned above individual risk takes no account of 
the numbers of people affected by a single event. It is 
widely accepted that the public have 
events which 
greater 
kill large repugnance/aversion to single 
numbers of people than multiple events which kill the same 
numbers but only one or two at a time. As a consequence of 
this, methods have been developed to measure risk in terms 
of frequency of occurrence and magnitude of consequence. 
This measure of risk is known as societal risk and requires 
information on the distribution of people around a hazard 
in time and space. Societal risk can be presented in 
tabular form but is commonly illustrated graphically as 
shown in Figures 2 and 3. Such graphical representation of 
societal risk is known simply as a frequency-number curve 
(FN curve) or "FN" line. The FN curve is most commonly made 
up of discrete data points; each point represents the 
frequency (F) at which a certain number (N) of people or 
more are killed. Thus, FN curves illustrate the cumulative 
frequency of killing N or more people. Societal risks can 
also be represented by non-cumulative means so that each 
discrete point represents the frequency of an event which 
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kills an exact number of people. This type of societal risk 
representation was first suggested by Farmers. However, it 
is more usual to adopt the cumulative approach (proposed by 
Kinchin42) so as to "smooth" out data thereby allowing for 
instances where events may kill say 50 people but not 49, 
51 or 52 people, etc. 
In a similar fashion to individual risks, societal risks 
are useful for risk comparisons. In addition, judgements 
can be made on socio-political considerations. However, the 
FN curve approach has a number of other advantages. 
Historical data can be expressed and compared and 
prediction by means of extrapolation is possible, 
Table 2 and Figure 3 illustrate various estimated 
individual and societal risks from a number of activities. 
Note 
For a complete understanding of the terms defined above 
reference should be made to the Institute of Chemical 
Engineers study on hazard and risk assessment 
for most nomenclature40, The study provides definitions 
terms encountered in risk assessment work. The terms used 
in this thesis reflect those given by the Institute of 
Chemical Engineers. Other definitions of 
terminology are available34,39,41 the most 
are those given by the Royal Society43 in 
risk assessment. 
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risk assessment 
notably of which 
their study of 
Table 2: Individual risks 
Cause of death 
Indivi~ual risk (10- /year) 
All causes 11900 
Cancer 2800 
All accidents(a) 343 
Road accidents(a) 138 
Motor vehicle accidents(b) 122 
Road accidents 100 
Railway accidents(a) 3.3 
Gas incidents(c) 1.8 
Lightning 0.1 
Bites and stings(d) 0.085 
Industrial accidents 
to employees 
Deep sea fishing(e) 880 
Quarries 390 
Coal extraction(f) 106 
Construction(f) 92 
Agriculture(f) 87 
Offices, shops and warehouses 4.5 
Risk of death as a consequence 
of travel 
Driving by car(g) 0.005 per million km 
Flying(h) 0.0003 per million km 
Rail travel (i) 0.00014 per million km 
Note: 
All values are mean values over the entire population of GB 
for the year 1985, unless otherwise stated. 
a. 1971-5. 
b. Excludes pedestrians 1975. 
c. 1981-5. 
d. 1958-78. 
e. 1984. 
f. 1986-7. 
g. Drivers and passengers. 
h. UK scheduled airlines, passengers 1975-9. 
i. Passengers 1981-5. 
Source: Health and Safety Executive (see ref. 38 and 39) 
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8.4 Acceptability of Risks 
Risk is inherent in almost all human activity, from 
driving a motor car to having one of the many rudimentary 
vaccinations as a child. In general the public have little 
perception of the risks incurred in daily activities. The 
chance of death per vaccination is one in a million 
(England and Wales 1967-76 43), whereas, five people die 
annually for every 1000 km travelled by motor car (GB 
1985) 45. Risk, as discussed in Section 8.3 is expressed as 
a probability or frequency of the occurrence of a 
particular harm (assumed here to be death). However, there 
is little evide.nce to support the claim that the public 
understand such probabilistic risk expressions and 
therefore the significance and acceptability of risks. 
Essentially governments balance risks against benefits. 
This suggests that there is a level of risk which is 
acceptable provided the activity causing risk produces 
suitable benefits. 
The question 
Unfortunately for 
risk, especially 
remains, "what is acceptable '?" 
governments the public's 
if channelled and nurtured 
perception of 
by opposing 
political factions and pressure groups, ·is critical to 
"acceptability". However, the public's perception is not a 
constant measurable factor as the 1982 attitude survey 
conducted by the HSE confirms46. The report states that 
only about two thirds of the UK population believe they are 
at risk from nuclear and chemical installations. Of these 
the majority feel that a substantial distance between 
themselves and such installations is needed for them to be 
free from worry (possibly 50 miles or more) . Those living 
near major industrial installations consider the risks to 
be less than other members of the public and those on 
relatively high incomes tend to be the most worried that a 
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serious incident could occur. 
As can be inferred from the above, public perception of 
risk is variable, often inconsistent and therefore 
difficult to measure. In addition the public are vulnerable 
to the "dread factor". It appears there is no advantage to 
be gained from suggesting that a two week holiday amongst 
the granite rocks of Cornwall will provide a greater dose 
of radiation than radiation leakage from the entire UK 
nuclear industry (normal activities over a ten year 
period), as suggested by Wrixon 47 . This is because, 
regardless of whether the public trust and believe 
scientific predictions, calculations and reassurances, and 
no matter how low the likelihood of occurrence they fear a 
catastrophic event, such as that which occurred at 
Chernobyl in March 1986 (the worlds worst civil nuclear 
disaster) . This 
tempered only by 
analogy applies to many activities and 
' 
tangible benefits. 
is 
A number of proposals suggesting acceptable levels of 
risk have been put forward. Chicken48 and Ashby 4 9 both 
suggest a value for individual risk of 10-6 per annum (i.e. 
often a one in a million chance of death) . It is 
suggested3 4 that a iisk of 10-6 i~ acceptable for average 
members of the public and that for workers acceptable risk 
is about 10-5 per annum. However, as a result of 
a. direct and indirect benefits to those exposed to risk 
activities, 
b. direct and indirect benefits to the general public, 
c. economic considerations, 
d. political considerations, 
levels of acceptable individual risk vary. Based on the 
above considerations (a-d) both the HSE38 and the Royal 
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Society43 state that the maximum tolerable risk to workers 
in any industry should be no more than 10-3, and that the 
maximum tolerable risk to members of the public from large 
scale industrial hazards should be no more than 10-4. A 
risk of 10-4 equates to the average annual risk of death 
from a traffic accident in GB32. However, these levels of 
risk are only tolerable where there is little choice but to 
accept such risks. The HSE estimate that the risk to the 
average worker in the nuclear industry (termed radiation 
worker) is between 10-4 and 10-5. In comparison, the risk 
to members of the public living near to nuclear 
installations is estimated to be between 10-5 and 10-6 
(during normal operations) • It is acknowledged that there 
may be a small minority of workers and members of the 
public exposed to risks greater than 10-4 and 10-5 
respectively. The (first) Canvey Reportl0,32 estimates that 
the risk to individual members of the public was 2.57 x 
10-3 and this was deemed to be intolerable, even allowing 
for the economic importance of Canvey. After 
improvements12 ,32 the risk to individual members of the 
public was estimated as 7.0 x lo-5 and deemed tolerable. It 
should be noted that the term "acceptable" tends to be used 
by the HSE when risks are considered trivial. In comparison 
the term tolerable tends to be used when risks are endured 
in return for substantial benefits. At present the HSE 
propose a tolerable individual risk level of 10-5 for all 
new housing developments near existing major industrial 
hazards32, This value of individual risk is not, however, a 
fixed unyielding limit. This is because there are many 
other considerations which need to be taken into account 
when determining acceptability/tolerability. These other 
considerations are discussed in detail later in this 
section. 
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As with individual risk there is no uniformly applicable 
limit of acceptable societal risk. In their assessment of 
risk32 and its tolerability38 the HSE concluded that 
"where we have little choice but to accept a major 
societal risk, [not defined but clearly non-nuclear 
and capable of killing 500-1000 people or more] we 
require the risk to be less than 1 in 1000 [10-3 ] 
and if possible less than 1 in 5000 [0.2 x 10-3] 
per annum, that is, something like these are the 
maximum levels we would tolerate, and we would want 
to do better. But we might very reasonably demand a 
lower order of risk than this where we had some 
.choice whether to accept it or not". 
From HSE literature32,38 it appears that an upper bound for 
societal risk tolerability from major industrial hazards is 
in-fact between 10-3 and 10-5 depending on specific 
circumstances. 
In order to help classify societal risks, areas or bands 
have been proposed categorising societal risks into 
"acceptable/tolerable", "further assessment required/as low 
as reasonably practicable" and "unacceptable/intolerable" 
risks. The criterion suggested by the Provincial waterstaat 
Groningen44 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. From these 
bands acceptable and unacceptable societal risks are 
estimated to be about 1.5 x 10-6 and 1.5 x 10-2 per annum 
respectively. It has been remarked50 that the differing 
totals of expected fatalities inferred by the criterion 
illustrate the measure of doubt in categorising risk in 
simple terms. It can be seen from Figure 3 that the 
estimated societal risks from canvey10, 12,32 exceed the 
limit enclosing the area of "unacceptability". The societal 
risks estimated at Canvey (first reportlO) were initially 
deemed to be intolerable, but after improvements and a less 
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conservative assessment (second report 12) they were deemed 
to be tolerable32. However, as the HSE points out the 
societal risks are only tolerable for the specific 
circumstances relative to Canvey. Figure 3 also details the 
societal risks from a Wharf handling explosives. Although 
the societal risks, when expressed as an FN curve, are 
substantially below those from Canvey they were deemed to 
be intolerable. Thus, it is apparent that although societal 
risks are informative they cannot be easily classified by 
FN curve representation or simply compared one with 
another. Obviously, (in a similar fashion to, and in 
conjunction with individual risks) other factor need to be 
considered and are critical to the acceptability of 
societal risks. 
Estimating individual and societal risks 
part in the quantification of risks. 
quantification does not by itself 
acceptability of risks. There are 
unquantifiable factors such as 
is an important 
However, such 
determine the 
a number of 
a. public aversion to particular risks (e.g. nuclear 
hazards, explosions of plant, etc.), 
b. economic benefits, 
c. political implications (international, national and 
local). 
d. limitations of risk assessments, 
e. nature of hazards. 
However, these factors (a-e) and many 
some means of assessment and judgement. It 
others require 
is apparent that 
these considerations have been assessed to varying degrees, 
otherwise there would be no basis or justification for 
accepting risks shown to be greater than other risks deemed 
unacceptable (when expressed in individual and/or societal 
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terms). The HSE have produced a list of factors32 which are 
useful in determining the acceptability of risks and these 
are reproduced here in Table 3. It is acknowledged by the 
HSE that the list is by no means exhaustive. In addition, 
from their analysis of a number of risk assessment studies, 
it is suggested that numerical weighting of factors is 
futile. This is because the factors tend to vary in their 
relative importance, are of a political nature, depend on 
the decision maker and the specific circumstances of the 
decision. 
From this section it can be concluded that their are no 
hard and fast rules in the judgement of acceptability. It 
is apparent however that quantified risk assessments are an 
important part of the decision process. 
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Table 3: Factors of importance in judging acceptability 
(tolerability) of individual and societal risks 
A: The hazard, the consequential risks and the 
consequential benefits. 
1. The nature of the hazard and the risk it presents to 
the public. 
a. Is it natural or man made ? 
b. Does the hazard arise from a fixed installation or 
a distributed or mobile installation ? Does it 
present different aspects in different situations 
(as with most mobile risks) ? 
c. Does the hazard present a continuous or catastrophic 
risk ? 
d. Can the hazard arise in normal peacetime situations 
or only in war time or other extreme situations ? 
2. The nature of potential effects upon health of the 
public; and the particular qualities of the harm, 
as a factor additional to the numbers that might be 
affected. 
a. How are the victims affected - through injuries, or 
induced disease ? 
b. What is the particular agent of possible death -
impact, blast, fire, drowning, gassing or radiation ? 
c. Timing of harm - immediate or delayed ? 
d. Is the harm likely to be confined to immediate 
locality/spread over a wide region/spread 
internationally ? 
e. Are sectors of the public (e.g. infirm, old, young, 
etc) particularly at risk ? 
f. Is there a possibility of harm to future generations 
(i.e. through genetic effects) ? 
3. Other consequential effects upon the public. 
a. Is there a possibility of interdicting other 
developments, or areas (i.e. Seveso or Chernobyl) ? 
b. Effect upon amenity prior to any accident (including 
manifestation of this in property prices) ? 
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Table 3: continued 
4. Offsetting economic benefits. 
Those exposed: 
a. What proportion get a livelihood from the plant or 
proposed plant ? 
b. What other benefits does the plant provide to the 
exposed community (e.g. support for leisure or 
community facilities, rate income, improvements to 
local amenity, or special prices for local consumers 
etc) ? 
Those not exposed: 
c. Can any judgement be made on the societal or 
economic benefit in general terms of the development 
proposed ? 
B: The nature of the assessment. 
5. The nature, purposes and limitations of the risk 
assessment. 
a. What was its purpose - justification or optimisation, 
conservative or best estimate ? 
b. Uncertainties in predictions of; 
(i) • probabilistic calculations, 
(ii). consequences. 
C: Factors of importance to those generating the risk, 
to government, or to regulators. 
6. Economic factors influencing the occupier/developer/ 
regulatory agency. 
a. The new plant vs. existing plant dimension; is the 
issue in question one of development (extension or 
creation of risk) or control (reduction of existing 
risk) ? 
b. Is what is being proposed an extension to a new 
plant (or housing estate); or a new development on a 
green field site ? 
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Table 3: continued 
c. Questions of reasonable pract~cability; can 
relatively cheap modifications significantly reduce 
the risks ? 
d. Does substantial investment run the risk of being 
written off by disaster ? Is this risk insurable ? 
If not who will bear the cost (company/taxpayers) ? 
7. Matters affecting the interest of the nation as a 
whole; and of local authorities. 
a. The importance to the nation of the project, 
including both economic benefits and other benefits~ 
b. What is the purpose of the installation presenting 
the hazard ? Is it production/distribution of 
essential goods, public utility or private 
manufacturing or service/leisure activity ? 
c. What are the available alternatives and the 
implications ? 
d. What are the constraints arising from past 
decisions ? 
e. How well could the nation, its institutions and its 
services, actually absorb the consequences of any 
really serious event ? 
f. Where national societal risk enters into the 
equation stricter controls upon an industrial 
development may be required than local decision 
makers might themselves wish. A similar factor will 
apply, though in reverse, where a risk which is 
principally local in character is undertaken for a 
national benefit. 
8. Relevant wider political aims of government, local 
government and interest groups. 
a. Political objectives at national and local level. 
b. The influence of organised pressure groups at local, 
national and international level. 
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Table 3: continued 
D: Public attitudes 
9. Dimensions of public concern about the inherent 
aspects of the activity and the consequential risks. 
a. Is it familiar and long established risk or a new 
and/ or dread risk ? Does at least a proportion of 
the public regard the plant as well established and 
secure ? 
b. Is it a voluntary risk ? 
c. Perception of associated benefits. 
d. Irreversibility of possible detriment. 
e. Unpopular associations in the minds of particular 
groups (e.g. "police state" said to be associated 
with "development of the plutonium economy"), or 
more substantial members of the public (an 
association of civil nuclear power with "the bomb" 
may be inferred to be influential in attitudes to 
nuclear power stations) • 
f. Can one be confident that if one has survived one is 
not still at risk as a consequence of the original 
accident ? (Contrast Flixborough and Mexico City 
with Chernobyl and Bhopal) . 
g. Has a similar accident occurred ? In particular, 
has it occurred fairly recently ? 
It will be borne in mind that "public attitudes" are 
rarely if ever homogeneous, and can be influenced in 
regard to any particular risk by factors or 
consequences which lie well beyond it. 
10. Public confidence in authorities; government, 
regulatory authority, plant operators, experts and 
emergency services. 
a. Public decision making process (does the public 
believe that all views have been heard, all 
alternatives have been considered and that the 
government has fairly considered the necessity of 
the proposal) ? 
b. The regulatory process (does the public have 
confidence in the effectiveness and independence of 
regulatory authorities) ? 
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Table 3: continued 
c. Expert advice (does the public have confidence in 
the independence and quality of expert advice) ? 
d. What is known about the quality of the project and 
plant management ? 
e. Ability of emergency and medical services to cope 
with any event, either in the short or long term. 
Source: Qua~ti~~ed risk assessment: Its input to decision 
mak1ng 
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8.5 Risk Assessment Sensitivity 
Results gained from risk assessment techniques are often 
presented in such a way that they appear definitive and 
absolute. It is therefore not surprising that many people 
are unconvinced of the scientific merit and validity of 
risk assessments, even allowing for the persuasive and 
convincing nature of statistics and probabilistic analysis. 
This is because presenting results in absolute terms 
neglects the fact that all risk assessments are subject to 
some error and uncertainty. It is generally agreed that 
most data are subject to uncertainty and therefore very few 
absolute values exist34. In addition, doubts exist as to 
a. the relevance of data, 
b. the accuracy of assumptions, 
c. limitations inherent in risk assessment techniques, 
all of which can affect accuracy and assessment validity. 
It is apparent that all risk assessments need to be 
realistic in approach (i.e. a best-estimate) rather than 
conservative (i.e. err on the side of caution over-
estimate). This is because a policy of conservatism 
throughout an assessment will culminate not only in a 
conservative assessment, but one which may provide 
unrealistic and meaningless results. Paramount to any risk 
assessment study, therefore, is the need to assess and 
acknowledge 
a. sensitivity of results with respect to uncertainties 
in data and assumptions, 
b. relative importance of specific data, assumptions and 
estimates, 
c. limitations of risk assessment techniques. 
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Dunster and Vinck51 indicate a degree of error which can 
be expected from a risk assessment, they state that 
"Uncertainties in estimates of probability .••. by 
factors of less than two or three can hardly be 
expected, and uncertainties by a factor of ten or 
more may occur" 
Assuming that uncertainties in estimated values are as 
pessimistic as those suggested by Dunster and Vinck51, then 
the accumulation of such factors may well lead to results 
which are orders of magnitude above/below reality. It is 
shown here that for only small errors in values, results 
can vary significantly. 
Consider the probability of explosion of an imaginary 
vehicle laden with explosives as a result of crash and 
subsequent fire. The probability of explosion, Px, is given 
by 
Where 
Pa = 
pf = 
Pe = 
pt = 
probability of accident (crash) (10-4) . 
probability of fire given crash (2 X 10-3) 
probability that fire becomes engulfing ( 0. 05) 
probability that engulfing fire is sustained for a 
duration exceeding that which explosive can passively 
withstand (0.8) 
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Hence 
= 
10-4 X 2 X 10-3 X 0.05 X 0.8 
8 X 10-9 
Assuming that the estimated probabilities are no more 
than 10% in error provides a range of Px between 1.17 x 
10-8 and 5.25 x 10-9, a variation of +46% and -34%. In this 
instance it is unlikely that such a large error (i.e. +46% 
or -34%) would occur in practice, the estimated probability 
most likely falling somewhere between 1.17 x 10-8 and 
5.25 x 10-9. However, uncertainties in estimates by factors 
of 2 or more are not uncommon in risk assessment studies. A 
large 
could 
uncertainty in one of the above probabilities 
possibly affect the estimate of explosion by orders 
of magnitude. For example, assuming an error in the 
estimation of engulfment by a factor of 3 (from the data 
given in Chapter 3.0 this is not unreasonable, i.e. a value 
of Pe between 0.017 and 0.15), provides approximately one 
order of magnitude between the lowest and highest estimate 
of explosion (i.e. 3 x 10-8 and 2 x 10-9). 
One view, expressed by Dunster and Vinck51, suggests 
that risk assessment uncertainties ·can be limited, but not 
eliminated, 
judgement. 
by careful analysis and sound 
More precisely, JC Consultancy34 
sensitivity assessment is best served by 
professional 
suggest that 
"An allowance for errors •... incorporated into each 
stage of the analysis [assessment]" 
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The approach suggested above is of some considerable 
merit, although for a number of reasons 
a. lack of data, 
b. relevance of data, 
c. differences of opinion amongst experts/analysts, 
d. time constraints, 
e. cost constraints, 
it is rarely practicable. In cases where such an approach 
is impracticable, for one or more of the above reasons, 
then the best means of assessing sensitivity is by 
discretionary analysis of a number of estimates/data known 
.or thought to be important. This approach is the one most 
favoured by analysts and others involved in risk assessment 
studies. 
The sensitivity of risk assessment techniques themselves 
is dealt with in terms of limitations, and has been 
discussed in Section 8.2. Finally, it should be noted that 
sensitivity is often considered to be a technical or 
mathematical problem. However, it is not uncommon for risk 
assessment sensitivity to be affected by economic and 
socio-political factors. These factors are discussed in 
Section 8.4. 
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8.6 Monitoring Risk: Hazard Warning Structure 
Although risk assessments may suggest a frequency of 
major 
does 
hazard realisation so low as to be negligible, it 
not alter the fact that realisation could occur 
tomorrow. In addition to this, almost all risks are the 
result of a number of events and sub-events, all of which 
are subject to change. Consequently, for risks to remain 
acceptable/tolerable they require a system by which they 
can be continually monitored. Such a system has been 
devised by Lees52 . The system is known as "Hazard Warning 
Structure" and is similar in concept to fault tree 
analysis, in as much that 
a. logic gates are used ("AND" and "OR"), 
b. the hazard is illustrated in such a way that events 
leading to its realisation are clearly shown by a 
formal structure. 
However, unlike fault tree analysis, where it is simply 
shown that a number of lesser events are necessary for the 
occurrence of higher events, hazard warning structure 
incorporates a concept used in pyramid models53 
"that as the severity of an accident 
increases its frequency decreases"52 
[event] 
This concept is commonly illustrated in the form of an 
accident pyramid, such as that given by Heinrich53 and 
shown here in Figure 4. 
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While combining features of both fault tree analysis and 
pyramid models53 hazard warning structure introduces the 
concept of "time relation" between lesser and higher 
events. Thus, as concluded by Lees52 hazard warning 
structure is not only useful in showing that the frequency 
of a major event is low, but also that 
a. the probability is very low that a major event will 
not be preceded by a number of lesser events, 
b. these lesser events serve as warnings from which 
remedial action can be taken to avoid the realisation 
of a major event (higher event) . 
The construction of a hazard warning tree essentially 
consists of identifying event-mitigation pairs and 
arranging these pairs in the form of a "tree". Such 
construction is not an exact science and it is possible to 
derive a number of trees for a particular system. However, 
the exact form of the tree is of minor importance provided 
selected events are observable, and measurable protection 
from escalation is offered by mitigating features. A 
typical hazard warning tree is shown in Figure 5. The top 
event or major accident is shown at level 3 and will only 
occur if there is failure of mitigating features at levels 
1 and 2 (i.e. failure of mitigating feature 1 escalates 
event 1 into event 2 and failure of mitigating feature 2 
escalates event 2 into the top event) . 
Mitigating features 
attenuation factors (>1) 
are expressed in the form of 
or attenuation fractions (<1) . The 
most common means of expression is the attenuation fraction 
which equates to the probability of mitigation failure. 
As the attenuation fraction increases so its escalation 
protection diminishes. Depending on the protection offered 
these fractions are considered as "strong" or "weak". For 
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example, 
considered 
protection 
an attenuation fraction less than 0.1 is usually 
a strong feature providing a good degree of 
from escalation. In comparison, an attenuation· 
fraction above 0.1 tends to be considered as a weak 
feature. 
A number of examples illustrating the application of 
hazard warning structure, with respect to major industrial 
hazards, is given by Lees55,56. However, only one example 
refers to a transit hazard, this being the transport of 
liquefied natural gas by pipeline. Two further examples of 
hazard warning structure application, specific to transit 
hazards, have been given by Davies and Lees17,18, These 
hazard warning trees relate to the transport of military 
explosives by road and rail in the UK. In both the 
assessment of road transit and rail transit, hazard warning 
trees detail separately fire and non-fire incidents. The 
hazard warning trees for the transport of explosives by 
road are reproduced here in Figures 6 and 7. 
It is apparent that strong mitigating features need to 
be consolidated and maintained, since they provide good 
protection against escalation. In comparison, weak 
mitigating features require strengthening, so as to 
increase the assurance that a major event will not occur. 
Both the hazard warning trees shown in Figures 6 and 7 
contain examples of strong and weak mitigating features, 
some of which can be controlled by management policy. The 
principal mitigating features shown by the trees are as 
follows. 
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Mitigating feature Attenuation fraction 
(failure probability) 
Non-exposure of a major target 
Collision with other HGVS 
Insufficient impact stimulus 
Engulfing non-crash fire 
Fire given crash 
0.01 
0.05 
<0.01* 
0.05 
0.02 
* For confidential reasons actual value is not disclosed. 
By far the strongest mitigating feature for non-fire 
incidents is "insufficient impact stimulus". It is 
suggested that this mitigating feature can be strengthened 
further by 
a. stressing the importance of vehicle speeds to drivers 
and crew, 
b. ensuring the enforcement of speed restrictions. 
Limited control is also possible over targ~t exposure, 
thereby strengthening the mitigating feature "non-exposure 
of a major target". This can be done, wherever practicable, 
by re-routing movements so as to avoid high density areas. 
In comparison, it is acknowledged that management have very 
little control over the strongest mitigating feature for 
fire incidents, that of "fire given crash". Similarly, only 
limited control is possible over vehicle engulfment given a 
non-crash fire. However, it is thought that both mitigating 
features, "fire given crash" and "engulfing non-crash fire" 
may benefit from 
a. strict and thorough vehicle maintenance, 
b. crew awareness and competence in first aid fire-
fighting techniques. 
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Figure 4: Accident pyramid 
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n2 
n3 Property damage 
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and 1:100: 500 (Bird and German$"~-) 
Source: Lees52 
Figure 5: A typical hazard warning tree 
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PARTE 
9.0 METHODOLOGY APPLICATION 
Application of the risk assessment methodology developed 
in the preceding chapters is illustrated here for the rail 
transport 
gaps in 
of military explosives (i.e. munitions). Due to 
some of the data a number of simplifying 
assumptions 
results the 
are made. Rather than a series of definitive 
following should be considered as a 
demonstration of methodology application. 
Consider the transport of mass initiating UN hazard 
division 1.1 (HD 1.1) munitions by rail through built-up 
areas (BUAs) in Great Britain. Munitions are conveyed in 
dedicated freight wagons by electric or diesel locomotives. 
Typical freight trains (FTs) conveying munitions consist of 
20 wagons of which no more than 4 are laden with 
explosives1 . Average net explosives quantity (NEQ) per 
wagon of HD 1.1 explosives approximates to 0.8 te. 
Distribution of wagon loads for HD 1.1 munitions is shown 
in Table 1. One half of all loaded movements involve HD 1.1 
explosives. Loaded movements account for 0.5 million km; 
10% of this distance is on track passing through built-up 
areas. 
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Table l: Distribution of wagon loads: HD 1.1 munitions 
Size of Mid-Range Proportion of 
range (NEQ) value (NEQ) all loads 
te te % 
0 - 0.10 0.05 33 
0.10 - 0.25 0.18 10 
0.25 - 0.50 0.38 5 
0.50 1.00 0.75 11 
1. 00 - 2.00 1.50 35 
2.00 3. 00 2.50 6 
Note: 
a. Data are based on a survey conducted by the author of 
rail movements from CAD Longtown between November 1987 
and October 1988. 
Source: Central Ammunition Depot2 
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9.1 Rail Transport: Non-Fire Incidents 
9.1.1 Identification of accidents liable to cause 
explosion 
The simulation approach adopted for the assessment of 
road vehicle collisions, and detailed in Chapter 6, Section 
6.5.1, suffers from a number of impediments when applied to 
train collisions. The reasons for this are discussed in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1. As a consequence of this, train 
accidents liable to cause initiation of explosives are 
identified and quantified here from data collated on train 
accidents, detailed in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Only those accidents resulting in casualties and/or 
extensive damage are likely to incur stimuli having 
initiation potential. In addition, it is assumed that of 
those accidents only those possessing initial closing 
speeds above 35 m/s are likely to cause initiation. 
Accidents liable to incur sufficient impact stimuli have 
been previously identified in Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1 as 
a. high speed collisions between rolling stock, 
b. high speed collisions between trains· and 
vehicles at level crossings, 
road 
c. high 
d. high 
speed collisions of trains with massive objects, 
speed collisions/derailments causing wagons to 
fall from bridges/viaducts onto hard surfaces. 
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9.1.2 Frequency of accidents 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4.1, there is no 
evidence to suggest that FTs conveying hazardous goods are 
less likely to be involved in accidents than FTs conveying 
non-hazardous goods. As a consequence of this, regardless 
of load conveyed it is assumed that all FTs have identical 
accident rates. 
The proportion of FT accidents that occur in BUAs is not 
known. Therefore, due to lack of suitable data it is 
assumed that the likelihood of FT accidents is independent 
of location. Thus, FT accidents per unit distance are the 
same in BUAs as in non-BUAs (i.e. 10% of travel distance 
occurs on track passing through BUAs, therefore, 10% of 
accidents occur in BUAs) . 
Freight trains travelled a total of 54 x 106 km on 
British railways during 1986 and were involved in 113 
collisions. Of the 113 FT collisions 19 involved other 
rolling stock. It is assumed here that 1986 was a typical 
year for FT accidents between 1980 and 1989 (there is no 
evidence to suggest otherwise) . 
The frequency of accidents can be expressed per unit 
distance or per unit time. Hence 
Frequency (accidents/km) of FT collisions with rolling 
stock in BUAs 
= 19 I 54 X 106 
= 3.52 x 10-7 accidents/km 
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Loaded movements for FTs conveying military explosives 
(CME) equals 0.5 x 106 km. 
10% of distance is covered on track passing through BUAs. 
Frequency (accidents/year) of FT (CME) collisions with 
rolling stock in BUAs 
= 3.52 X 10-? X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 
= 0.018 accidents/year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 0.018 FT (CME) 
collisions with rolling stock per year in BUAs. 
A total of 6 FT collisions occurred on level crossings3 
during 1986. The number of such collisions involving road 
vehicles is not known. However, it is argued in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.1.1, that approximately half of all level 
crossing collisions involve road vehicles. Similarly, it is 
not known how many of these collisions occur in BUAs. 
However, the vast majority of level crossings are protected 
in BUAs and therefore it is thought that no more than a 
third of BUA collisions involve road vehicles. 
Frequency (accidents/km) of FT collisions with 
vehicles on level crossings in BUAs 
= (6 X 0.5 X 0.33) I 54 X 106 
= 1.85 x 10-8 accidents/km 
road 
Frequency (accidents/year) of FT (CME) collisions with road 
vehicles on level crossings in BUAs 
= 1.85 X 10-8 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 
= 9.25 x 10-4 accidents/year 
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Thus, it is estimated that there are 0.001 FT (CME) 
collisions with road vehicles on level crossings per year 
in BUAs. 
Collisions with objects on the track are unlikely to 
cause extensive damage from impact. As noted in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.1.1, most objects lying on track include rail 
debris, animals and objects placed maliciously or 
otherwise. Such objects are of insufficient mass to 
endanger trains or their loads. As a consequence of this, 
initiation from collisions with objects on track is not 
considered further. However, such accidents can cause train 
derailment and subsequent collision with massive objects 
off the track and these collisions are considered here. 
Derailments of FTs on British railways totalled 158 
during 1986. It is not known how many of these resulted in 
subsequent collision with rolling stock or massive objects. 
However, from a study conducted by Taig4 , and detailed in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2, approximately 2.6% and 4% of 
derailments lead to subsequent collision with rolling stock 
and objects off the track respectively. 
Frequency (accidents/km) of FT derailments followed by 
subsequent collision with rolling stock in BUAs 
= (158 I 54 X 106) X 0.026 
= 7.61 x 10-8 accidents/km 
Frequency (accidents/year) of FT (CME) derailments followed 
by subsequent collision with rolling stock in BUAs 
= 7.61 X 10-8 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 
= 3.81 x 10-3 accidents/year 
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Thus, it is estimated that there are 0.004 FT (CME) 
derailments followed by subsequent collision with rolling 
stock per year,in BUAs. 
Frequency (accidents/km) of FT derailments followed by 
subsequent collision with objects off the track in BUAs 
= (158 1 54 x 106> x o:o4 
= 1.17 x 10-7 accidents/km 
Frequency (accidents/year) of FT (CME) derailments followed 
by subsequent collision with objects off the track in BUAs 
= 1.17 X 10-7 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 
= 5.85 x 10-3 accidents/year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 0.006 FT (CME) 
derailments followed by subsequent collision with objects 
off the track per year in BUAs. 
Train derailment may occur whilst a train is passing 
over a bridge. Consequently, wagons have a likelihood of 
falling from bridges onto surfaces below. Railway 
Inspectorate accident reports detail damage and FT speeds. 
Using this information it is estimated here that derailment 
would need to occur at high speed, possibly 70 mph or more, 
for at least one wagon to leave the track with sufficient 
momentum to crash through bridge perimeters and fall onto 
surfaces below. From a study conducted by Taig4, and noted 
in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, approximately 2% of FT 
derailments occur at 70 mph or more. Based on a survey of 
over 1500 km of rail track, Cook and Shears5 indicate that 
1 bridge is encountered every 1.64 km (average). Assuming 
395 
a. the survey is representative of British rail track, 
b. incidence of bridges is the same in BUAs as in non-
BUAs, 
c. likelihood of derailment is the same at any point 
along the track, 
d. average bridge lengthS equals 140 m which equates to 
an exposed bridge length of 70 m (from which wagons 
may fall), 
then the frequency of FT derailments whilst passing over 
bridges followed by at least one wagon falling onto hard 
surfaces below can be calculated as shown. 
Frequency (accidents/km) of FT derailments whilst 
over bridges in BUAs followed by at least one wagon 
onto surfaces below 
= (158 I 54 X 106) X 0.02 X (70 X 10-3 I 1.64) 
= 2.50 x 10-9 accidents/km 
passing 
falling 
Frequency (accidents/year) of FT (CME) derailments whilst 
passing 
falling 
= 2.50 
= 1.25 
over bridges in BUAs followed by at least one wagon 
onto surfaces below 
X 10-9 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 
X 10 - 4 'd I acc1 ents year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 1 x 10-4 FT (CME) 
derailments leading to at least one wagon falling from a 
bridge/viaduct per year in BUAs. 
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9.1.3 Frequency of explosions 
There is a possibility that one rail wagon explosion may 
propagate another rail wagon explosion (virtually 
instantaneously) (i.e. as a result of sympathetic 
explosion/detonation caused by overpressure and/or 
fragmentation). British Rail6 maintain that wherever 
practicable rail wagons containing explosives are not 
marshalled "side-by-side", but are separated throughout the 
train. The Explosives Storage and Transport Committee7 
(ESTC) suggest a sympathetic explosion/detonation distance 
given by the equation 
n = o.ao1/3 
where 
D = distance beyond which sympathetic explosion/detonation 
is not expected to occur (m) 
Q = mass of explosive (kg) 
It should be noted that the equation given above is 
based on overpressure and is used chiefly on insensitive 
munitions, such as general purpose bombs and shells etc .. 
However, for the situation considered here it is thought to 
be a best estimate of sympathetic explosion/detonation. 
Common rail wagons used for the conveyance of munitions, 
detailed in Appendix C, vary in length from 10.2 m to 12.8 
m (over headstocks) (Railfreight wagon designations VAB, 
VBA, VBB and VGA) . Assuming a distance of one typical rail 
wagon (similar to those used for the conveyance of 
explosives) between wagons containing explosives, together 
with an additional distance of no more than 2 m to account 
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for couplings and buffers, then just over 3.5 te (NEQ) of 
explosives have a chance of causing sympathetic 
explosion/detonation. 
i.e. 
10.2 + 2 = o.8o1/3 
lnQ = 3(ln15.25) 
Q = 3.55 te 
Military explosives are also conveyed by short wheelbase 
wagons (SWB) (5.3 m over headstocks). Based on the above 
sympathetic explosion for SWB wagons is possible from 0.73 · 
te (NEQ) of explosives. However, SWB wagons are only used 
by BR on long-established private sidings and depots having 
sharp track curvatures. As a consequence of this, the use 
of such wagons is declining. It is considered that SWB 
wagons are much less likely to move along track in BUAs, 
compared with other common wagons used for explosives 
movements. In addition, SWB wagons have a carrying capacity 
of only 12 te compared with 29.5 te and 29 te for common 
10.2m and 12.8m wagons respectively. The load movement 
survey detailed in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.5, indicates that 
the mean gross weight of typical munitions is between five 
and six times its NEQ. For a typical NEQ of 2 te this 
suggests that a gross weight of 12 te is not uncommon. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the greater NEQ 
loads are conveyed in the larger rail wagons. Therefore, 
the probability of 0.73 te (NEQ) or more of explosives 
loaded into SWB wagons is much less than that for the 
larger rail wagons. The load movement survey detailed in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.5, reveals that not one wagon issued 
from CAD Longtown between November 1987 and October 1988 
and CAD Kineton between November 1988 and February 1989 was 
laden with 3.5 te (NEQ) or more of explosives. The largest 
recorded load (HD 1.1) in any one rail wagon was no more 
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than about 2.7 te (NEQ). 
From the above, it is considered here that the vast 
majority of wagon loads capable of causing sympathetic 
explosion of other wagon loads are conveyed in 29.5 te and 
29 te capacity rail wagons. Based on a train size of 20 
wagons and at least one wagon (containing non-explosive 
goods) separating explosive laden wagons, and as a 
consequence of the fact that average wagon loads consist of 
0.8 te (NEQ) of explosives and rarely exceed 2.5 te 
(NEQ), sympathetic explosion is not considered further. It 
should be noted that neglecting sympathetic explosion does 
not greatly affect calculated risk values. However, the 
affect of sympathetic explosion on individual and societal 
risks is detailed in Section 9.5.4. 
Wagon exposure is dependent on a number of factors such 
as accident type and position in train. However, wagons are 
not marshalled together and therefore wagons are unlikely 
to experience identical accident environments. As a 
consequence of this, and in the absence of the risk of 
sympathetic explosion, it is assumed here that only one 
munitions wagon explodes per explosion incident. 
Freight train accident speeds are detailed in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3. Unfortunately, the data collected do not 
discriminate between collision types and are thought to be 
a biased sample. The reasons for this are discussed in 
Section 4.3. It is sensible to assume that the closing 
speed of head-on collisions will tend to be greater than 
for other collision types. However, the data do not 
convincingly support this. It is important to note that 
even with sufficient data to distinguish between collision 
types the probability value derived below would not alter 
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the explosion estimates significantly. 
From the FT closing speed distribution given in Chapter 
4, Section 4.3, the probability that an FT collides (with 
other rolling stock) at a combined impact speed of 78 mph 
or more (i.e. 35 m/s, minimum speed to cause impact 
initiation) is approximately 5 x 10-5 (based on a mean FT 
closing speed of 27 mph) . 
i.e. P [ (x) < X] 
= p [ (78 - 27) < Z) 
13.18 
= P[(3.87) 
= I (3.87) 
""' 
5 X 10-5 
Glancing 
cause only 
about 25% 
< Z] 
collisions with rolling stock, in the main, 
minor train damage (although they account for 
of all FT collisions4) . 
Frequency (accidents/km) of FT glancing collisions with 
rolling stock in BUAs 
= 3.52 X 10-7 X 0.25 
= 8.80 x 10-8 accidents/km 
Frequency (accidents/year) of FT (CME) glancing collisions 
with rolling stock in BUAs 
= 8.80 X 10-8 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 
= 4.4 X 10-3 accidents/year 
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The frequency of glancing collisions are given above for 
completeness only. Compared with other collision types they 
are extremely unlikely to introduce stimuli capable of 
initiating munitions. The minor nature of glancing 
collisions is supported by a number of FT reports studied 
by the author. Consequently, FT glancing collisions are 
excluded from the following explosion estimates. 
One half of all loaded movements involve HD 1.1 munitions. 
Hence 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
collisions with rolling stock in BUAs 
= (0.018 - 4.4 X 10-3) X 5.0 X 10-5 X 0.5 
= 3.40 x 10-7 explosions/year 
From the level crossing accidents recorded in the 
freight train accident (FTA) survey and detailed in Chapter 
4, Section 4.2, it is apparent that a small proportion of 
level crossing accidents have the potential to cause 
extensive train damage. It follows that such accidents may 
introduce stimuli capable of initiating military 
explosives. No data are known to be available which would 
help quantify level crossing accidents by their severity 
and hence initiation potential. Therefore,· it is assumed 
here that all level crossing accidents with road vehicles 
which occur at 35 m/s or more are capable of initiating 
munitions. In addition, it is assumed that the probability 
of such accidents occurring at 35 m/s or more is the same 
as that estimated for collisions between rolling stock. 
A significant proportion of level crossing accidents 
involve road vehicles impacting trains rather than trains 
impacting road vehiclesB (22%) • From data obtained through 
the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory9, 
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regarding 
supplied 
HGV impact speeds, 
by the Transport and 
together with information 
Road Research Laboratory10, 
it is concluded that the proportion of road vehicle impacts 
at 35 m/s or more in BUAs is no more than about 5 x 10-5 
(by coincidence this value is the same as that estimated 
for train impacts at 35 m/s). 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
collisions with road vehicles on level crossings in BUAs 
= 9.25 X 10-4 X 5.0 X 10-5 X 0.5 
= 2.31 x 10-8 explosions/year 
As with rolling stock collisions it is assumed here that 
only FT derailments which result in subsequent collision 
·with rolling stock or massive objects at 35 m/s or more 
are capable of initiating military explosives. For a 
rolling stock collision the probability that it occurs at 
35 m/s or more has been estimated previously as 5 x 10-5. 
It is considered here that this value is a good estimate 
for all train collisions at 35 m/s or more. 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
derailment and subsequent collision with rolling stock in 
BUAs 
= 3.81 X 10-3 X 5.0 X 10-5 X 0.5 
= 9.53 X 10 - 8 1 . I exp os~ons year 
The likelihood of FT collision following derailment 
whilst the derailed FT is still moving is considered here 
to be so small it can be neglected (accounting for such 
collisions would have negligible effect on the explosion 
estimates given below). 
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From a survey of FT derailments conducted by Taig4 it is 
considered here that about 2% of FT derailments occur at 35 
m/s or more. However, for impacts to occur with objects off 
the track, at 35 m/s or more, it is suggested that 
derailment would need to occur at speeds well over 40 m/s. 
Obtainable speeds of FTs are considered here to be no more 
than 100 mph (at the most extreme) . It is estimated that 
about 0.1% of FT derailments occur at 40 m/s or more. The 
probability of hitting a massive object is thought to be 
very small. Assuming a typical journey of 350 km, no more 
than about 5 km over which there are objects off the track 
(presenting a potential collision accident), and of these 
only 20% massive, then the probability of hitting a massive 
object for the constraints given here is estimated as 3 x 
10-3. 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
derailment and subsequent collision with massive objects 
off the track in BUAs 
= 5.85 X lQ-3 X 0.001 X 3.0 X 10-3 X 0.5 
= 8.78 x 10-9 explosions/year 
For initiation to occur from FT derailment and 
subsequent wagon impact, as a result of falling from 
bridges, a bridge height in excess of 60 m is required (for 
a terminal wagon impact speed of 35 m/s or more) • From a 
survey of over 1500 km of trackS no bridge was recorded as 
exceeding 50 m (at its highest point). As a consequence of 
this, and in addition to the small proportion of exposed 
bridge length at maximum height, and the fact that not all 
impacted surfaces will be hard and "unyielding" (i.e. 
surfaces will include trees, other vegetation, lakes, and 
rivers etc.), explosion as a result of falling from bridges 
is thought to be considerably less than for other causes 
calculated above and therefore is not considered further. 
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Using the explosion frequencies calculated here the 
overall frequency of explosions resulting from non-fire 
incidents can be estimated. 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
non-fire incidents in BUAs 
= 3.40 X 10-? + 2.31 X 10-8 + 9.53 X 10-8 + 8.78 X 10-9 
= 4.67 x 10-7 explosions/year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 5 x 10-7 explosions 
per year as a result of FT non-fire accidents in BUAs. 
9.1.4 Explosion consequences 
The "explosion effects" model developed at Loughborough 
by Withers and Lees 11 and described in Chapter 7, Section 
7.5, is used here to determine individual and societal 
risks. A number of critical assumptions, many of which are 
detailed in preceding chapters, are required so as to 
calculate risk values. 
a. Explosion .is instantaneous, hence no evacuation is 
possiblea. 
b. Average population densityb equals 4000 persons/km2. 
c. Populations are situated on both sides of track (i.e. 
double-sided track) . 
d. Munitions may be transported at any time during the 
day or night, therefore average house occupancy 
equals 2.5 persons per dwellingb. 
e. No route incurs more than 1% of annual traffic 6 • 
f. Large loads are not disproportionally allocated 
among journey routes. 
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g. Average distance travelled through BUAs equals 35 km 
per movement 1 . 
h. Only 1 munitions wagon explodes per incident. 
Note: 
a. See Chapter 6, Section 6.5.2. 
b. See Chapter 7, Section 7.4. 
It is not known how many movements crew members 
undertake per year. Therefore, a judgement is made here 
that no individual is involved in more than 2% of all 
annual movementsl,6, 12 . The probability of death resulting 
from an event is taken as unity. 
Individual exposure 
Probability of death 
= 0.02 
= 1.0 
Frequency of explosion = 4.67 x 10-7 
Hence 
Individual risk (FT crew) 
= 0.02 X 4.67 X lQ-7 
= 9.34 x 10-9 deaths/year 
explosions/year 
This is the risk to an individual member from a "pool" 
of train crew used in a single year. The number of deaths 
expected from the "pool" assuming that there are 2 crew 
members per movement is estimated as 9.34 x 10-7 deaths per 
year (i.e. 1 death every 1 million years). This estimate 
assumes that crew members have no possibility of escape 
prior to explosion. Thus, there are 2 crew deaths per 
explosion. 
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Based on an average wagon load of 0.8 te (NEQ), primary 
and secondary death circle radii are 12.8 m and 73 m 
respectively. 
effects" model 
These radii are derived from the "explosion 
detailed in Chapter 7, Section 7.5.2 
(including Figure 8) . 
As outlined in Chapter 7, Section 7.5.2, "primary" 
refers to death by direct effects. The numbers who survive 
within the zone are assumed to be balanced by those who die 
outside. Similarly 
which dwellings are 
of people killed 
dwellings) . 
"secondary" refers to a zone within 
made uninhabitable, and only a fraction 
(1 death for every 10 uninhabitable 
From the "explosion effects" model an effective or 
equivalent death circle radius can be identified. In this 
case the effective death circle radius approximates to 14 
m, as shown below. 
Note: 
a. Although FTs conveying explosives pass through BUAs it 
is thought that very few people actually reside within 
20 to 30 metres of rail track. Accounting for the 
distance between track and inhabitable dwellings 
effectively 
reduces the 
eliminates deaths from primary 
number of expected deaths 
secondary death circle. 
Hence 
Secondary area 
= it X 0.0732 
= ~ 0. 017 km2 
406 
causes 
within 
and 
the 
Secondary area (void of dwellings) 
= .# X 0.0252 
= 1.96 x 10-3 km2 
Number of dwellings in secondary area 
= (population density/house occupancy) x area 
= (4000/2 .5) X (0, 017 - 1. 96 X 10-3) 
= 24.1 dwellings 
Number of secondary deaths 
= number of dwellings x deaths per dwelling 
= 24.1 X 0.1 
= 2.41 deaths 
Total number of deaths 
= 2.41 deaths 
From the total number of deaths an effective death 
circle radius can be estimated. 
R2 = (2.41) I (4000 X #) 
R = 13.8 m 
Using the effective death circle radius calculated 
above, together with the traffic incurred per route per 
year and the BUR distance per movement, public exposure 
along a typical route can be estimated. 
Proportion of annual traffic = 0.01 
Death circle diameter 
BUR distance per movement 
Hence 
= 27. 6 m 
= 35 km 
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Exposure probability 
= (27.6 I 35 X 103) X 0.01 
= 8.0 x 10-6 
From this estimate individual risk to members of the 
public can be calculated. 
Exposure probability = 8.0 X 10-6 
Frequency of explosion= 4.67 x 10-7 
Hence 
Individual risk (members of the public) 
= 4.67 X 10-7 X 8.0 X 10-6 
= 3.74 x 10-12 deaths/year 
explosions/year 
Societal risks from non-fire incidents are derived from 
the "explosion effects" model11 and detailed here in Table 
2 and Figure 1. 
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Table 2: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (HD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Rail Transport: 
- Non-fire Incidents 
Mass of .Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
2.50 0.28 X 10-7 5.62 0.28 X 10-7 
1.50 1. 64 3.34 1. 92 
0.75 0.51 1.54 2.43 
0.38 0.23 0.60 2.66 
0.18 0.47 0.09 3.13 
0.05 1.54 X 10-7 -- 4.67 X 10-7 
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Figure 1: Fatality distribution (FN) curve for explosion 
of a munitions wagon in a built-up area: 
Rail transport: - Non-Fire Incidents 
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9.2 Rail Transport: Fire Incidents 
The vast majority of explosives are sensitive to thermal 
stimuli. It is assumed here that all military explosives 
transported by rail are sensitive to thermal initiation. 
Suitable thermal . initiation sources are absent in the 
normal transport environment. However, engulfing and 
sustained fires, as a result of accidents and faults, can 
cause initiation. 
9.2.1 Identification of fires liable to cause explosion 
In a similar fashion to the treatment of non-fire 
rail incidents, it is considered here that only those fires 
which result in casualties and/or extensive damage are 
likely to cause wagon fires capable of initiating military 
explosives. From the freight train accident (FTA) survey, 
conducted by the author and detailed in Chapter 4, Section 
4.2, both crash and non-crash wagon fires 
potentially engulfing and sustainable, 
liable to cause initiation of munitions. 
are identified as 
and therefore, 
Explosives cannot be conveyed with flammable liquids 
having flash points below 21°C. These liquids are classed 
as highly flammable liquids by British Rail and include 
most dimethyl solutions, acetones and petroleum fuels. 
However, explosives can be conveyed with flammable liquids 
55 ct. provided their flash points are between 21ct and 
Flammable liquids within this category (British Rail class 
3b) include some petroleum fuels, alcohol solutions and 
common liquids such as kerosene (paraffin). The author has 
been unable to obtain actual data on the proportion of rail 
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movements that involve both military explosives and 
flammable liquids. It is estimated from discussions with 
British Rail 1 that no more than about 60 movements out of a 
total of between 10000 and 11000 movements (per four weeks) 
have the possibility of conveying explosives and 
liquids (i.e. a mixture of class 1 and class 
flammable 
3b goods) . 
Therefore, the proportion of movements involving military 
explosives and flammable goods is thought here to be very 
small (much less than 0.5%) and British Rail 1 consider such 
traffic movements to be extremely unlikely. As a 
consequence of this, fires caused by the ignition of 
flammable liquids are not considered further. It is 
suggested that neglecting fires caused by flammable liquids 
. will not greatly affect the risk values calculated here. 
Fires occurring in locomotives are unlikely to spread 
beyond themselves or the immediate barrier wagon. Thus, 
locomotive fires as a source of wagon engulfment are also 
ignored. 
Potential Incidents 
a. Fires not associated with running-line accidents, 
causing casualties ·and/or extensive damage, resulting 
from, or leading to, sustained wagon engulfment. 
c. Severe collisions and derailments, causing casualties 
and/or extensive damage, resulting from, or leading 
to, sustained wagon engulfment. 
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9.2.2 Frequency of fires 
During 1986 a total of 53 FT fires occurred on British 
railways8, It is not known how many of these fires occurred 
on track passing through BUAs. However, it is argued in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3, that about 17% of FT fires occur 
on track in BUAs. Assuming 1986 to be a typical year for FT 
fires on British railways (there is no evidence to 
otherwise), and from the fact that FTs travelled 
suggest 
54 X 106 
km during 1986, 10% of which was on track in BUAs, then 
Frequency (fires/year) of FT fires in BUAs 
= 53 X 0.17 
= 9.01 fires/year 
The frequency of accidents can be expressed per unit 
time and per unit distance. Hence 
Frequency (fires/km) of FT fires in BUAs 
= 9.01 I (54 X 106 X 0.1) 
= 1.67 x 10-6 fires/km 
The above fire rate only applies to FT non-crash fires. 
This is a direct result of the way in which fires are 
recorded and classified by the Railway Inspectorate. Fires 
tend to be secondary features when classifying accidents. 
For example, collisions or derailments accompanied by 
subsequent fire are simply classed as collision or 
derailment accidents (for further details refer to Chapter 
4, Section 4.1.3). 
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As noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3, only about 18% of 
fires occur in non-powered rolling stock (i.e. wagons, 
etc.), and of these 40% are the result of leaking tank 
wagons laden with flammable liquids. Ignoring locomotive 
fires and FTs conveying tank wagons containing flammable 
liquids (see Section 9.2.1), then 
Frequency (fires/year) of non-crash FT fires in BUAs 
(excluding locomotive fires and FTs conveying flammable 
liquids) 
= 9.01 X 0.18 X 0.6 
= 0.97 fires/year 
Frequency (fires/km) of non-crash FT fires in BUAS 
(excluding locomotive fires and FTs conveying flammable 
liquids) 
= 0.97 I (54 X 106 X 0.1) 
= 1.80 x 10-7 fires/km 
From the FTA survey detailed in Chapter 4, Section 
and from a number of fire reports received through 
Cleveland County Fire Brigadel3 it is apparent that 
few wagon fires are engulfing. The probability that 
4. 2, 
the 
very 
non-
crash train fires lead to wagon engulfment is estimated 
here to be between 0.05 and 0.15. This estimate is based on 
the estimation of the following. 
A- The probability that fire is not detected until 
well established (0. 20 - 0.30). 
B - The probability that fire fighting is not 
undertaken or there is insufficient time to take 
effective action (0. 2 0 - 0.40). 
C - The probability that fire fighting is inadequate in 
preventing wagon engulfment (0.20- 0.40). 
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The figures given above provide a rough guide to the 
probability of wagon engulfment given a wagon fire. A value 
of 0.10 is used henceforth. It can be argued that this 
estimate would be improved by the collection and analysis 
of FT fire data. However, the detail required to calculate 
a better estimate is not recorded in the vast majority of 
Railway Inspectorate accident reports and the author has 
been unable to find other data sources which would be of 
use. 
Assuming that the causes of non-crash FT fires given 
above remain constant regardless of FT location, and that 
the probability of such fires leading to the engulfment of 
at least one wagon is 0.10, then the rate of FT fires 
causing wagon engulfment in BUAs can be estimated. 
Frequency (fires/year) of non-crash FT fires leading to 
wagon engulfment in BUAs 
= 0.97 X 0.10 
= 0.097 fires/year 
Frequency (fires/km) of non-crash FT fires leading to wagon 
engulfment in BUAs 
= 0.097 I (54 X 106 X 0.1) 
= 1.80 x 10-8 
As noted in the FTA survey only two FT crash fire 
reports were identified as not involving flammable liquids. 
Both of these incidents were the result of high speed 
collisions between rolling stock. It is suggested here that 
these incidents are the most likely crash fires to cause 
thermal initiation of explosives. This assumption is based 
on the fact that both incidents caused extensive train 
damage and were serious enough to warrant a public enquiry 
and investigation by the Railway Inspectorate. 
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The author has been unable to 
accidents during the period 1967 to 
identify similar FT 
1984 (i.e. FT crash 
fires resulting from high speed rolling stock collisions), 
therefore it is assumed here that these incidents are the 
total of such accidents during this period. Hence, assuming 
that the likelihood of fire is the same regardless of FT 
location and therefore the FT fire rate per unit distance 
is the same in BUAs as in non-BUAs, and that 
a. FTs travelled an average* of 59.2 x 106 km per year 
(1967 - 1984), 
b. 10% of annual FT travel is through BUAs, 
then the rate of FT crash fires in BUAs, as a result of 
collisions with rolling stock, can be calculated. 
* approximate 10 year average 1975 - 1984 
Frequency (fires/km) of FT crash fires in BUAs as a result 
= 
of rolling stock collisions 
2 I (59.2 X 106 X 18) 
1.88 x 10-9 fires/km = 
Frequency (fires/year) of FT crash fires in BUAs as a 
result of rolling stock collisions 
= 1.88 X 10-9 X 59.2 X 106 X 0.1 
= 0.01 fires/year 
Fires as a result of derailment,· which have the 
potential to cause wagon engulfment and hence initiation of 
explosives, are considered here to be less likely to occur 
than similar fires resulting from collisions with other 
rolling stock. To support this assumption, between 1981 and 
1988 no FT fires were recorded as being the result of 
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a. derailment followed by subsequent collision with 
rolling stockl, 
b. derailment followed by subsequent collision with. 
massive objects1 . 
In addition, during this 
FT derailment alone. 
liquids. 
period only 4 fires were caused by 
These fires involved flammable 
As a consequence of the above, and in the absence of 
further data, only crash fires as a result of high impact 
collisions between rolling stock are calculated here. It is 
assumed that all fires resulting from collisions lead to 
the engulfment of at least one wagon. It is suggested that 
the elimination of other initiation possibilities will not 
greatly affect calculated risk values. 
Hence 
Frequency (fires/km) of FT crash fires leading to wagon 
engulfment in BUAs 
= 1.88 x 10-9 fires/km 
Frequency (fires/year) of FT crash fires leading to wagon 
engulfment in BUAs 
= 0.01 fires/year 
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9.2.3 Frequency of Explosions 
Regardless of fire type no more than 1 munitions wagon 
is engulfed per incident. The probability of wagon exposure 
for both crash and non-crash fires, based on an FT 
conveying 20 wagons of which 4 wagons are laden with 
military explosives, is taken as 0.2. Using the approach 
adopted in Section 9.1.3, sympathetic explosion/detonation 
of other wagon loads can be ignored. The affect of 
sympathetic explosion/detonation on calculated risk values 
is illustrated in Section 9.5.4. 
The majority of munitions wagons are constructed almost 
entirely of wood. As a consequence of this, it is thought 
that the duration of engulfing wagon fires is much greater 
than that needed to cause most explosives to initiate. In 
the absence of data, specific to wagon fires, the 
probability of explosion given an engulfing wagon fire is 
considered here to be unity7 . Now 
loaded FT movements equal 0.5 x 106 km, 
10% of distance is covered on track in BUAs, 
one half of all loaded movements involve HD 1.1 munitions. 
Assuming FT fire rates are the 
conveyed (excluding locomotive 
liquids), then 
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same regardless of load 
fires and flammable 
For Non-Crash Fires 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
non-crash fires in BUAs 
= 1.80 X 10-8 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 X 0.5 X 0.2 
= 9.00 X 10-5 explosions/year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 1 x 10-4 explosions 
per year in BUAs as a result of FT non-crash fires. 
For Crash Fires 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
crash fires in BUAs 
= 1.88 X 10-9 X 0.5 X 106 X 0.1 X 0.5 X 0.2 
= 9.40 x 10-6 explosions/year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 1 x 10-5 explosions 
per year in BUAs as a result of FT crash fires. 
For Both Crash and Non-Crash Fires 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
FT fires in BUAs 
= 9.00 X 10-5 + 9.40 X 10-6 
= 9.94 x 10-5 explosions/year 
Thus, it is estimated that there are 1 x 10-4 explosions 
per year in BUAs as a result of FT fires. 
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9.2.4 Explosion consequences 
The "explosion effects" model 11 developed at 
Loughborough is used here to calculate risk values in a 
similar manner to that detailed in Section 9.1.4. 
Assumptions "b" through to "h" listed in Section 9 .1. 4 are 
also valid for fire incidents. 
As noted in Section 9.1.4, it is not known how many 
movements crew members undertake per year. It is assumed 
that no individual is involved in more than 2% of all 
annual movements. In the absence of data to suggest 
otherwise this assumption is also used here. 
The probability of death from a crash and non-crash fire 
incident is assumed to be 0.2 and 0.1 respectively. Using 
these assumptions individual risk can be calculated. 
For Non-Crash Fires 
Probability of exposure = 
Probability of death = 
Frequency of explosions = 
Hence 
Individual risk (FT crew) 
= 0.02 X 0.1 X 9.0 X 10-5 
= 1.80 x 10-7 deaths/year 
0.02 (particular individual) 
0.1 
9.0 X 10-S explosions/year 
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For Crash Fires 
Probability of exposure = 0.02 (particular individual) 
Probability of death = 0.2 
Frequency of explosions = 9.40 x 10-6 
Hence 
Individual risk (FT crew) 
= 0.02 X 0.2 X 9.40 X 10-6 
= 3.76 x 10-8 deaths/year 
For Both Crash and Non-Crash Fires 
Individual risk 
= 1.80 X 10-? + 3.76 X 10-8 
= 2.18 x 10-7 deaths/year 
explosions/year 
This is the risk to an individual member from a "pool" 
of train crew used in a single year. The number of deaths 
expected from the "pool" is 9.94 x 10-6 deaths per year 
(i.e. 1 death every 100 thousand years). This estimate 
assumes that there are 2 crew members per movement and that 
1 crew member dies for every 10 explosions. Compared with 
non-fire incidents (see Section 9.1.4) it is considered 
that there is a possibility of escape prior to explosion. 
Very few people reside within 20 m to 30 m of rail track. 
Based on an exclusion zone of 25 m, and assuming an average 
wagon load of 0.8 te (NEQ), the probability of individual 
exposure is calculated in Section 9.1.4 as 8 x 10-6. 
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As shown in Chapter 6, Section 6.5.2, it is unlikely 
that the 
explosion 
addition, 
fire services will arrive in time to prevent 
given an explosives laden wagon fire. In 
due to a number of logistical problems evacuation 
is unlikely to occur. Even if evacuation is implemented the 
reduction in exposed individuals is thought to be 
negligible. Hence, evacuation of surrounding populations is 
not considered further. 
For Non-Crash Fires 
Exposure probability = 
Frequency of explosions = 
Hence 
8.0 X 10-6 
9.0 X 10-5 
Individual risk (members of the public) 
= 8.0 X 10-6 X 9.0 X 10-5 
= 7.2 x 10-10 deaths/year 
For Crash Fires 
Exposure probability = 8.0 x 10-6 
F f 1 • 9.4 X 10-6 requency o exp os~ons = 
Hence 
Individual risk (members of the public) 
= 8,0 X 10-6 X 9.4 X 10-6 
= 7.52 x lo-11 deaths/year 
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explosions/year 
explosions/year 
For Both Crash and Non-Crash Fires 
Individual risk (members of the public) 
= 7.2 x 1o-10 + 7.52 x 1o-11 
= 8.0 x 10-10 deaths/year 
Societal risks from crash and non-crash fire incidents 
are derived from the "explosion effects" model and detailed 
here in Tables 3,4 and 5, and Figures 2 and 3. 
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Table 3: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (HD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Rail Transport: 
- Non-Crash Fire Incidents 
Mass of Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
2.50 0.54 X 10-5 5.62 0.54 X 10-5 
1.50 3.15 3.34 3.69 
0.75 0.99 1.54 4.68 
0.38 0.45 0.60 5.13 
0.18 0.90 0.09 6.03 
0.05 2.97 x 1o-5 -- 9.00 X 10-5 
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Table 4: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (HD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Rail Transport: 
- Crash Fire Incidents 
Mass of Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
2.50 0.56 X 10-6 5.62 0.56 X 10-6 
1.50 3.30 3.34 3.86 
0.75 1. 03 1.54 4.89 
0.38 0.47 0.60 5.36 
0.18 0.94 0.09 6.30 6 
0.05 3.10 X 10-6 -- 9.40 X 10-
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Table 5: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (HD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Rail Transport: 
- Crash and Non-Crash Fire Incidents 
Mass of Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
2.50 0.60 X 10-5 5. 62 0.60 X 10-5 
1.50 3. 48 3.34 4.08 
0.75 1. 09 1.54 5.17 
0.38 0.50 0.60 5.67 
0.18 0.99 0.09 6.66 
10-s 0.05 3.28 x 10-s -- 9.94 X 
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9.3 Hazard Warning structure 
The basic principles and applications of hazard warning 
structure are discussed in Chapter 8, Section 8.5. Two 
examples of its application are detailed for the road 
transport of military explosives. For completeness, two 
hazard warning trees are detailed here for the transport of 
military explosives by rail. 
Regardless of mode of initiation, a major incident is 
considered to be an incident involving 30 or more 
fatalities. Realisation of a major incident relies upon 
explosion in a built-up area AND exposure of a major 
target. For road incidents the probability of major target 
exposure is given in Section 8.5 as 0.01. It is considered 
here that the probability of major target exposure on the 
railways is less than that on the roads. However, it has 
not 
this 
an 
been possible to find a reliable means of quantifying 
reduction. Therefore, although it is acknowledged as 
upper limit, the same probability of major target 
exposure, as used for road transport is used here for rail 
transport. 
Both the "non-crash fire" and ''crash fire" trees contain 
mitigating features of various strength. As noted in 
Section 8.5, strong mitigation is considered to be inherent 
in those features which have a low probability of failure. 
The dividing line between strong and weak mitigating 
features is taken as 0.1. Management may have some control 
over these features. Operational policy may be exercised to 
consolidate and maintain strong mitigating features while 
strengthening those which appear to be weak. 
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The principal mitigating features illustrated by the 
Hazard Warning Structures detailed here are as follows (see 
Figures 4 and 5. 
Non-exposure of a major target 
Non-exposure of a level crossing 
Insufficient closing speed 
Subsequent collision - rolling stock 
Engulfing non-crash fire 
Significant fire given crash 
Failure probability 
0.010 
0.053 
5.0 X 10-5 
0.026 
0.100 
0.006 
The strongest mitigating feature is related to speed. It 
is considered that this feature can be consolidated by the 
strict enforcement of speed restrictions and the emphasis 
of the dangers of excessive speed. For fire incidents, the 
strongest mitigating feature is "significant fire given 
crash" followed by "engulfing non-crash fire". Management 
can exercise very little control over these features, 
except to ensure thorough wagon maintenance, the awareness 
of train crew to their responsibilities when involved in 
accident/fire situations and the possible selection of 
wagons for fire retardation characteristics. 
Subsequent collision following derailment is a strong 
mitigating feature over which management effectively has no 
control. In comparison, the "non-exposure" mitigating 
features are strong features over which management have 
limited control. Careful selection of movement routes 
minimising the 
together with 
number of major targets and level crossings 
the avoidance of built-up areas where 
practicable, may strengthen "non-exposure" features. 
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• 
Figure 4: Hazard warning tree for a major accident resulting 
from the rail transport of military explosives: 
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9.4 Sensitivity Assessment 
The problems of risk assessment sensitivity and the 
merits of sensitivity assessment are discussed in Chapter 
8, Section 8.4. Most data used in risk assessments are 
subject to 
practicable 
uncertainty. 
to assess 
Unfortunately, 
the effect of 
it 
all 
is rarely 
data or 
combinations of data, and therefore, the assessment of a 
number of important estimates/values is usually adopted. 
This approach is useful for identifying and illustrating 
the relative importance of estimates/values. It 
here to illustrate the relative importance of 
initiation speed, passenger train fatalities, major 
exposure and sympathetic explosion of rail wagons. 
9.4.1 Explosives Vulnerability to Impact 
is used 
impact 
target 
For impact initiated incidents this report assumes that 
a minimum impact of 35 m/s is sufficient to cause munitions 
to initiate. Initiation variability exists and it is 
acknowledged that a small number of munitions initiate at 
impact speeds below 35 m/s. It is shown here that 
substantially increasing impact initiation speed reduces 
the risk values calculated in this chapter by an order of 
magnitude. 
Note 
It would be more usual to reduce impact initiation 
speed. However, due to the scarcity of data and the fact 
that most explosives have impact initiation speeds well 
above 50 m/s the only means of providing a meaningful 
analysis is to increase impact initiation speed. 
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Consider a minimum impact initiation speed of 40 'm/s (90 
mph). Using the method described in Section 9.1.3 the 
probability of FT collisions at 90 mph or more is 
approximately 5 x 10-6. Similarly, for level crossing 
collisions with HGVs and cars; the probability that these 
occur at 90 mph or more is estimated here to be in excess 
of 1 x 10- 6 and 1 x 10-5 respectively. Based on the annual 
number of road vehicle injury accidents an overall value of 
9 x 10-6 is used here for all road vehicles (i.e. vehicles 
involved in 
313,994 and 
injury accidents, 1986 
HGVs/buses/coaches 26,910 
cars/taxis/LGVs 
- taken from Road 
Accidents Great Britain, The Casualty Report 1986 - HMSO) • 
As noted in Section 4.1.3, for impacts to occur with 
objects off the track at 35 m/s or more derailment would 
need to occur at speeds well over 40 m/s. Adopting this 
approach here; for impacts to occur at 40 m/s or more it is 
assumed that derailment would need to occur at 45 m/s or 
more. It is estimated from the survey conducted by Taig4 
that less than 0.01% of FT derailments occur at 45 m/s or 
more. 
Hence 
For collisions 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
collisions with other rolling stock in BUAs 
3.40 X 10- 8 1 ' I = exp os~ons year 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
collisions with road vehicles on level crossings in BUAs 
= 4.20 x 10-9 explosions/year 
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For derailments 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
derailment and subsequent collision with rolling stock in 
BUAs 
= 9.53 X 10-9 explosions/year 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
derailment and subsequent collision with massive objects 
off the track in BUAs 
= 8.78 x 1o-l0 explosions/year 
For both collisions and derailments 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
non-fire incidents in BUAs 
= 3.40 X 10-8 + 4.20 X 10-9 + 9.53 X 10-9 + 8.78 X 10-10 
= 4.90 x 10-8 explosions/year 
From the estimates given above individual and societal 
risks can be calculated. 
Hence 
Individual risk (FT crew) 
= 9.80 x 10-10 deaths/year 
Individual risk 
= 3. 92 x 1o-13 
(members of the public) 
deaths/year 
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Both individual risks and societal risks are reduced by 
an order of magnitude (due to the adoption of the 40 m/s 
minimum impact initiation speed) . Assuming the change in 
risk to be symmetrical (about the minimum impact initiation 
speed, 35 m/s), then for a 5 m/s reduction an· order of 
magnitude increase in individual and societal risk could be 
expected. However, by reference to the impact data detailed 
in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.3, it can be seen that FT closing 
speeds are not evenly distributed about 35 m/s and 
therefore calculated risks are not symmetrically 
distributed about the minimum impact initiation speed. In 
fact using the method described in Section 9.1.3 it can be 
inferred that a reduction in minimum impact initiation 
speed is liable to increase risks by orders of magnitude. 
However, the increased individual risks remain acceptable 
for those working on and living near many chemical plants. 
Similarly, the increased societal risks are unlikely to 
compare unfavourably with the strict Groningen criteria and 
the risks considered by the Advisory Committee on Major 
Hazards14 not to be "unacceptable". 
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Table 6: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (BD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Adjusted for 
greater impact initiation speed (40 m/s): 
Rail Transport: - Non-fire Incidents 
Mass of Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
2.50 0.29 X 10-8 5.62 o.29 x 10-8 
1.50 1.72 3.34 2.01 
0.75 0.54 1.54 2.55 
0.38 0.24 0.60 2.79 
0.18 0.49 0.09 3.28 
0.05 1. 62 X 10-8 -- 4.90 X 10-8 
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Figure 6: Fatality distribution (FN) curve for explosion of 
a munitions wagon in a built-up area: Adjusted 
for greater impact Initiation speed (40 mjs): 
Rail transport: - Non-Fire Incidents 
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9.4.2 Passenger Train Fatalities 
The risk assessments performed in Sections 9.1 and 9.2 
take no account of fatalities on other trains which may be 
involved in explosion incidents. In particular passenger 
train (PT) fatalities have been ignored. It is obvious that 
the number of expected fatalities from a munitions wagon 
explosion dramatically increases if PTs are involved in 
initiating incidents. This scenario is considered here for 
non-fire initiated explosions. It is shown that a large 
increase in the number of fatalities does not greatly 
increase societal risks. 
Consider an impact initiating collision between an FT 
and a PT in a built-up area, where the PT is carrying 100 
individuals. In addition to exposed members of the "non-
travelling" public the incident causes passengers and train 
crew to be exposed to the effects of explosion. 
Based on lung haemorrhage Eisenberg et a1 15 estimate 
that a blast wave having a peak overpressure of 1.4 bar or 
more will cause 50% fatalities in those exposed. Similarly, 
a blast wave having a peak overpressure of 0.3 bar or more 
will cause 50% serious injuries from flying fragments and 
10% of those injured will suffer fatal wounds. Doubts have 
been expressed over the accuracy of the equations given by 
Eisenberg et al (see Chapter 7.0, Section 7.1, page 262). 
Using the relationship between peak overpressure and 
scaled distance, and from protection, however minimal, 
offered by wagons and wagon furniture etc., it is assumed 
here that no more than approximately 40% of passengers are 
exposed. From these assumptions the number of additional 
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fatalities resulting from explosions involving PTs can be 
estimated. 
For example, consider the above scenario involving the 
explosion of 0.75 te (NEQ) of explosive. 
Number of exposed individuals = 
Probability of death from blast 
40 
= 0.5 
Probability of death from fragments given serious injury 
= 0.5 X 0.1 = 0.05 
Fatality factor = 0.27 (see note) 
Expected number of additional fatalities 
= 40 X ( (0.5 + 0.05) - (0.5 X 0.05)) X 0.27 
= 5.67 deaths 
Total number of expected fatalities 
= 5.67 + 1.54 
= 7.21 deaths 
Note 
The fatality factor is based on the expected reduction 
in deaths with respect to size of explosive consumed. e.g. 
for the maximum mean NEQ of 2.5 te, 5.62 members of the 
"non-travelling" public are expected to die compared with 
1.54 for an NEQ of 0.75 te i.e. a reduction of 73%. 
Table 7 lists the additional and total number of 
expected fatalities for various wagon loads. 
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Freight train collisions with PTs account for only 5.3% 
of all FT collisions with rolling stock. From Sections 9.1 
and 9.2 it can be deduced that such collisions form only a 
small part of the estimated frequency of annual explosions 
in BUAs. The frequency of explosions per year from FT/PT 
collisions in BUAs is 1.80 x 10-8. This compares with 4.49 
x 10-7 explosions per year for all other non-fire initiated 
explosions in BUAs. 
From Table 8 and Figure 7 it can be seen that allowing 
for passenger train fatalities does not greatly increase 
societal risks. 
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Table 7: Expected fatalities as a result of passenger train 
deaths 
Load (NEQ) Additional Total 
te Fatalities Fatalities 
2.50 21.00 26.62 
1.50 12.40 15.74 
0.75 5.67 7.21 
0.38 2.31 2.91 
0.18 0.42 0.51 
0.05 0.12 0.12 
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Table 8: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (HD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Collisions with 
passenger trains: Rail Transport: 
- Non-fire Incidents 
Mass of Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
. 2. 50 0.11 X 10-8 26.62 0.11 X 10-8 
1. 50 0.63 15.74 0.74 
0.75 0.20 7.21 0.94 
0.38 0.09 2. 91 1. 03 
0.18 0.18 0.51 1.21 
0.05 0.59 X 10-8 0.12 1. 80 X 10-8 
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9.4.3 Major Target Exposure: Fatalities at Stations, 
Terminals and Marshalling Yards 
It is shown here that although the numbers of expected 
fatalities increases at stations, terminals and marshalling 
yards (STM), the frequency of explosion is sufficiently low 
as to not greatly alter the significance of perceived 
societal risks. 
Trains conveying explosives are known to 
destination trains and therefore train stops are 
be single 
kept to a 
minimum. Route details are not known and are obviously 
variable. As a consequence of this, it has not been 
possible to determine the proportion of time FTs accumulate 
passing through STM locations. However, it is estimated 
that 17% of FT travel time is spent in BUAs. Using this 
estimate, and assuming that no more than 1% of travel 
distance in BUAs occurs on track in STMs, then at these 
locations the frequency of explosions for fire and non-fire 
initiated causes is estimated to be two orders of magnitude 
less than the frequency of explosions at other BUA 
locations. 
Consider a non-crash fire initiated explosion of a 
munitions wagon at an STM location in a BUA. Applying the 
above assumptions 
Frequency (explosions/year) of FT explosions resulting from 
non-crash fire incidents whilst passing through STMS in 
BUAS 
= 9.00 X 10-5 X 0.01 
= 9.00 X 10-7 explosions/year 
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The number of individuals present at STM locations is 
difficult to estimate with any certainty. It is suggested 
that STM populations may well increase exposed populations 
from as few as 2 individuals to over 100 individuals. As a 
consequence of this the frequency distribution curve shown 
in Figure 8 depicts a range of possible curves for the 
explosion of a munitions wagon. The frequency number (FN) 
curve range is plotted on the same scale as that used in 
Figure 2 (for non-crash fire initiated incidents) so that 
the societal risks can be compared. 
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·Figure 8: Fatality distribution (FN) curve for explosion of 
a munitions wagon at an STM location in a built-up 
area: Rail transport: - Non-crash Fire Incidents 
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9.4.4 Sympathetic explosion 
Trains conveying military explosives typically consist 
of four wagons laden with explosives. In Sections 9.1.3 and 
9.2.3 sympathetic explosion is ignored and it is assumed 
that only one wagon explodes for any given incident. 
However, allowing for sympathetic explosion, so that all 
four wagons explode, does not greatly increase individual 
risks. Furthermore, societal risks are only significantly 
increased for the higher death tolls. These increases in 
risk are shown here for non-crash fire incidents. 
Average wagon load = 0.8 te (NEQ) 
Average four wagon loads = 3.2 te (NEQ) 
Following the same procedure as given in Section 9.1.4, 
then 
Proportion of annual traffic 
Death circle diameter 
BUR distance per movement 
Frequency of explosions 
Exposure probability 
= (0.01 X 60.6) I (35 X 103) 
= 1. 73 X 10-5 
Hence 
= 0.01 
= 60.6 m 
= 35 km 
= 9.0 X 10-5 
Individual risk (members of the public) 
= 1.73 X 10-5 X 9.0 X lQ-5 
= 1.56 x 10-9 deaths/year 
explosions/year 
The individual risk estimated above is similar to the 
individual risk of 7.20 x 10-10 deaths/year for a single 
wagon explosion estimated in Section 9.2.4. 
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From Table 9 and Figure 9, it can be seen that the 
increase in societal risks for a four wagon explosion 
compare favourably with the strict Groningen criteria. 
Compared with a single wagon explosion the risks, although 
greater, are comparable for low death tolls. 
The risk estimates given here are based on the 
sympathetic explosion/detonation equation suggested by the 
ESTC7 and used in this chapter. 
i.e. 
o = o.so113 ....•..... 1 
However, it is thought that for small distances, such as 
those between adjacent wagons (no more than about 2 m), 
sympathetic explosion/detonation will result from loads of 
0.3 te or more7. Based on this assumption the estimated 
increase in individual and societal risks is less than that 
given by equation 1 above. This is because sympathetic 
explosion is only likely from 0.3 te (NEQ) or more of 
explosives. The 
Section 4.5, 
load movement survey detailed in Chapter 4, 
reveals that over 40% of explosive laden 
wagons contain less than 0.3 te (NEQ). 
Thus, it can be concluded that accounting for 
sympathetic explosion (for the munitions train considered 
here) does not greatly increase individual risks although 
for the higher death tolls there is a significant increase 
in societal risks. 
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Table 9: Estimated frequency-size distribution of 
explosions of wagon loads (HD 1.1) in built-up 
areas and resultant fatalities: Adjusted for 
sympathetic explosion: Rail Transport: 
- Non-Crash fire Incidents 
Mass of Frequency Fatalities Frequency 
explosive (point) (cumulative) 
te explosions/year deaths > N/y 
10.00 0.54 x lo-5 18.02 0.54 X 10-5 
6.00 3.15 12.02 3.69 
3.00 0.99 6.50 4.68 
1.52 0.45 3.50 5.13 
o. 72 0.90 1.46 6. 03 ' 
0.20 2.97 X 10-5 0.14 9.oo x lo-5 
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Figure 9: Fatality distribution (FN) ·curve for explosion of 
a munitions wagon in a built-up area: Adjusted for 
sympathetic explosion: Rail transport: 
- Non-Crash Fire Incidents 
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CONCLUSIONS 
10.0 CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that the identification and 
quantification of transient hazards can be dealt with in a 
logical and organised manner through the application of 
quantitative risk assessment. 
The methodology developed here is a useful tool for the 
identification and quantification of transient hazards. 
More specifically, the methodology is particularly useful 
for the assessment of risks from the road and rail 
conveyance of commercial and military explosives. 
General Conclusions and Observations 
Road and rail conveyance can provide accident 
environments having the potential to cause accidental 
initiation of commercial and military explosives. The 
likelihood of explosion is·heavily dependent upon the 
accident and transport environments to which explosives are 
exposed. There have been a number of historical accidents 
involving explosives some of which have led to explosion. 
As a consequence of this, and because accident and 
transport environments are subject to change they need to 
be kept under review. 
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Stimuli most likely to cause accidental initiation of 
commercial and military explosives for both road and rail 
accident environments are fire, particularly non-crash 
fire, and impact. Explosions are much more likely to be 
associated with non-crash fires than crash fires and fire 
incidents than non-fire incidents. This conclusion is based 
on contemporary commercial and military explosives and 
current accident and transport environments. 
Initiation of explosive loads conveyed both commercially 
and militarily by road and rail have the potential to 
damage surrounding environments and cause multiple 
casualties. Surrounding environments may be damaged and 
individuals injured as a result of blast overpressure, 
missile impact and/or thermal radiation. A number of 
techniques and models have been identified which can be 
used to evaluate the consequences of explosion alongside 
roads and rail track. 
Further Work 
Handling operations, such as loading and unloading, are 
not considered, and neither is temporary storage prior to 
handling. Investigation of these areas would complement the 
methodology developed here and enable not only transient 
hazards but also fixed hazards (associated with transport 
operations) to be assessed. 
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Further development of the explosion effects 
detailed in Chapter 7.0, would improve confidence 
estimation of fatalities. Main areas of concern 
model, 
in the 
include 
damage and injury assessment from fragmentation and thermal 
radiation. Of particular interest would be the extension of 
the model to incorporate HO 1.2 and HO 1.3 explosives. 
Finally, the methodology developed here does not 
consider the transport of damaged or deteriorated 
explosives (i.e. "non-Al" explosives). It is known that 
such explosives are conveyed as and when necessary to 
refurbishment establishments and disposal sites. 
Investigation of these movements would add to the overall 
assessment of transient hazards. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE 
ABL Allegancy Ballistics Laboratory 
ACDS 
ADR 
ANFO 
ASI 
BR 
BUA 
BUR 
BMT 
BWU 
CAD 
CIA 
CIM 
CM 
CME 
COT IF 
CPL 
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances 
European Agreement Concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by road 
ammonium nitrate fuel oil 
accident severity index 
British Rail 
built-up area 
built-up road 
blast/missile/thermal (range) 
British weight units 
Central Ammunition Depot 
Chemical Industries Association 
International Convention Concerning the Carriage of 
Goods by Rail 
closing momentum 
conveying military explosives 
Convention Concerning International Rail Transport 
Classification, Packaging and Labelling of 
Dangerous Substances Regulations 1984 
CS closing train speed 
CT closing train tonnage 
DMU diesel multiple unit 
ECP Explosives and Chemical Products Limited 
ECS empty coaching stock 
EEC 
EMU 
ESTC 
European Economic Community 
electric multiple unit 
Explosives, Storage and Transport Committee 
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FL freightliner 
FN frequency-number 
FT freight train 
FTA freight train accident (survey) 
HD hazard division 
HGV heavy goods vehicle 
HMSO Her Majesty's Stationary Office 
HMX cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine 
HSC Health and Safety Commission 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
ICI Imperial Chemical Industries 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
JSODOC Joint Service Ordnance Disposal Operations Centre 
LDG list of dangerous goods 
LGV light goods vehicle 
LPG liquefied petroleum gas 
MC motorcycle 
MIRA Motor Industry Research Association 
MOD 
MPFSL 
MV 
NEQ 
NG 
OCTI 
OECD 
OR 
oss 
OT 
Ministry of Defence 
Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory 
munitions vehicle 
net explosives quantity 
nitroglycerine 
Central Office of International rail Transport 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
operational research 
order of the secretary of state 
overturning 
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P probability 
p 0 peak overpressure 
PAR parcels train 
PC pedal cyclist 
PED 
PETN 
pedestrian 
pentaerythritol tetranitrate 
Pr probit 
PSV public service vehicle 
PT passenger train 
RARDE Royal Armament Research and Development 
Establishment 
RDX cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine 
RI Railway Inspectorate 
RID International Regulations Concerning the carriage 
of Dangerous Goods by Rail 
RLSD 
SRD 
STM 
SVA 
SWB 
TNT 
TRRL 
UKLF 
UN 
X 
Research and Laboratory Services Division of the 
Health and Safety Executive 
Safety and Reliability Directorate 
stations, terminals and marshalling yards 
single vehicle accident 
short wheelbase (wagons) 
trinitrotoluene 
Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
United Kingdom Land Forces 
United Nations 
mean 
standard deviation 
variance 
constant (3.142) 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATIONS AND CONVENTIONS 
GOVERNING THE TRANSPORT OF EXPLOSIVES 
As a consequence of the need to transport explosives, 
and because such materials are of a hazardous nature, the 
conveyance of explosives are regulated throughout the 
industrialised world by regulations aimed at 
a. improving safety during transit, 
b. reducing the frequency of accidents, 
c. limiting the consequences of accidents. 
The first set of regulations governing the conveyance of 
explosives in the United Kingdom (UK) were in the form of 
the 1772 Gunpowder Act. Numerous regulations have since 
been made, the latest being the Conveyance of Explosives by 
Road Regulations 1989. The following sections detail 
briefly the regulations which affect or have some relevance 
on the transport of both military and commercial explosives 
and related goods in the UK. 
European and International Regulations 
International transport regulations have been based on, 
or amended (or are in the process of being amended), so 
that they conform to the recommendations of the United 
Nations (UN) Committee of Experts on the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods. The UN committee, established on 15th 
April 1953, develop recommendatio.ns on the transport, 
classification, labelling and packaging of dangerous goods. 
There are ten current members of the committee; Canada, 
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France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Under the auspices of the UN these 
countries publish joint recommendations in the form of a 
book, entitled the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which is 
commonly known as the "Orange Book". In addition, pressure 
is exerted on other states, regional economic commissions 
and international organisations (e.g. International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO)) to bring existing and proposed 
transport 
thereby 
practices into line with UN recommendations, 
encouraging international conformity on the 
transport of dangerous goods. 
Prior to any recognition of the UN committee the 
transport of dangerous goods by road and rail in Europe was 
governed to a large extent (and still is) by two 
international conventions. 
1. The International Regulations Concerning the Carriage 
of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID), 
2. The European Agreement Concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) . 
The RID regulations are incorporated in Annex I of the 
International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Goods 
by Rail (CIM) • CIM is administered by the Central Office of 
International Rail Transport (OCTI) in Berne, Switzerland. 
In its 1984 version CIM was supplemented by the Convention 
Concerning International Rail Transport (COTIF) • CIM was 
established in 1890 and by the 1950's RID was considered 
the basic source of reference for the transport of 
dangerous goods in Europe. 
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In September 1957 the ADR regulations were formulated by 
a Working Party of the Inland Transport committee under the 
auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe. The 
regulations were published in 1959 supplementing the 
Convention Covering the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road (CMR), adopted in Geneva in 1956. Provisions within 
the agreement were to a large extent based on those 
previously incorporated into RID, thereby ensuring 
conformity between road and rail transport. As a 
consequence of this both RID and ADR contain similar 
information and deal primarily with 
a. general regulations, 
b. listing dangerous substances and articles, 
c. marking and labelling, 
d. packaging, 
e. classification, 
f. loading/unloading 
g. documentation, 
h. safety tests, 
i. vehicle requirements. 
Over the last decade those administering RID and ADR 
have 
More 
seen many amendments to their 
often than not these have been 
original prov~s~ons. 
recommended by the UN 
Committee so as to aid international conformity. However, 
even within the European Economic Community (EEC) most 
member states, although abiding by RID and ADR, have their 
own additional laws, regulations and interpretations of RID 
and ADR. These differences between EEC members (at present) 
prevent not only European harminization of regulations 
governing the transport of hazardous goods but also 
international harminization. For example, the UK is not 
bound (at present) by ADR on the transport of explosives. 
However, UK regulations are based on UN recommendations and 
therefore it is expected in the near future that ADR will 
462 
conform or mirror closely the regulations adopted in the 
UK. Similarly, it is hoped that RID will soon reflect UK 
regulations on the transport of explosives by rail. 
Unite4 King4om Regulations 
In the UK the transport of dangerous goods by road is 
governed by four sets of regulations. The first three refer 
to the transport of dangerous substances in general and the 
fourth the conveyance of explosives. All four are based on 
UN recommendations and are being continually revised so as 
to maintain conformity with ADR to which the UK is a 
signatory. The regulations are essentially 
a. The Dangerous Substances (Conveyance by Road in Road 
Tankers and Tank Containers) Regulations 1981, 
b. The Classification, Packaging and Labelling of 
Dangerous Substances 1984 (CPL), 
c. The Classification and Labelling of Dangerous 
Substances for Conveyance by Road in Road Tankers, 
Tank Containers and Packages 1988,. 
d. The Conveyance of Explosives by Road Regulations 
1989. 
It can be seen that all four regulations are relatively 
recent. Over the last 5 to 10 years the Health and Safety 
Executive/Commission (HSE/HSC), the Explosives Storage and 
Transport Committee (ESTC) and Her Majesty's Explosives 
Inspectorate have been up-dating and amending previous 
regulations and legislation in order to conform with UN 
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recommendations. At present the CPL regulations on having 
adopted UN recommendations find themselves differing with 
ADR on substance classification. The CPL regulations 
include a ninth class, "miscellaneous dangerous 
substances", which cover harmful substances not categorised 
by the existing eight classes. There are also differences 
in the classification of toxicity and flammability. For 
example, 
toxicity 
between 
removed 
the ADR regulations tend not to be as strict on 
as the CPL regulations1 . Other differences exist 
CPL and ADR, but these, it is thought, will be 
with the forthcoming revision of ADR to conform 
with UN recommendations. 
Prior to the introduction 
Explosives by Road Regulations 
governed by Order of the Secretary 
of The Conveyance of 
1989 explosives were 
of State· (OSS 11), dated 
20th September 1924 and made under the Explosives Act 1875. 
Military explosives were (and most remain see below) 
governed by a separate regulation under the direct control 
of the Ministry of Defence (The Conveyance by Road of 
Military Explosives Regulations 1977 No. 888). With the 
introduction of the new regulations both commercial and 
military explosives fall under the same provisions aiding 
conformity (i.e. The Conveyance of Explosives by Road 
Regulations 1989). The new regulations do not, however, 
apply to the UK Armed Forces or visiting Armed Forces, 
although where practicable they are expected to comply with 
the regulations. In comparison, all MOD civilians and 
contractors must conform to the regulations unless exempt 
in writing by the Secretary of State for Defence. 
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The CPL regulations not only apply to the transport of 
dangerous substances by road but also to the transport of 
dangerous substances by rail. However, for commercial 
explosives British Rail have their own regulations. These 
are incorporated into a publication known as the "List of 
Dangerous Goods" (LDG) and more specifically the Byelaws 
Relating to Explosives (1989) • For military explosives, 
conveyance is governed by,Statutory Instrument 1977/BBB, 
"The Conveyance by Rail of Military Explosives Regulations 
1977". British Rail's LDG classifies all dangerous goods in 
accordance with UN recommendations; except LDG has a tenth 
class specifically for the transport of dangerous chemicals 
in small quantities. In comparison, RID has only eight 
classes (similar to ADR) and differences exist (with ~LDG) 
on the categorisation of toxicity. Continual revision of 
RID to incorporate UN recommendations should soon alleviate 
these differences. In addition to the LDG regulations 
British Rail encourage safe practices amongst their 
employees by issuing a working manual to all staff engaged 
in the handling and conveyance of dangerous substances. The 
manual is commonly known as the "Pink Pages" and contains 
pertinent information on classification, lab~lling, 
loading/unloading, marshalling and action to be taken in 
the event of an incident involving dangerous substances (BR 
30054). 
Although to a 
recommendations on 
major difference 
large extent the UK 
the transport of 
exists in the 
complies with UN 
dangerous goods, a 
area of hazard 
identification marking of vehicles and packages. In the UK 
the HAZCHEM system has been adopted. For tanks and tank 
containers orange, white and black placards measuring 400 
mm x 700 mm are affixed to the side and rear of vehicles, 
so that, in the event of an accident at least one placard 
can easily be seen. The scheme was pioneered in Cleveland 
in 1974 and proved extremely useful to the emergency 
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services. Initially HAZCHEM was used voluntarily throughout 
the UK under the auspices of the Chemical Industries 
Association (CIA) until it was finally incorporated as a 
requirement in 1981 under the Dangerous Substances 
Regulations. Information contained on the placards includes 
a. emergency action code, 
b. hazard warning sign, 
c. substance identification number, 
d. contact point for specialist advice, 
e. name of manufacturer or consignor. 
The emergency action code details appropriate measures . 
to be taken, such as, evacuation, the use of breathing 
apparatus and/or special clothing, whereas, the hazard 
warning sign provides a pictorial representation of the 
main hazard associated with each substance. The 
identification number corresponds to the UN numbering 
system aiding rapid and precise substance identification. 
In addition, the contact number(s) and name of the body 
responsible for the load is included so as to aid emergency 
' 
and clear-up operations. A typical HAZCHEM panel for the 
marking of road and rail tankers is shown in Figure 1. 
Marking of packages in the UK is also based on the HAZCHEM 
system, but only the substance identification number and 
hazard warning sign are employed. 
The HAZCHEM scheme has not been adopted in its entirety 
for the transport of commercial or military explosives 
either by road or rail. Due to the need for security road 
vehicle placards only depict information relating to the 
hazard, whereas, rail wagon placards also identify the mass 
of explosives conveyed. At present the placarding of road 
and rail vehicles used to transport explosives in the UK 
differ not only with respect to the information given but 
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also pictorially from the HAZCHEM scheme (and each other) 
(see Figure 2) . 
Unlike the UK most European countries have adopted the 
UN system of marking vehicles and packages to warn of the 
hazards of dangerous substances (see Figure 3). The system 
is known as the Kemler Code and takes the form of two or 
three digits identifying main and subsidiary hazards. At 
present there are no plans to harmonise the two systems, 
although the UK HAZCHEM system has been used to some extent 
in France and Germany. It should be noted, that the Kemler 
Code is a mandatory part of both ADR and RID regulations 
and therefore, must be complied with for all trans-
frontier shipment between the UK and continental Europe. 
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Table 1: List of useful references 
Gunpowder Act 1772 
Explosives Act 1875 (amended 1923) 
Explosives Storage and Transport Committee (formed 
1925) 
Notes on the conveyance by road of military explosives 
regulations (1977 - leaflet 19). 
Notice to crews of road vehicles carrying military 
explosives including ammunition (1984 - leaflet 20). 
Conditions for"the use of freight cOntainers for the 
conveyance of military explosives (1983 - leaflet 21). 
Notice to crews of road vehicles carrying military 
explosives including ammunition (1989 - F MOV 773) • 
Hazardous load warning sheet for road movement of 
explosives (1989 - F MOV 774). 
Health and Safety at Work Act etc. 1974. 
The European Agreement Concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (1990 - ADR) • 
The International Regulations Concerning the Carriage 
of Dangerous Goods by Rail (1990 - RID) • 
Statutory Instrument 1977/888 The Conveyance by 
Road of Military Explosives Regulations 1977. 
Statutory Instrument 1977/889 The Conveyance by 
Rail of Military Explosives Regulations 1977. 
Dangerous Goods by Freight Train and Passenger Train or 
Similar Service BR 22426 (revised) • 
The Dangerous Substances (Conveyance by Road in Road 
Tankers and Tank Containers) Regulations 1981. 
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Table 1: continued 
The Classification and Labelling 
Regulations 1983 (CLER). 
of Explosives 
Working Manual for Rail Staff (1987 - BR 30054). 
The Classification, 
Dangerous Substances 
1988). 
Packaging and Labelling 
1984 (CPL - amendments 1986 
of 
and 
The Classification and Labelling of Dangerous 
Substances for Conveyance by Road in Road Tankers, Tank 
Containers and Packages 1988. 
Recommendations on the Transport of Hazardous Goods 
(United Nations - fifth revised edition 1988) 
The Conveyance of Explosives by Road Regulations 1989. 
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Figure 1: UK hazard warning panel for road tankers, rail 
tank wagons and roadjrail tank containers: 
HAZCHEM system 
a. Hazard warning panel arrangement 
(1) 
(3) 
(2) 
~ 
(4) (5) 
Nota 
a. Space (3) is orange, all other spaces are white. 
b. All boarders and characters are black. 
c. The following information shall be shown on each hazard 
warning panel. 
(1) Emergency action code (HAZCHEM code). The code 
consists of two or three characters. The first 
character (figure) indicates the correct fire-
fighting medium (1-jets, 2-fog, 3-foam, 4-dry 
agent) • The second character (letter) indicates the 
correct emergency response, personal protection and 
whether the substance can be violently reactive 
(P,R,S,T- dilute, W,X,Y,Z- contain, S,T,Y,Z-
breathing apparatus, P,R,W,X- breathing apparatus, 
full body protection and gloves, P,S,W,Y - violently 
reactive, explosive decomposition, ignition of 
flammable gas/vapour, rapid combustion, rapid 
generation of steam, etc). The third character 
(letter) indicates whether evacuation should be 
considered (E- consider evacuation, omission of 
letter- evacuation is not deemed necessary) • 
(2) Substance identification number (SIN) (these are 
listed in the United Nations recommendations on the 
Transport of Hazardous Goods). 
(3) Hazard warning sign (these are listed in the United 
Nations recommendations on the Transport of 
Hazardous Goods but may differ in the UK by national 
legislation) . 
(4) Telephone number or text indicating where specialist 
advice can be obtained at all times whilst the 
substance is being conveyed. 
(5) Name of manufacturer or owner of substance, his 
house symbol or both (otherwise left blank) • 
b. Typical hazard warning panels 
single load 
..: r-:-. __ __! • .____ _____ ~,-----'~---. 
·-
2··Rl .. - - I 1 
2§E 
1090 l 
Ac:11on• 
051-350-4595 
multi-load 
Source: 
2R 
MUlTI-lOAD 
Newtown-on-Moors (0123) 45678 
' • 
THE 
CHEMICAL 
eo 
Guide to the Dangerous Substances Regulations 1981. 
London Fire Brigade. 
Working Manual for Rail Staff (BR 30054) • 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (United 
Nations) . 
Figure 2: E1.1ropean haza.rd warning panel tor road tankers, 
rail tank wagons and road/rail tank containers: 
l<emler code 
a. Hazard warning panel arrangement 
(1) 
(2} 
Nota 
a. Spaces (1) and (2) are white. 
b. All borders and characters are black. 
c. The following information shall be shown on each hazard 
warning panel. 
(1) Hazard identification number (l<emler code). 
(2) Substance identification number (SIN) (these are 
listed in the United Nations recommendations on the 
Transport of Hazardous Goods). 
b. Typical hazard warning panel 
33 
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Figure 3,: tJ1( hazard warning panel for heavy goods vehicles 
conveying commercial/military explosives 
a. hazard divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 
' 
A\ 
'''""' y ', 
' 1.2 E 
b. hazard division 1.4 
> 
,, ...... ~ 
c. hazard division unknown 
Note 
' 
' V 
a. Basic panel colour orange. 
b. All borders, characters and illustrations are black. 
c. One panel affixed each side of vehicle, trailer, semi-
trailer or freight container in which explosives are 
conveyed. 
d. In addition to the placards 
rectangular reflectorised orange 
15 mm black border) affixed to 
vehicle. 
illustrated one blank 
plate (300 mm x 400 mm, 
the front and rear of · 
Figure 4: OK hazard warning panel for freight wagons 
conveyinq commercial and military explosives 
a. commercial 
tlm\M U.l. 
DANGEROUS GOODS 
CLASS 1 
.,.AISHAL IM ACCOAO . UU:I 
\Yiflt lff$TIIUCT:0NS \AIO 
DOWN IN WOUIIfQ hiN'IIU6L 
•o" ..... n.u• 
•• JOOs.tn 
EXPLOSIVES 
.. ,.,. 
NOT TO BE 
LOOSE 
SHUNTED 
. -1f1"nnl • •vwtUI 
b. military (hazard division 1.1) 
•••nsH t.fJI. 
DANGEROUS GOODS 
CLASS 1 
c-,-__ _ 
EXPLOSIVES 
J j JJ 
I0I1I1IIIM!vl 
IMUQUC"I' ~01 
I Mov 154 
MAIISMAL 1111 ACCOIIOAHCt: 
W1TM INrntU~ONS 1,.610 
OOWN 11\1 WQIU:IHG MANUAl. 
0" U .. STAIJ 
,. .... 
NOT TO BE 
LOOSE 
SHUNTED 
c. military (hazard divisions 1.2, 1.3, 1.4) 
uansH RAft. 
DANGEROUS GOODS 
CLASS 1 
.,.,_,._. __ _ 
---
Nota 
EXPLOSIVES 
A I JJ l0l1ll 11.--M,_...,Iol 
IMUOUCT CODI 
a. Basic panel colour white. 
~HA4 ~ACCD~OAHCI 
W11l4 INSTIIUCTIDNS LAID 
DOWN IN W0"11NG .....,.u.&a. 
011 '-"- sr.u• ,.,.., 
NOT TO BE 
LOOSE 
SHUNTED 
b. All borders and characters are black. 
TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS GOODS: THE LEGAL SITUATION 
Anxiety 
with the 
increase 
stemming from the perceived risks associated 
transport of hazardous goods has tended to 
over the last decade in direct relation to the 
increase in the quantities transported. A multitude of 
international organisations have responded to this by 
initiating studies and establishing regulations in order to 
ensure the safe transport of such goods1. However, the 
majority of the work performed by these organisations (i.e. 
Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, OECD 
and !MO). coexists with, or merely forms a component part 
of, existing international regulations (often termed 
conventions), which are themselves affected by national 
laws and legislation. Resulting from the relaxation of 
national boundaries and the introduction of the free 
movement of goods throughout the European Economic 
Community (EEC), effective from 1992, harmonization of the 
laws relating to the transport of hazardous goods have 
taken on a new importance. 
At present most member states of the EEC have adopted 
international conventions covering the transport of 
hazardous goods (as previously discussed). Unfortunately 
individual member states have repealed, altered and/or 
included additional rules over many years causing a jungle 
of rules and amendments specific to each state. As a direct 
result of this it is not surprising that the EEC have a 
major task in finding common ground so that all 13 member 
states can be bound by a single convention. The task is 
hindered in the main by the three systems of law, 
international, national and community law. National laws of 
individual states often contradict and/or prevent the 
formation of community laws and therefore, weaken the 
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communities voice in international circles. In addition, it 
is often difficult to determine current laws in force and 
distinguish between instruments which are binding or merely 
recommendations. Furthermore, laws and recommendations are 
continually being revised and amended adding to the 
confusion already present. 
It is not the intention of this work to discuss in depth 
legislative procedures or the interrelation of 
international, national and community law. This area itself 
has been the subject of many extensive studies. The most 
recent being published in 1987 by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions1 . The· 
book categorises and clearly defines all the legal aspects 
of the transport of dangerous goods throughout the EEC and 
is very informative. Thus, the following sections address 
the obligations and liabilities of consignors and carriers 
without in-depth reference 
legislature. 
to specific laws and 
Obligations associated with the transport of hazardous 
goods 
Legal distinctions regarding the obligations of 
consignors and carriers are found in most of the national 
laws of industrial countries. However, the obligations of 
intermediaries, such as, drivers, businesses undertaking 
storage, loading and packaging are ill defined (with the 
exception of the Federal Republic of Germany), and are 
therefore difficult to interpret clearly due to the complex 
legal systems involved. 
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Obligations of the consignor are in the main based on 
international conventions covering 
laws often 
the transport of 
extend or repeal 
but in general the 
hazardous goods. National 
certain consignor responsibilities, 
following obligations are enforced: 
a. preparation of detailed transport documents, 
including a declaration that all regulations 
applicable to the consignor have been observed, 
b. ensure that packaging, marking and labelling of the 
load meets the regulations concerned, 
c. inform the carrier of the exact contents of the load 
and provide written instructions on the safety 
precautions and measures to be taken in the event of 
an accident. 
In addition to the obligations above, in the UK and most 
the packaging of goods must be European countries 
supervised by the consignor. 
Similarly, obligations conferred on the carrier are 
based on international conventions, modified to varying 
degrees by national law. The main responsibilities of the 
carrier take the form of 
a. 
b. 
an obligation to use transport suitable for the 
conveyance of dangerous goods which comply with 
specific technical requirements, 
be in the possession of a current authorisation or 
operators certificate relevant to the goods being 
transported, 
c. obtain from the conveyer relevant transport 
documents, 
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d. employ only qualified personnel and ensure they 
understand the safety precautions to be taken in the 
event of an accident, 
e. take sufficient measures to ensure that packaging is 
intact and that goods are correctly loaded and 
secured. 
In addition to these obligations, UK carriers must 
possess a current haulage operators certificate and drivers 
must satisfy specific training requirements. A certificate 
of competence detailing the class or classes of hazardous 
goods a driver has been trained with must be held. A 
special licence is also needed for the carriage of goods 
when using heavy goods vehicles in excess of 3.5 te 
(unladen). Training of drivers elsewhere in Europe tends to 
be sparse or practically non-existent, apart from the 
ga1n1ng of a heavy goods vehicle licence. It is apparent 
that safety could be improved by the implementation of 
compulsory vocational courses similar to those used in the 
UK, where drivers of road tankers conveying more than 3000 
litres undergo additional specialised training. Progress is 
currently 
although 
being made in this area by many other 
the majority of the effort appears to 
countries, 
be coming 
from the UK, namely, the Chemical Industries Association 
(CIA) and the Road Transport Industry Training Board. 
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Liabilities associated with the transport of hazardous 
goods 
The liabilities of consignors, carriers and 
intermediaries is extremely difficult to ascertain clearly. 
This is because both transport and environmental law is 
involved together with various legal systems 
(international, national, etc.) which are highly technical 
and constantly being amended. National courts have tried to 
differentiate between contractual relations of the 
transport parties, tortious liability, whereby the 
existence of fault is presumed, and the need to compensate 
third parties regardless of fault. However, such 
differentiation is hard to distinguish. For example, many 
risks are not covered by contracts, fault is often hard to 
proportion and the limit of liability difficult to assess. 
In addition to these problems there is often a thin 
dividing line between the need for a victim to prove fault 
and the need for a defendant to prove that no action by him 
gave rise to damage suffered by the victim. From the points 
raised above it is clear that simplification of the various 
laws in force would improve the present situation, if only 
in clarifying the liabilities of consignors, carriers and 
intermediaries. 
Contractual liability of carriers usually refers to the 
safe passage of goods. If damage to the goods is sustained 
whilst in the care of the carrier then usually the injured 
party can claim compensation without proving fault. The 
carrier may, however, be exempted from making reparation 
for the damage caused if he can prove: 
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a. circumstances were beyond his control, 
b. fault was on the part of the consignor, 
c. orders issued by the consignor or claimant led to the 
damage, 
d. goods were inherently defective causing damage. 
The amount of compensation payable by the carrier is 
limited to the weight and volume of the goods transported, 
unless, the carrier is guilty of wilful or serious 
negligence. In comparison, once the carrier has taken 
responsibility for the goods, the contractual liabilities 
of the consignor are removed. This assumes that the 
consignor has correctly fulfilled his own obligations, as 
previously outlined, otherwise blame maybe attributable to 
the incompetence and/or negligence of the consignor. 
It is generally agreed that the parties involved in the 
transport of dangerous goods should be liable for the 
consequences of failure to competently perform their 
obligations. However, the greatest difficulties arise when 
damage is caused to third parties unconnected with the 
transport contract, such as, the general public and the 
environment. In the UK liability for such damage is based 
on the tort of neglect ·which constitutes a breach of duty 
to ensure an undesired event does not occur. This duty has 
been extended to incorporate the "neighbour" and 
"proximity" principles, whereby, courts proportion blame on 
the fact that there was a duty to third parties and that 
damage was foreseeable. However, compensation is not 
obligatory in all incidents that cause damage. The gravity 
and likelihood of occurrence is often taken into account 
and certain risks considered acceptable if measures to 
avoid their consequences are deemed to be disproportionate 
in terms of cost (with respect to the social benefits 
usually gained) • 
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Generally, the compensation paid to innocent third 
parties by UK courts is very comprehensive. The payment 
usually includes not only direct costs but all indirect 
costs, such as, loss of earnings and mental anguish etc •. 
UK courts have also been known to increase compensation 
excessively as a means of punishing the defendant, although 
in some cases full compensation has not been granted in 
view of the defendants circumstances. Expenses resulting 
from emergency and cleaning operations also qualify for 
compensation provided the measures taken are deemed 
necessary. It should be noted, that if for any reason the 
offender is not known or the damage is not direct and 
identifiable, the victim will (usually) be denied all 
compensation. If the victim dies, direct ascendants, 
descendants or collateral relatives can claim compensation 
on the victims behalf, acting as the deceased dependents. 
Compensation for persons on board the vehicle causing 
damage are covered by the contractual liability of the 
consignor and carrier, together with laws enforced 
internationally and nationally on the obligations of those 
engaged in transport operations. With respect to employees 
of the offending consignor or carrier, provided that they 
are free of any blame, then injuries sustained whilst 
performing their duties can be compensated through 
appropriate unions and legislation on accidents at work. At 
present compensation for environmental damage is much more 
reserved. Such damage affects the whole community and 
therefore usually requires local 
to act on the publics behalf. 
often not forthcoming, courts 
authorities or governments 
However, compensation is 
cite that no specific 
interests are directly affected and therefore, there is no 
case to answer. 
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It is obvious from the points raised above that greater 
clarity and harmonization of laws and conventions would 
help simplify the rules by which obligation and liability 
are assessed. Such action would provide greater legal 
certainty and clearly identify consignor, carrier and 
intermediary responsibilities leading to easier attribution 
and identification of fault. 
Reference 
1. The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions. (1987). 
Transport of Dangerous Goods. 
485 
APPENDIX B: ROAD AND RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES 
Road Accidents: UK 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
12 October 1957 
Early morning 
Five miles from Brecon on the main Brecon to 
Abergavenny road (A40 ?) • 
EXPLOSION, non-crash fire. 
Injuries: Driver and mate were treated for shock. 
Description: A non-crash lorry fire caused the ignition and 
Source: 
explosion of 3.5 tons of "blasting powder 
(TNT)". The lorry was en-route to a mining 
site in Aberdare when the driver stopped the 
vehicle to de-mist the wind screen. Both 
driver and mate smelt burning and decided to 
summon the fire brigade and warn approaching 
traffic. Two cottages suffered roof, wall and 
window damage ("roofs fell-in"). Broken 
windows were reported up to 3 miles away from 
the blast and a crater 15 feet deep and 42 
feet wide was made in the road. Driver and 
mate were 100 yards away when the explosion 
occurred. 
The Times (Sat. Oct. 12 1957). 
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Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
15 September 1981 
Evening/night 
Motorway M4, Berkshire-Hampshire border. 
Non-crash fire 
Description: A commercial HGV in a convoy of 3 HGVs caught 
fire on the M4 motorway. The HGV was laden 
Source: 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
with 20 tons of unprimed USAF "cluster bombs" 
en-route from Barry Docks South Wales to RAF 
Welford in Berkshire. Fire started as a result 
of rear brake drum overheating. Flames were 
seen coming from the rear and underside of the 
lorry. Police, fire brigade and bomb disposal 
experts attended the scene. The fire took 3 
hours to extinguish and a 15 mile stretch of 
motorway was closed for eight hours. The load 
was transferred to another "British Road 
Services" lorry to continue its journey. 
The Times (Wed. Sept. 16, Thur. Sept. 17 and 
Thur. Nov. 5 1981). 
13 December 1982 
A17, Long Sutton (near Spalding), Lincolnshire 
Vehicular collision 
Description: An RAF HGV conveying Martel air-to-surface 
missiles collided with a commercial HGV on the 
A17 at Long Sutton. The load consisted of ten 
missiles each weighing one tonne. No fire or 
explosion accompanied the accident. The area 
was "sealed-off" and traffic diverted. Service 
personnel supervised the transferral of the 
load to another HGV in a 6 hour clear-up 
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_ Source: 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
operation. 
The Times (Tue. Dec. 14 1982). 
22 March 1989 
Explosion between 09.40 and 09.45 
Fengate Industrial Estate, Peterborough. 
EXPLOSION, non-crash fire. 
1 (fireman) 
81 (11 firemen and 70 office and factory 
workers) . 
Description: A 7.5 ton Iveco Ford HGV laden with between 
750 kg and 800 kg of commercial explosives 
caught fire causing its load to ignite and 
consequently explode. The load consisted of 
gelignite (powergel), and up to 750 detonators 
and fuses. The HGV was en-route from Nobels 
Explosives, Lichfield, to Le Maitre, a 
fireworks factory in Cambridge. The HGV 
stopped in the yard of a factory on the 
Fengate Industrial Estate. Smoke and flames 
were seen coming from the rear and underside 
of the vehicle including its rear door. The 
first emergency call was received at 09.36 and 
the first fire appliance arrived 4 minutes 
later. Within about 2 to 4 minutes of 4 fire-
engines, 
arriving 
about 75 
off their 
support vehicles and 50 firemen 
the load exploded. People standing 
yards away were said to be knocked 
feet by a warm blast. A large number 
of detonators were scattered across a wide 
area. Severe damage was caused to 20 
buildings, several fire-engines and about 100 
other vehicles. Buildings up to 300 yards away 
were severely damaged. Nearby walls collapsed, 
and roofs fell-in. Glass, brick and metal 
objects were thrown through the air showering 
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Source: 
surrounding buildings and cars. Secondary 
fires were caused to a number of surrounding 
vehicles. The explosion created a crater 3 
metres across and a little under half a metre 
deep. The dead fireman was only yards away 
from the HGV when the explosion occurred. One 
other firemen was severely 
admitted to intensive care. A 
injured and 
total of 81 
people were injured, injuries to 13 were so 
severe as to warrant a stay in hospital. 
An inquiry into the cause of the incident is 
to be published and made public sometime in 
1990. 
The Daily Telegraph (Thur. Mar. 23, Fri. Mar. 
24 1989), The Times (Thur. Mar. 23, Fri. Mar. 
24 1989) and The Daily Express (Thur. Mar. 23 
1989). 
Road Accidents: Worldwide (excluding OK) 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
4 June 1971 
Waco, Georgia. 
EXPLOSION, crash fire. 
5 
33 
Description: A car collided with a semi-trailer truck 
conveying commercial explosives. Gasoline and 
diesel split onto the road and ignited. Both 
vehicles were engulfed in flames and the load 
exploded. A total of 5 people were killed, 
these included 3 emergency service personnel 
and 2 bystanders. 
Source: National Transportation Safety Board (US) • 
489 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Hazardous materials special 
PB87-917001, NTIS. 
12 June 1983 
investigation. 
Autobahn, near Schweinfurt, West Germany. 
Crash 
Injuries: 2 soldiers 
Description: A United States Army lorry conveying munitions 
Source: 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
overturned in a crash on a West German 
autobahn. The lorry shed its load of 3 Hawk 
missiles (conventionally armed) • Ordnance 
disposal personnel attended the scene. The 
accident was not accompanied by fire or 
explosion but the autobahn was closed for more 
than 4 hours. 
The Times (Sat. Jun. 11 1983). 
1 August 1984 
Denver, Colorado. 
Single vehicle accident 
Description: A semi-trailer truck conveying Navy torpedoes 
Source: 
overturned on an intersection between two 
major interstates near Denver. Diesel fuel 
split onto the highway but did not ignite and 
no explosion occurred. The fire services 
attended the scene. 
National Transportation Safety Board (US) • 
Hazardous materials special 
PB87-917001, NTIS. 
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investigation. 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
10 May 1985 
Bonnieville, Kentucky. 
Crash fire 
Description: A semi-trailer truck conveying military 
explosives collided with a parked car on 
Source: 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
interstate 65 near Bonnieville. The fuel tank 
of the truck ruptured and an estimated 30 US 
gallons spilt onto the road and ignited. The 
load of plastic explosives ignited and burnt 
intensely. The fires services attended the 
scene and extinguished the fire with water. No 
explosion occurred. 
National Transportation Safety Board (US). 
Hazardous materials special 
PB87-917001, NTIS. 
4 August 1985 
03.30 
Checotah, Oklahoma, USA. 
EXPLOSION, crash fire. 
investigation. 
Injuries:· 4 9 
Description: A semi-trailer truck loaded with military 
explosives collided with the rear of a car on 
interstate 40, 1 mile from the centre of 
Checotah. The load consisted of 10 MK84 894 kg 
general purpose bombs (2000 lb.) each filled 
with approximately 430 kg of tritonal. On 
collision the fuel tank of the car ruptured 
spilling diesel onto the road which 
subsequently ignited. Despite 
the truck driver fire quickly 
the car and truck. Police 
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the efforts of 
engulfed both 
received an 
emergency call at 03.34. On arrival at the 
scene the police found both vehicles to be 
engulfed in flames. Three fire-engines were 
present and preparing to withdraw when the 
first of three explosions occurred at 03.45. 
The second explosion occurred shortly after 
04.00 and the third, and most powerful, at 
04.22. The third explosion left a crater 
almost 11 metres across and just over 8 metres 
deep. Firemen over 300 m away were knocked to 
the ground. Damage was caused to residences 
over 1.5 km away. The majority of damage 
consisted of broken windows, damaged roofs, 
door frames collapsed ceilings and weakened 
exterior and interior walls. A nearby school 
(224 m away) was substantially damaged, 22 
homes required major reconstruction and 11 
homes needed re-building. In addition to the 
explosives truck and car a fire-engine was 
completely destroyed. One bomb, 80%-90% burnt-
out, was thrown between 45 m and 55 m. Two 
other bombs were also scattered away from the 
site, a one metre end section was found 
approximately 50 m away. Both the driver and 
passenger of the car suffered injury. The 
passenger being admitted· to hospital for 
second degree burns and abrasions/bruises. The 
driver of the truck was also slightly injured. 
Eight emergency personal were injured, the 
worst suffering face abrasions and a ruptured 
eardrum. In total 49 people were injured, most 
as a result of smoke and tritanol fume 
inhalation. Checotah evacuated its population 
of 5,000 people at 06.00 due to the threat of 
further explosions. The evacuation was 
completed at 07.45 and people were allowed to 
return to their homes at 12.30. Road-side 
492 
Source: 
fires were extinguished by 09.30 and the road 
re-opened 
completed 
at 12.00. Clear-up operations 
on 7th August. 
were 
National Transportation Safety Board (US) • 
Hazardous materials special 
PB87-917001, NTIS. 
investigation. 
Rail Accidents: UK 
Date: 
Time.: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
• 
22 October 1969 
22.18 
Chelmsford Station 
Derailment 
Description: The 8th wagon of a class 6 special FT 
Source: 
conveying military explosives derailed at 45 
mph. The FT consisted of 27 covered wagons 
hauled by a diesel-electric loco. The first 5 
wagons and the last wagon were empty, the 
other 21 were loaded with just over 117 tons 
of ammunition and pyrotechnics. No wagon 
contained more ·than 7 tons. Press reports 
suggested that "mortar bombs" were being 
carried and a track-side transformer was hit. 
Extensive track, signalling and platform 
damage was caused. Both up and down lines were 
blocked. A hot axle box overheated and caught 
fire after derailment. Explosives were removed 
by the Army. Clear-up operations took over 7 
hours. 
Railway Inspectorate report, HMSO. The Times 
(Thur. Oct. 23 and Fri. Oct. 24 1969). 
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Date: 
Ti.me: 
Location: Parkway Station, Stoke Gifford, Bristol. 
Accident: Collision 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
Description: An ammunition laden FT derailed in sidings at 
Parkway Station as a result of being hit by 
another FT. No fire or explosion accompanied 
the accident. The accident caused local 
Source: 
politicians to demand an inquiry. 
station is in a densely populated 
Bristol (nearby housing estate) • 
The Sunday Express (Oct. 1987) 
Parkway 
area of 
Rail Accidents: Worldwide (excludinq UK) 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Accident: 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
Description: 
12 November 1987 
Iri, South Korea. 
EXPLOSION, non-crash fire. 
57 
1300 
A watchman asleep in a freight car knocked 
over a candle igniting surrounding materials. 
The fire spread causing the trains load of 
dynamite to explode. The explosion occurred 
at a crowded station. Ten thousand people were 
made homeless. 
Source: HSE 
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(1) Rigid 2-axle HGV, 5 te NEQ (military) 
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(2) Loading and securing typical palletised munitions. 
lfjt 
R · 
as-+.~ 
(3) Rigid 2-axle HGV, 5 te NEQ (commercial) 
(4) Articulated 4-axle HGV, ISO container, 16 te NEQ (commercial) 
Photographs: Courtesy of Pennine Transport 
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!:" ( 1) 12 te ventilated goods wagon, air braked (military) 
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(2) Unloading palletised munitions. 
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(3) 29.5 te goods wagons, air braked (military/commercial) 
(3) (4) Interior of 29.5 te goods wagon, 
palletised munitions prior to unloading. 

